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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines cultural continuities and changes over time in the education of 
leaders in Iraq (1921-1968) and Japan (1868-1912), in times when both countries 
experienced drastic political and social changes. 
Based on documentary research, the analyses developed in the first narrative, on Japan, 
describe the modernity projects in the Meiji period, the consequences of the 
transformation of Shinto and Bushide , and the new forms of the bureaucracy and the 
education of leaders. The focus is on the changing concepts of merit in Tokugawa and 
Meiji Japan as these were defined in the education system. Similar approaches are 
used in the second narrative on Iraq; the thesis describes the continuing roles of Islam 
and of Arab tribal values as Iraq itself changed. It focuses on the changing concepts of 
merit in Abbasid, Ottoman, monarchical and republican Iraq. 
The education of leaders was shaped by struggles over both state and social modernity, 
renegotiations of cultural traditional values which were based on religious and ethnic 
values and concepts of merit, and the institutionalisation of these values in the 
education systems at the state and social levels. While Japan transformed traditional 
values and concepts of merit by combining them with foreign knowledge, Iraq 
preserved much of its tradition, resisting modern pressures. Modern state and social 
developments in Iraq and Japan have been decisively influenced by cultural traditions 
in political, social, cultural and intellectual contexts. 
New styles of state and cultural leaders emerged, differing in each country. Rapid 
change was instituted in Japan and a new, coherent society was constructed, whereas in 
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Iraq changes were slow and fragmented communities were created. As a consequence, 
the patterns of the education of leaders in the two countries developed different styles 
and different routes with contrasting long-term consequences. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter identifies the main themes of the thesis, its analytical frame, its purpose 
and arguments, and its chapter structure. The thesis offers a comparative interpretation 
of the state modernity projects and the education of leaders in Japan (1868-1912) and 
Iraq (1920-1963) - times when both countries experienced revolutionary political and 
social transitions. 
The thesis pursues two main ideas. Firstly, as each state modernised itself, changes in 
concepts of merit and in what was counted as good knowledge in both Japan and Iraq 
were shaped by renegotiating the previous cultural traditions. Secondly, these changes 
created new styles in the education of leaders. 
The detailed analysis and narrative of the thesis are displayed in three chapters each on 
Japan and Iraq. These chapters investigate the projects for modernising the Japanese 
state in the Meiji period and the Iraqi state in the monarchical and republican periods. 
Thus the main themes are: (1) the role of state modernity projects, which affected the 
education of leaders; (2) the continuities in the changing traditional concepts of merit 
which shaped the different styles of the education of leaders in the modern period; and 
(3) the political and intellectual struggles over the institutionalisation of the redefined 
traditional values in the education of leaders. 
Overall, the thesis asks how cultural traditions were adapted in these societies in times 
of rapid change, how they affected the education of leaders, and how these themes may 
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be understood comparatively. 
However, this perspective on the thesis took a long time to develop. There were shifts 
in my approach, although the sources of my curiosity were constant. They were 
personal. 
Origins of the thesis: personal involvement 
Both of my families, in the two countries, were involved in these historical changes. 
By 1867, my father's family in Japan was in the service of the Tokugawa Yoshikatsu, 
the lord of the Owari domain (now Aichi Prefecture, whose capital is Nagoya).1 After 
the Meiji Renovation in 1868, they were responsible for the establishment of a new 
style of classical Chinese school, the Wag() Shoin, and for maintaining order in the 
Owari fortified town and province, protecting the Bushi families who had suddenly 
lost their positions in society when the domains were abolished. 2 The personal 
relationships between my family, the families of students at the Wago Shoin and the 
Tokugawa family continued through the new shared Owari vision applied in the 
formation of Yakumo, a village in Hokkaido. In order to introduce dairy farming in 
Japan, my great-grand father studied in England. The village rapidly developed, 
adopting the Danish school system and revitalising the Wag6 spirit. 3  Today the 
Yakumo area is still known for dairy farming. 
The professions in the family gradually changed, and became specialised in later 
generations. However, there is a historical link over generations, because the family 
retained a moralistic family discipline (kakun), which was redefined by each 
generation and encouraged the individuals of the family to meet social obligations.4 
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In contrast, in terms of family history, the transformations of individuals, positions, 
experience and occupations were slow in Iraq. Over generations, my Iraqi husband's 
family was a family of tribal sheikhs. In the early twentieth century, my father-in-law 
and his tribal members were heavily involved in the Arab nationalist movement in the 
Diyala governorate.5 After playing a vigorous role as a leader in the 1920 tribal 
movement there, he was the sheikh al masheikh Azza (the chief sheikh of the whole 
tribe of Azza). He was personally involved in the politics of King Faisal's vision,6 but 
he soon resigned as a governor of Khalis and as a member of the Parliament, and chose 
to remain as a sheikh of the tribe. The family legacy of the learning style of the 
traditional diwrin, which he cultivated, continued in the next generation and attracted 
all sorts of visitors to the village. After 1990, the sheikh's main diwein moved to 
Baghdad.'  
His son, my husband, was a state leader until the Saddam regime came into power in 
1979.8 He returned to a tribal sheikh's life in 1981, and devoted himself to creating a 
new style for the traditional Fasl negotiations, and to maintaining peace among the 
tribes through his diwcin.9 The family has learned from their father in particular about 
diwan culture and peace-making between the communities, through Fasl practice as a 
social obligation. Our village, 120 km northeast of Baghdad, has remained a village, 
but the area is changing as a result of the government dam on the Diyala River, which 
is controlled by the military, and more recently, as a result of the 2003 war and its 
aftermath. 
Thus both the Japanese and Iraqi families experienced four generations of the 
modernisation of their country. The Japanese family retained traditional values, but 
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combined them with new knowledge, and continually invented new styles of 
association. In contrast, the Iraqi family retained and continued the traditions within 
the family more strongly than the Japanese family. This was the case in the twentieth 
century, especially in Iraq between two wars (1979-1991) and during the UN economic 
sanctions (1990 to 2004). 
For the last four generations, there have been international and social struggles over the 
renegotiation of traditional values and new knowledge. There have been important 
cultural continuities in the socialisation of the leaders within the families. However, 
the transformations of the education of leaders were different in each family. One of 
my first areas of study was the literature on the education of leaders. 
Existing studies of the comparative education of leaders 
There are studies of the education of elites which refer to the formation of elites and the 
role of state educatton,10 but there are few comparative interpretations of these studies 
of elites. Elites may be defined sociologically as small status groups of privileged 
people who normally exert power and influence over social or political decision-
making. They share cultural aspects of knowledge, legal knowledge, morality, 
ideology and consciousness as members of elite groups, and occupy certain parts of a 
hierarchical social structure. 
Among the few comparative studies of elite formation and education, Rupert 
Wilkinson's classical study of 'The Prefects' described the way in which Victorian 
public school prefects were created and trained to be rulers. Wilkinson's idea, in his 
comparisons with other countries, was that the English public school produced a strong 
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prevailing ethos. One way to identify this ethos is to examine the public school as a 
political institution. Japan and China were used as critical test cases to help understand 
this English experience, because of the sensitivity to deep culture and the highly 
consolidated bureaucratic elites formed in those countries. Although Wilkinson's 
study is Eurocentric in its interpretation of "totalitarian" Japan, "corrupt" Chinese 
bureaucrats and "gentleman" British civil servants, it offers an important comparative 
analysis of the nature of different societies by illuminating the relations between the 
indigenous traditional cultures, their legitimation and the moral order in state 
institutions." 
In contrast, Wright Mills' work was not a comparative study but a detailed analysis of 
power elites, their education and American society. In his account of the education of 
the power elites, Mills emphasised the lack of a truly common elite programme of 
recruitment and training.12  His argument was that behind the decision-makers and 
events of history there are linkages of the major institutions of modern society; the 
typical institutional unit has become enlarged and administrative.13 Mills' detailed 
study of education for the power elites is a useful source for comparison with the 
various elites in modern institutions, and for how a new elite could gain access to 
positions of power in politics, the economy and the military, though each state has 
different ways of unifying these three sets of institutions. 
Like most other scholars, Wilkinson and Mills emphasised the cultural discontinuities 
in political value systems. For them, the dichotomy between the new state elites and 
the disadvantaged citizens was a moral issue. What Wilkinson and Wright Mills 
overlooked in their studies was the exploration of the changing styles of the education 
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of elite leaders. This is one of the areas which I wish to explore. 
In this thesis, leaders are defined as persons, sometimes charismatic persons, who hold 
leadership positions in the state or private institutions, and influence others effectively 
by playing specific roles through their personalities and activities in political or social 
processes. In Japan and Iraq, there were two groups of leaders in addition to those in 
the traditional positions of Emperor or Sultan. First, political figures in the new state, 
military officials and civil servants in the bureaucracy were parts of the state 
leadership. Second, another new group of leaders offered alternative voices to those of 
the first group. In the thesis this group is called 'the cultural leaders'; they will be 
defined in the section on the education of leaders later in this chapter. 
Leadership positions and their associated educational institutions changed in both the 
pre-modern and the modern epochs in Japan and Iraq. In Japan in the Tokugawa 
period (1600-1867), the Emperor (Tenni)), the Shoguns, and Daimya clans took the 
political leadership positions and had their own education. In Iraq in the Abbasid 
period there was an occupational separation between Arab political leaders and Islamic 
leaders. During the Ottoman Empire, the sultans and their courts continued the Islamic 
legacies. In both Japan and Iraq, the education of leaders emphasised morals, martial 
arts and refinement. In modern Meiji Japan as well as modern Iraq, the new civil 
servants and the military officers held state power. Leadership positions in Japanese 
society were found in the private universities led by the cultural leaders. In Iraqi 
society, traditional religious and tribal leaders continued their leadership within their 
own communities. 
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However, such changes are complex. To address them in the two societies in a 
systematic way, this chapter briefly discusses 'modernity' from the perspective of 
Tonnies, moves on to Cowen's transitologies, to three themes from Weber, and offers 
my own core ideas. The next section will discuss these initial theoretical choices. 
Modernity theory 
I began by using versions of modernity theory drawn from the classical western 
sociologists. I worked in particular on Ferdinand TOnnies' concepts of Gemeinschaft 
and Gesellschaft which offered an interpretation of traditional and modern social 
relations. Tonnies traced four themes in the modernisation of society: first, the 
distinction between community and association, second, the sociological displacement 
of community (Gemeinschaft) by non-communal modes of organisation (Gesellschaft), 
third, new knowledge and scientific sociological inquiry as the solution to the 
modernity crisis, and fourth, social change marked by a shift from Gemeinschaft to 
Gesellschaft.14 
However, when I began to construct the thesis, it became clear that Tonnies' modernity 
theory did not apply easily to the two cases of Japan and Iraq. First, Tonnies defined a 
clear difference between Gemeinschaft as "a living organism", and Gesellschaft as "a 
mechanical aggregate and artifact".15 However, the dichotomous definition of two 
types of society does not describe Japan and Iraq well, since both societies were 
characterised by simultaneous interactions of tradition with modernity processes. 
Second, TOnnies explained the sociological displacement of community by non- 
communal modes of organisation, such as law and polity. However, the societies in 
17 
Meiji Japan and Iraq were not modernised by the displacement of old communities but 
by struggles over the institutionalisation of newly defined traditional values practised 
in the old communities. Tonnies overlooked the specific importance of the study of 
groups and individuals who opposed the Gesellschaft type of social system and who 
continuously used traditional Gemeinschaft cultural resources to revitalise individual 
ways of life and identities. 
Third, TOnnies suggested individual intellectual struggles for knowledge and will as 
the solution to the modernity crisis.16 As in the case of the contemporaries of TOnnies, 
intellectuals in Meiji Japan and Iraq searched for a source of identity through a reform 
of knowledge. However, the way in which knowledge was sought and developed in 
Meiji Japan and Iraq was different from what 'ninnies expected. Tonnies assumed a 
positivistic reform of knowledge in Gesellschaft, in a rational and contractual context. 
Fourth, the modernisation of Meiji Japan did not change the society through a 
monolithic and sequential linear shift from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. In his 
analysis, Tonnies overlooked the effectiveness of the old knowledge and values which 
were re-negotiated in the processes of modernisation of the state and the society. 
In the cases of both Japan and Iraq, traditional values and knowledge continued, though 
in ways which were different in each country. The state and leaders in the society of 
Meiji Japan tried to renegotiate old and new foreign knowledge, combined them, and 
institutionalised new knowledge in the new education systems. In Iraq, leaders in the 
society retained old knowledge, and continued their previous practice. 
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Modernities 
The concept of modernity was discussed by philosophers, social and political scientists 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and has continued to be studied by them, as 
well as by historians, anthropologists, psychologists, and educationists. There is much 
literature on the state dimension of modernity.17 
This dimension normally arises from political pressure from the international 
environment, and absorption into the world system and cultural processes. The 
following propositions will help to frame the analysis. In this thesis, projects in the 
state dimension of modernity entail the rational imposition of a vision, and aim at 
changes in the political and social orders, in the mode of being, in existence and 
thoughts; hence these projects entail double modernity processes. They develop: 
(i) to establish the state's central value systems in the context of the destruction, 
recognition or reconstruction of institutions and social stratification systems; 
(ii) to renegotiate cultural traditions and values, the concept of merit and what was 
counted as good knowledge: the redefined culture is used to reinforce a political vision; 
(iii) to legitimate the redefined traditional values in highly centralised symbolic and 
ritual forms; and 
(iv) to institutionalise these values in the state education of leaders. 
In the process of modernising the state, the state education of leaders leads to the 
emergence of new technocratic, civil servants and military officers who give their 
loyalty to the nation-state. 
The dynamism of the projects for state modernity derives from the timing of the 
changes in the social stratification systems and of the emergence of new leaders and 
their education systems, and from the negotiations of the political, social and moral 
orders between the new state leaders and leaders in the society. 
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There is a large literature on the social dimension of modernity.18 In this thesis, social 
modernity has two aspects. First, it is a part of state modernity projects; although it 
normally contains social and cultural elements. This means that social modernity is 
incorporated or integrated into state modernity projects through the state's 
institutionalisation of the redefined traditional values. Changes were particularly 
visible in the case of Abdul Hamid II's Islamic version of social traditions in the later 
Ottoman Empire and in Mustafa Kemal AtatUrk's Turkey, Mao Zedong's China, 
Stalin's Russia and Ayatollah Khomeini's Shi'a version of social tradition. Changes 
were often related to new identities in an affirmation of an ideological collectivity. For 
example, the social dimension of modernity even includes instructions about new 
clothes and personal appearance; hence social modernity involved struggles for each 
individual. Thus state modernity not only includes projects which modernise the state 
itself, but also contains strong social motifs and often alters social and ontological 
experience. 
Secondly, social modernity can also emphasise alternative visions of society to those of 
the state modernity projects. Alternative voices are normally raised by cultural leaders 
to protest against political values and projects, to defend intellectual knowledge as well 
as values based on the life experiences of individuals and groups in the society, and to 
institute redefined traditions and alternative projects. In Meiji Japan, the state projects 
which emphasised defending the Imperial nation-state and revering the Emperor were 
resisted by voices calling for the formation of a democratic and independent Japan. 
These opposition voices expressed alternative visions from those of the cultural leaders. 
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Transitology 
Transitology is a new concept, in the sense that it has only recently been formalised. 
Robert Cowen defines transitologies as social processes "occurring in a short time 
span: operationally ten years" and they are: 
the more or less simultaneous collapse and reconstruction of (i) state 
apparatuses; (ii) social and economic stratification systems; (iii) the central 
value system, especially the political value system, to offer a new definition 
of the future;19 and (iv) political visions of the future in which education is 
given a major symbolic and reconstructionist role in these social processes 
of destroying the past and redefining the future.2°  
This concept of transitology does not only apply to central and eastern Europe in the 
late 1980s. Cowen suggests, for example, that Meiji Japan (1868-1912) was in 
principle a transitology. First, changes in the early Meiji period included new state 
apparatuses. Second, changes in political, economic and social stratification occurred 
simultaneously. Third, a new central value system stressed the formation of a strong 
and rich state. Fourth, in this ideological context, state educational systems were 
rapidly established. These political, social and educational transitions occurred, more 
or less, in a span of ten years with the emergence, growth and maturity of the Meiji 
state.21 
However, the Meiji period is not fully captured by Cowen's concept of transitologies. 
In my view, the political and social changes were not a rapid collapse and equally rapid 
reconstruction, but showed continuous renegotiation of the past. There were cultural 
and moral continuities led by the state and leaders in the society. 
In the main body of the thesis, it will be argued that, in the early Meiji period, political 
and social changes took place through the restoration of Shinto and Bushida The shift 
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was rapid, and new leaders came into power. In the process of the modernisation of the 
state, moral values and knowledge of Shinto and Bushido traditions were legitimised in 
highly centralised symbolic and ritual forms, and in the redefined notions of loyalty 
and filial piety. There were political, social and intellectual struggles. At the same 
time, the Tokugawa legacies of learning networks in the society continued. 
Similarly, Iraq was not a transitology in Cowen's sense. It will be argued that the 
political and social changes and the reconstruction of Iraq were slow, and that 
traditions continued. 
In both countries, changes were indeed seen in the state apparatus, economic and social 
stratification systems, the central value system, the education system, and the 
socialisation of leaders. Overall, however, the more I thought about the two countries, 
the more I became interested in the ways in which political, social and educational 
change occurred through cultural renegotiation, with strong cultural continuities in the 
interactions of state and society. 
I worked in particular on Max Weber's perspectives on rationalisation, Legitimation 
and the education of leaders, because these three themes offered significant 
interpretations of modernisers' struggles over the political, social and educational 
changes. 
Rationalisation of authority and modernity projects 
Weber's concept of the rationalisation of authority involved the rationalisation of state 
authority, of social authority and of individual lives and thought. Rationalisation 
meant the 'disenchantment of the world', expressed mainly in the spread of modern 
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science. 'Disenchantment of the world' meant that magical elements of thought and 
mysterious incalculable powers accepted in previous times were displaced by technical 
performance and calculations. This Weber called `intellectualisation'.22 
The rationalisation of state authority meant that the state's domination of power in the 
society was made acceptable. The state had both legal rational authority. Modern 
bureaucracy was one form of the legitimation of power associated with legal rational 
authority, and affected all aspects of social life. For Weber, the increase of 
bureaucratisation was a powerful manifestation of the historical process of 
rationalisation; the analysis of bureaucracy was a means of illuminating Chinese, 
Indian, and ancient Roman society as well as Europe, and distinguished the modern 
from the medieval Western world as well as from the ancient and Asian worlds. 
Rationalisation involved the development of forms of state and social organisations, 
association and community, which were characterised by the achievement of cultural 
values through systematically calculated means. This rationalisation implied 
interference in all aspects of human life: in diverse cultural and social structures as well 
as in individuals' or groups' values, knowledge, codes and status. It led to the 
absorption of individuals and groups into rational institutions. Rational state projects 
worked for the rationalisation of the value systems of individuals and social 
institutions. Weber called this phenomenon (the rationalisation of values, knowledge 
and authority), the 'fate' of the modern era.23 He argued that an increase of 
irrationality and a loss of ideals and of meaning in existence are the consequences of 
rationalisation.24 The tensions between the modern state and social changes, and the 
development of individuals and that of organisations, were key themes of Weber's 
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sociology. 
In working on this thesis, it was useful to keep in mind how rationalisation affected 
thought, authority and social life through modern state projects, changes in society, 
indigenous values and knowledge, and selection for leadership positions and education. 
Legitimation and modernity projects 
Weber viewed the legitimation of state authority as a part of the rationalisation 
process.25 However, in terms of the social dimension of modernity, the legitimation of 
the state's power was not always accepted by the citizens.26 In Iraq and Japan, there 
were alternative voices against this legitimation of the state's authority. Traditional 
leaders often retained cultural and traditional authority and the value of status, honour 
and trust within their groups, though they were liable to be undermined by the 
rationalisation process of the state. Weber's perspective on the legitimation of 
authority did not allow for these voices of disagreement. 
Thus this thesis first investigates different forms of interaction within particular 
political and social environments and the continuities of cultural processes in the 
educational institutions. The narrative brings out the way in which different political 
and social actors pursued their own agendas with differing results. 
At the end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth centuries, scholars considered 
tradition, charisma or modernity separately. But Weber was trying to think about these 
three phenomena by relating them to each other historically, sociologically and 
imaginatively. In Weber's perspective, religion was described as a form of power and 
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as a legacy of politics, theology and cultural thought.27 In his time, as sociological 
thinking developed, religion, the state and social relations were linked with 
domination, legitimation, and authority. For Weber, the sociological investigation of 
religion was required to understand the meaning of religious phenomena, which 
included the social action of the leaders, and the development of religious ethics and 
ways of intellectual learning. 28 Weber's analytical framing of rationalisation and 
religion is relevant in this thesis, as Shinto in modern Meiji Japan and Islam in Iraq 
were absorbed into the nation state's projects. This meant that the modernisation of the 
state and the society were affected by religious traditions, and in both countries the 
religious roots of identity have oriented the education of leaders at different levels of 
the cultural process. 
The education of leaders 
Weber clarified the notion of the education of leaders in the early twentieth century. 
Modern science had made the world systematically calculable and predictable, and 
created a new world different from the previous non-scientific world of the West.29 
Weber emphasised the development of diplomas from universities and colleges, since 
the creation of educational certificates in all fields made for the formation of a 
privileged stratum in bureaucracies and offices. The most common phenomena were 
the increase of special examination systems and of the trained experts that were 
indispensable for modern bureaucracy.30 All these phenomena were manifestations of 
the rationalisation process. 
Taking education as a crucial element in the 'sociology of authority', Weber defined a 
sequence of three types of authority within specific social relationships. According to 
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his account of the Chinese literati, charisma was replaced by religious tradition in the 
early history of China, and the cultivated Chinese literati were replaced by experts.3I 
Weber's strategic framing of 'the expert and the cultivated' entails sensitivity to 
cultural changes. This contrasting frame enables this thesis to propose a way to think 
about the modernity projects in terms of struggles over the institutionalisation of 
cultural traditions in the education of leaders and of those who aim to modernise the 
state and develop the society. The thesis considers the roles of religious and traditional 
social groups' values and knowledge, the cultural renegotiation of these and the forms 
of the education of leaders at both state and social levels. 
To do this, three types of leaders are considered in this thesis, namely the expert, the 
cultural, and the traditional leaders. The source for this classification is Weber's essay, 
`The Chinese Literati'. 32 The expert as an authority uses knowledge of modern 
techniques and specialised knowledge, and has formal qualifications which identify 
persons for occupations in modern societies and modern bureaucracies. Second, 
cultural leaders use cultivated knowledge, which includes philosophy and access to 
moral principles through it. They emerge with alternative voices to state modernity by 
redefining the values of cultural traditions with new knowledge and debating in public 
their social obligations and a vision of the new society. They do this at a time when 
political and social transitions are in tension. Third, traditional authorities in tribal 
society use especially their knowledge of the moral order and older forms of loyalty 
and obligation. Critical discussions of all three types of leaders will be an integral part 
of this thesis. 
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Overall, Weber's thinking is helpful for the thesis as offering the broadest way to think 
about its themes within the classical sociological perspective. The thesis considers the 
changes in state and society through perspectives on the cultural traditions which were 
renegotiated and institutionalised by leaders at state and social levels in the 
modernisation process. Weber's approach enables me to frame this thesis; it offers a 
context for understanding the narratives in it, and comparing the two societies of Iraq 
and Japan. However, discussions of Weber will not appear in each chapter; the thesis 
will revisit his ideas only in its conclusion. 
The Central Arguments 
The arguments of the thesis cluster round three core ideas: firstly, cultural debate over 
foreign knowledge and indigenous knowledge, and over the Way to Truth and new 
scientific knowledge; secondly, changing concepts of merit, and thirdly cultural 
continuities. 
Cultural debate, the first theme, normally arises from modern pressures, and from 
political, social and intellectual struggles over the impact of foreign knowledge on 
indigenous knowledge, and over the traditional Way to Truth and new scientific or 
pragmatic knowledge. In the process of the debates, different kinds of knowledge and 
values were redefined in the form of combination, absorption, adjustment, interruption, 
preservation, revitalisation or cancellation. These differences and changes were 
discussed in both Japan and Iraq, and the debates could in a loose sense be called, 
`discursive struggles'. 
Thus the thesis attempts to understand the education of leaders through a classical 
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sociological perspective, drawing in particular on Weber's sociological investigation of 
religion and modernity and his analytical framing of rationalisation, legitimation and 
education. It traces political and social changes through perspectives on cultural 
traditions debated and institutionalised by the different types of leaders. However, the 
thesis is concerned with the education of leaders and modernities in two societies, 
those of Iraq and Japan, which Weber did not look at directly. 
Second, the changing concepts of merit in both Japan and Iraq had strong political 
implications and were shaped by renegotiating and institutionalising the previous 
cultural traditions. The changes in the concepts of merit, and the struggle over 
modernity, created new modes of the education of leaders. Merit in Japan and Iraq will 
be seen as having two components, namely philosophical knowledge and practical or 
useful knowledge. The changing concepts of merit in the two countries will be 
identified, in particular by showing how people at various times understood good 
knowledge as the balance between philosophical, practical, useful and moral 
knowledge, and how this knowledge was negotiated and renegotiated over generations. 
The third theme is cultural continuities, and these are found in: (i) the legacies of 
traditional values and merit to modernity; (ii) the changes from foreign to new 
indigenous values and vice versa; (iii) the education of leaders in state and private 
education systems; and (iv) the contexts of transformations in the social stratification 
systems. These four types of cultural continuities are often interrelated. Continuities 
are seen in the outcome of the values and knowledge institutionalised through the 
cultural debates and the struggles over the changing concepts of merit. 
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Based on these three interrelated core ideas, the thesis will first analyse Japan, but will 
later apply the same perspective to the analysis of Iraq. In times of drastic state and 
social changes in Meiji Japan, cultural leaders struggled over the institutionalisation of 
the forms and contents of cultural traditions as well as foreign knowledge; hence they 
established altered religious and moral values derived from the traditional social groups 
in the private universities. 
The concept of merit was changed at state level, and as a reaction to it the cultural 
leaders brought up issues about individual, social and national independence through 
public debate. In contrast, in Iraq, changes in the traditional values and the concept of 
merit at state level retained Ottoman legacies of religious values and leadership. The 
reaction of the cultural leaders to the militaristic state power and projects was to 
confine and develop their traditional values in the education of leaders within their 
communities. 
Overall, this opening chapter proposes, first that, as each state was modernised, the 
cultural traditions were renegotiated and institutionalised in the education of leaders, 
and various styles of education were created; second, that while Japan transformed its 
values and concepts of merit by combining them with foreign knowledge, Iraq 
preserved much of its tradition; third, that rapid change was instituted in Japan whereas 
in Iraq changes were slow. As a consequence, the patterns of the education of leaders 
in the two countries developed different styles which had long-term consequences. 
For this comparative study, research sources in the English, Japanese and Arabic 
languages were sought.33 The approach to the thesis is documentary research, which 
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leads to the detailed narratives. My documentary research uses historical information 
within a broad sociological and comparative perspective 34 
The thesis has not considered Kurdistan, due to its different language, political and 
social experiences and history.35 It was not possible to conduct research in Iraq, due to 
the very delicate political situation. For the investigation of Iraq, given the sociological 
and cultural framework of the research, the documentary work mainly included the 
collection of historical information from some archival research and newspaper 
articles, laws and curricula, personal letters, statements, speeches and official diaries 
and reports. Research was mainly conducted in the British Public Record Office, 
which has a large collection of political and cultural materials, in libraries and cultural 
institutions, and through written enquiries. For political reasons, many sources of Iraq 
are unpublished and kept in private homes or exist as unwritten memories. 
The structure of the thesis 
The thesis will take Shinto and BushidO as the core of the religious and cultural 
traditions in Japan, and as Japanese equivalents to Islam and Arab tribal traditions, in 
particular Fasl practice in Iraq. 
Chapter 1 locates the approach used in the thesis. Japan is analysed in Chapters 2, 3 
and 4. Chapter 2 describes the renegotiation of Shinto and Bushido values, the change 
of the social structure and the modernity crisis in Japan (1868-1912). Chapter 3 
focuses on the changing concepts of merit and of what was counted to be good 
knowledge and leadership, and their institutionalisation in the education system. 
Chapter 4 examines the education of leaders. 
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Iraq is analysed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Chapter 5 describes the ways in which cultural 
traditions, namely Islam and the Arab tribal values, were renegotiated and retained as 
Iraq itself changed (1921-1968). The emphasis is on how social stratification and 
leaderships were affected by the British mandate and the modernity crisis in Iraq. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the changing concepts of merit and of what was counted to be 
good knowledge, and their institutionalisation in the education system before and after 
the Ottoman Empire period. Chapter 7 examines the education of leaders. 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with a summary of the main themes of the work and 
with comparative reflections on what has been analysed. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CULTURAL TRADITIONS AND MODERNITY PROJECTS IN 
JAPAN 1868-1912 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the ways in which the education of leaders 
was shaped through the renegotiation of cultural traditions, namely Shinto and Bushido, 
as Japan itself modernised. 
This chapter has two main arguments. 
Firstly, in Meiji Japan the previous cultural traditions continued but were renegotiated 
by the state and leaders in the society. In the process of the modernisation of the state, 
the cultural traditions were legitimised in highly centralised symbolic and ritual forms, 
and were pragmatically reinforced in the new state institutions. 
Secondly, the institutionalised Shinto and BushiclO values in the state education system 
and bureaucracy led to criticism of the state's modernity projects. There was the 
emergence of the peoples' rights societies, and the growth of an awareness of rights 
among the new social groups and cultural leaders. 
It will be recalled from Chapter One that cultural leaders in this thesis are characterised 
as the leaders who emerge as a reaction to the renegotiation of traditional values 
institutionalised by the state projects. Cultural leaders are taken as representing a 
status group which redefines the values of cultural traditions and debates in public their 
social obligations and a vision of the new society. 
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To test these arguments, the chapter is organised into three sections. Firstly, it 
examines the state's official modernity projects, which aimed to change the social 
structure and leadership in Tokugawa Japan. Secondly, it identifies the historical and 
political contexts of Shinto and Bushiclo, and demonstrates the renegotiations and 
institutionalisation of cultural traditions within the state modernity projects. The state 
institutionalisations of cultural traditions were legitimised. 	 Thirdly the chapter 
examines the political, social and intellectual struggles against the bureaucratic power 
of the state. It will be recalled from the discussion in Chapter One that the concept of 
`social modernity' refers to the transformation of state modernity into cultural, social 
and private projects developed in civic society. As suggested in Chapter One, the 
process of redefining cultural traditions to modernise the society was complicated. 
Political and social structure 
The Meiji Renovation (Meiji Ishin) in 1868 marked the end of two hundred and sixty 
four years of Tokugawa rule and a turning point in the history of Japanese leadership. 
This section argues that the new state leaders succeeded in changing the social 
structure by redefining the old and new political cliques and reconceptualising 'good' 
knowledge. 
The new leaders of the Renovation proclaimed the legitimacy of their new 
government.' Their battle cry was 'Revere the Emperor'. 2 In order to realise the 
political ideology which led to the formation of the modern Imperial State, their first 
task was military action against the Tokugawa government. Co-operation between the 
upper and lower echelons of the Bushi stratum in several western domains, especially 
Chosha (the present Yamaguchi prefecture), Satsuma (the present Kagoshima 
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prefecture) and Tosa (the present Kochi prefecture), with some involvement from the 
imperial court nobles, toppled the Tokugawa regime and established a new political 
power.3  
A new ruling status group thus emerged. The term "ruling status group" refers in this 
thesis to the group which has major influence within the political order and tries to 
change the social order. In the case of Meiji Japan, the ruling status group was 
composed of the civil and military bureaucrats.  
In order to construct a modern Imperial state, the next challenge was to eliminate the 
local domain system. The idea of the abolition of the domains was first negotiated 
within the clique of Kido Takayoshi and Okubo Toshimichi.4 It was achieved quickly. 
In 1871, the government replaced domains by prefectures. The whole of Japan was 
divided into three urban prefectures and seventy-two other prefectures.' This marked 
the end of the landlords (Daimy6), and of the feudal system in which Daimyo and the 
local population had enjoyed political autonomy from the central government.6 
Local government institutions were created in 1871 by the introduction of two laws, 
the law of the Bureaucratic System of Prefectures and the law of the Governors of the 
Prefectures. These laws were enacted in rapid succession, within two months. The 
prefectures were, in 1888, positioned under the strict control and surveillance of the 
central government.7 The local bureaucrats were appointed by the central government 
and had to come from outside the local area.8  
As the central and peripheral political systems were rapidly reformed, the government 
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destroyed various local customs and privileges of the Bushi by abolishing hereditary 
salaries and introducing a conscription law.9 
The replacement of the old state leaders changed the previous social structure. One of 
the consequences of political change in the Meiji period was to disturb the immobility 
of the four social strata of the Tokugawa period. In order to promote a rich and strong 
nation-state (fukoku kyohei) and industrial and economic development (shokusan 
kiigyo),1° 'equality of the four status groups' (shimin byock5) was called for. 
In this context, Meiji state bureaucrats displaced the previous Bushi stratum but soon 
constructed new privileged social strata. The Imperial family became the highest 
stratum known in Japanese as kozoku; other court nobles, the Daimy6 and new state 
leaders who were from the western domains, rewarded with the title of the nobility 
(kazoku). The Bushi stratum in general was renamed as the gentry (shizoku), and all 
the other social strata became the common people (heimin). The previous outcast 
groups (senmin or eta) were merged with the common people. 11 By redefining the 
social strata, the government opened up access to the bunbu-kan, positions as officials 
in the governmental agencies.12 
The national slogan, 'Revere the Emperor', was soon made concrete by the summons 
to serve 'the rich and strong nation-state' and to make the political and economic 
position of Japan equal to the West.13 The most fervent supporters of this political 
ideology were a new generation of privileged state leaders, many from the lower Bushi 
stratum, all of whom had acquired Western learning, either abroad or at new 
educational institutions. The new Meiji government was soon staffed by new leaders. 
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The creation of these groups was made possible by the highly developed systems of 
social communication and learning networks at the end of the Tokugawa period, which 
enabled the political leaders in different domains to learn about and from each other. 
In the Tokugawa period, due to the lack of access to the formal legal system by 
individuals, knowledge of justice according to Shinto and BushidO morality, and arts 
and skill in the mediation of disputations between the ordinary people in the society 
were needed by the Bushi stratum.14 In Meiji Japan, as the laws and legal systems 
were being modernised, the life of the population was now differentiated and 
particularised by new rules and new institutions. All of this required the re-negotiation 
of Shinto and Bushiclo. 
Shinto and Bushido 
Meiji political modernisers, such as Kido, Okubo, Iwakura Tomomi and SaigO 
Takamori, institutionalised these redefined cultural traditions to create a Shinto state. 
This section argues that ShintO and BushiclO traditions were politicised in the formation 
of an imperial nation-state equal to the West, to shape national ethics, and to frame a 
bureaucratic government. 
One of the primary objectives of the early Meiji regime was to win legitimacy. The 
government needed an ideological defence for the realisation of the Imperial state. As 
early as 1868 the struggle for state modernity was seen as an area for the restoration of 
eighth century ShintO traditions and as requiring the creation of efficient state 
institutions at the political centre. 
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The motto of the new state leaders was 'restoration of the Emperor'. The leaders 
justified the overthrow of the Tokugawa government by calling for a return to Imperial 
government (osei fukko) and for people to 'honour the Emperor and expel the 
barbarians' (sonno jOi). The restoration of the Emperor was intended to be not only a 
change of government from the families of Bushi to the family of the Emperor but also 
a return to the original political order which Emperor Jimmu had established in 710.'5  
In order to legitimise the new state and the new leadership, state leaders renegotiated 
and redefined Shintoism in four main ways, Shinto for the state (Kokka Shinto), for the 
Imperial House (Koshitsu Shinto), of the sects (KyOha Shinto), and for the common 
people (Minkan ShintO).16 Among these, ShintO for the State and Shinto of the sects 
became a national political creed. Shrine rituals and education at shrines became 
public institutions. ShintO for the Imperial House was politicised, became a part of 
Shinto for the State, and had a major impact on the modernisation of the state. 
Shinto, in its original conception, had embraced theology, ethics, government and 
society. Paradoxically, once the traditional cultural concepts of faith and the 
institutions of government had proved unstable, religion became a powerful force for 
change in the government. Among the learning study groups, there were two opposing 
factions: those led by Hirata Atsutane and by Okuni Takamasa. Hirata Atsutane 
looked at ShintO and the Emperor in the context of religion. The Emperor was seen as 
sacred and divine. Okuni suggested universal Shintoism which emphasised the 
Emperor as a centre of power (moto) in the world. I7  
A centre of power (moto) depended on the moral values of loyalty, the obligation of 
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care and obedience, which were rooted in Shinto combined with Taoism.'8 The young 
state leadership supported Okuni's theory.° 
 Thus the idea of Shinto for the state was 
derived from Okuni's new concept of universal Shintoism. At the same time Okuni 
offered the practical idea of defining a national morality (kokumin dotoku). Traditional 
Shinto values were redefined and legitimised as 'national' ethics in highly centralised 
symbolic and ritual forms. 
Okuni's understanding of Shinto is seen in the way in which the Meiji state 
modernisers re-legitimised the political and social position of the Emperor and respect 
for ancestors in the secular state's policies of (i) the restoration of the Shinto tradition 
(ii) the 1868 Charter Oath of Five Articles (gokajo no goseimon) and (iii) the Meiji 
Constitution (Meiji kenpa" 1889). 
The restoration of the Shinto tradition was seen in the revival of the traditional imperial 
festivals.20 Shinto for the Imperial House came to be considered as a way to respect the 
ancestors, and the festival sites of the Imperial court became politically important 
places. The old political and cultural traditions were proclaimed by law as the state 
ideology. 21 For example, a declaration (13th March 1868) reintroduced the saisei-itchi 
theocracy which was the system that claimed to preserve harmony between the 
Emperor and the Deity (Kami) and Gods through ritual.22 The traditional conformity 
between religious ritual and government (saisei-itchi) became the state ideology, which 
authorised the political and social position of the Emperor as a consequence of absolute 
divine right (as had been originally claimed by the Jimmu Emperor in 710).23 Thus in 
the early Meiji period, the renegotiation of imperial tradition meant the restoration of 
divine right and the Emperor's political supremacy. 24 Shinto rituals became an 
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inseparable part of national politics. Okuni's moral values of loyalty, obligation of 
care and obedience reinforced the conformity between religious ritual and government. 
There was also work on the Imperial Oath by Okubo, Kido and Inada Masatsugu, and 
their influence was decisive.25 The substance of the 1868 Charter Oath of Five Articles 
was in line with the aspirations of the radical state modernisers to legitimise the state, 
but the fact that it was an oath sworn to the Emperor by his subjects was equally 
significant. 26 By the declaration of the 1868 Charter Oath of Five Articles, the 
Emperor was recognised as the source of all authority in general, and as the authority 
over Shinto and its beliefs and practices. 
The Charter Oath constituted a declaration of the state vision, namely the establishment 
of the Imperial State and the realisation of the equality of commoners, but what became 
clear was the state modernisers' political aim, which was a drastic and decisive change 
in the distribution of power in Japan. Article One promised to the commoners political 
participation through established assemblies and public discussion. Article Two 
promised a revolutionary break with feudal strata and the introduction of ideas of 
welfare. Article Three stated the obligations of the commoners, but also promised 
access to promotion through merit. Article Four promised legal protection to the 
commoners. Article Five opened the way for Western knowledge and Eastern ethics. 
The last article contained what was to prove the basic philosophy of the whole Shinto 
restoration in the context of 'a centre of power' as suggested by Okuni: that is, 
"knowledge" should be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen the 
foundations of imperial rule. Japan was to be modernised and strengthened through the 
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use of Western knowledge, because the only defence against the West lay in the 
creation in modern form of the ancient Chinese ideal of "a rich and strong military 
country" which could best be achieved through Western technology and the Japanese 
cultural tradition. Japan needed to unite so as to be equal to the West and to defend its 
political interest. 
Thus Shinto was effectively made into the state religion (Kokka Shinto). The formation 
of the Imperial nation-state became an official political ideology, which was 
pragmatically used to secure the political power of the state leadership in terms of the 
name of the sacred Emperor. The new political status of Shim() as the state religion 
began to diminish the strength of Buddhism and other sects. The government started 
controlling religious practices, including the Shinto of the common people (Minkan 
Shinto), through public and shrine administration. On the day after proclaiming the 
Oath of Five Articles, the state announced, as state policy, the abolition of 
Christianity.27 The state also abolished many local shrines and constructed new state 
shrines to perform its ritual festivities. 
On March 28, 1868, the Office of Shinto Religion declared the separation between 
Shinto and Buddhism:28  
There is no Shinto temple, ever so small, in which the title of its Kai has not 
been designated ever since the middle Ages by a Buddhist term, such as 
Avatar of Gozu-TennO. Each of those temples shall, as soon as possible, 
submit a notice containing the detailed history of the temple.29 
The place of Buddhism was made officially subsidiary to that of Shinto .30 Shinto 
rituals were made political and became state rituals. The rituals of the imperial court 
acquired a political meaning by making the Emperor a political figure. By separating 
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Shinto from other religions, Shinto ideology was embedded in the 1889 Meiji 
Constitution. Many ShintOists saw the restoration of the Emperor as confirming the 
independence of the spirit of Japan, and such a new political entity required new 
policies.31 This affected traditional definitions of BushidO values. 
Bushido values in the Tokugawa period had centred on the relationships between the 
landowning lord and his House followers. The lord and his followers were, as 
Fukuzawa Yukichi pointed out, tied to the Bushido values which were reflected in 
`personal independence in relation to the lord'.32 Selfless loyalty was not valued. This 
spiritual notion of independence was defined in the Tokugawa period, by Yoshida 
Shoin, as self-obligation and self-respect. ShOin emphasised the cultivation of the 
inner person, using his favourite term shisei [fulfilling sincerity].33  
A Meiji philosopher, Inoue TetsujirO, suggested that BushidO should be seen as the 
national morality (kokumin dotoku) and should be recognised by the state leaders.34 
According to Inoue, national ethics were the essence of the national polity (kokutai). 
This renegotiation of the previous Bushido values was a reconsideration of the 
harmonious relationships between 'pen' (bun) and 'sword' or the martial arts of war 
(bu): 
Bun and bu are like the wings of the bird, or wheels which go 
parallel... and ...in harmony. There is no eternal peace without bu. Bun 
and bu must be kept a balance. Those who have the knowledge of bun have 
the beauty of bu (bubi) and a leader (kunshi) must not be a man of only the 
pen. It must be important to cultivate the ability to defend the nation-state 
by providing ` bu' to those who have knowledge of 'bun' .35 
Inoue emphasised that bun is prior to bu. That is, in order to attain the aim of 'pen' 
(bun), learning of bu is only a prerequisite. In this way bun and bu must not be equal 
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but in superior (bun) and subordinate (bu) relations. If bu is prior to bun, militarism 
emerges. The purpose of bu is the realisation of bun.36 
Thus the Bushido spirit, according to Inoue's concept, penetrates the personal 
cultivation of bun and bu. Inoue's vision for the Meiji state was the construction of a 
moral entity: 
As a historically developing construct, Bushido exists for the sake of the 
protection of the moral national polity. In other words, we use bu in order 
to achieve the purpose of bun, and so it is not Bushido if we emphasise `bit' 
before bun. Therefore, Bushi' should not forget the spirit of 'clo-gr - the 
way of obligation to both values.37 
Bushido values were thus used as a national ethic and as a device to modernise the 
bureaucracy. The concept of Bushido as traditionally understood was transformed for 
the ideological and institutional purposes of the state. These purposes are seen in the 
state's effort to place bureaucratic institutions such as the military, the ministries and 
police at the political centre. 
Furthermore, the abolition of the Bushi stratum in 1871 made Bushido even more the 
property of the entire nation. The Bushi 'bugyo', as a commissioner of the government 
in Tokugawa Japan, was changed to a central civil servant as bishi and a local civil 
servant as gushi in the early Meiji period, and renamed as a civil bureaucrat (bunbu-
kan), or to a military bureaucrat (gunbu-kan).38 
In the military, bureaucratic and public educational systems, with the Emperor 
replacing the feudal lord as the object of selfless loyalty and sacrifice, Bushick5 became 
the foundation of ethical training.39 The change of loyalty marked the end of the Bushi 
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social system and the disappearance of the autonomous Bushi professions. The 
renegotiation of Bushido contributed both to the rise of Japanese nationalism and to the 
strengthening of wartime citizens' morale up to 1945. 
Thus the official modernity project of the state was served by the institutionalisation of 
Shinto and Bushido values. This institutionalisation involved a de-emphasising 
through a national code of ethics, of the value of personal autonomy in relation to 
society. As a consequence of this, the social cohesion of the Bushi was undermined 
and the concept of loyalty to the person of the lord was replaced by that of loyalty to 
the nation-state. 
In the process of constructing a modern state, the traditional systems of loyalty were 
pragmatically utilised to serve the power of the bureaucracy, but their contents, forms 
and function were deconstructed. At the same time new state institutions were 
constructed and the traditional leadership was eliminated or marginalised in the 
process. The consequence of this was that the traditional leaders were caught up in the 
pressures between nation-state priorities and their traditional cultural identities. 
In the next section, the institutionalisation of cultural traditions is described. The 
section describes how Shinto and Bushido values were institutionalised in the civil 
bureaucracy and the military, and shows what kind of state leadership was produced 
and reproduced in the state institutions. The official modernity project of the state 
included educational requirements. 
The development of the Meiji state is seen in the changes of the bureaucratic 
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leadership. The changes are divided into three stages: the emergence of the Meiji state 
(1868-1872), the growth of the Meiji Imperial state (1872-1890), and the maturity of 
Meiji Japan (1890-1912). 
Shinto and BushidO renegotiated 
(1) The emergence of the Meiji State (1868-1872) 
This section describes the shift of cultural traditions as the state was modernised. The 
years 1868 to 1872 were marked by the emergence of the Meiji state, by political 
struggles over the renovation of Shinto and Bushido traditions in the new political 
system, and by the establishment of a consensus about the new types of knowledge 
needed to support the bureaucratic institutions at the political centre. 
In the same year as the Meiji Renovation, the Officials of Shinto Worship, who were 
included in a 'Three Offices' system (san shoku-sei), were restored. As indicated 
earlier, the idea was suggested by Okuni Takamasa; it was intended to establish the 
Ministry of ShintO at the centre of the new government.40 The theocratic "Three 
Officials" were called 'the Council of State' (Dajiikan). The name was derived from 
the Grand Council of State in the Nara period (710-784). The old system of court 
ranks for government officials was revived. The senior members of the Emperor's 
government were called the SOsai (the Governor), the GijO (Senior Councillors), and 
the Sanyo (Junior Councillors).41 These offices were established in Kyoto in 1868 and 
became the new Imperial court government.42 This institutionalisation of the ancient 
Shinto-oriented political system was the starting point for developing the bureaucracy 
in Japan. 
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The state leaders aimed to sustain the traditional conformity between the government 
and religious ritual. As indicated earlier, all shrines and priests were controlled by the 
state, and the political ideology of 'the sacred state' was developing." The ritual of 
`The April 1868 Charter Oath of Five Articles' was conducted in the Imperial court. It 
was performed by senior members of the Emperor's government, Senior Councillors 
and Junior Councillors at the Imperial Palace in Kyoto.'" Thus the Emperor became 
involved in politics. For example, on 2nd April 1868, he presided over what a British 
diplomat called 'the first Parliament of Japan', a conference of the Emperor's 
government, including the Governor, Senior and Junior Councillors, in NO Castle.45  
However, the power of the Imperial governmental offices and Shintoist officials was 
gradually weakened as the lower Bushi stratum staffed the modernised government." 
In 1871, in a reform of the bureaucratic system, the Council of State was divided into 
three chambers for legislative, administrative, and judicial functions,47 and the Office 
of Shinto Worship was downgraded to the level of an ordinary ministry." The top 
posts, normally held by court nobles and Daimyo, became symbolic and lost their 
autonomy.49 
The Emperor became the highest leader of Japan but was only a political symbol in the 
new bureaucratic power structure.50 His political function was embedded in a sacred 
ritual context, and actual political power was in the hands of the government. 
By 1871, the construction of the Imperial State (rather than the construction of the 
sacred Shinto state) had become the most important political project. The formation of 
the new state was strongly supported by the military. In the first uncertain years 
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following the 1868 Renovation, one of the most rapidly evolving state institutions was 
the military administrations' 
In August 1869, it was renamed the War Department and in 1872 divided into separate 
army and navy departments which were equal departments of the government.52 At 
first, the real line of authority within the military was informally determined by the 
influence of certain individuals and groups rather than by the formal structure of the 
bureaucracy.53  
The War Department played a part in the modernisation of the state and the society. It 
was the first large bureaucratic organisation, and not only did it play a key role in the 
formation of the new army and navy, but also it was integrated with the civil 
ministries.54 Both civil servants and military bureaucrats played a role in the formation 
of the Meiji state by renegotiating Shinto and Bushicki traditions. Traditional values of 
personal loyalty to authority were replaced by loyalty to the Imperial State as the basis 
of national ethics. The 1882 Rescript ordered soldiers and sailors to: 
neither be led astray by current opinions nor meddle in politics but with 
single heart fulfil your essential duty of loyalty.55 
Other regulations excluded military personnel from voting and from standing for 
election; involvement in politics became a criminal offence under the Army and Navy 
Penal Laws.56 Traditional Shinto and BushidO values, systems and leaders became 
convenient tools to realise the Imperial nation-state and thus reinforce the political 
power of bureaucracy. This development is described in the next section. 
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(II) The growth of the Meiji Imperial State (1872-1890) 
The period from 1872 to 1890 was marked by political struggles. There was a shift 
from a Shinto-oriented to a privileged and Bushi-oriented state. Meanwhile, there was 
an internal institutional and cultural transformation in which the state and shrine 
education were involved. There was a rapid growth of civic bureaucratic institutions, 
marked by political, cultural and intellectual conflicts among state and social leaders. 
There was a growth of political opposition. 
In the Reform of 1872, the Council of State (DajOkan) was deliberately strengthened 
by abolishing the Ministry of Shinto. 
The aim of this DajOkan Reform was to reinforce the authority of the Bushi clique 
rather than that of the Shint6ist court nobles. 57 The legitimisation of their new 
leadership required emphasis on the political ideology of the Shinto-oriented imperial 
nation-state. 
At the same time as the Ministry of ShintO was abolished, in 1872 the government 
established the Department of Religion.58  
This department was established to politicise Shinto priests, to disseminate state 
Shintoism through them, to reinforce the ideology of the separation of ShintO from 
Buddhism, and also to defend ShintO against the increasing number of Christians. 
Shintoist bureaucrats (jingikan) and priests were defined in their identity as teachers or 
Shinto missionaries.59 
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As indicated earlier, shrine rituals and education became public institutions. 
Nationalised ShintOism was reinforced by a campaign for teaching ShintO values 
through the Department of Religion. This was launched as a Shinto socialisation 
movement and was called the Great Promulgation Campaign. The campaign was 
supported by the Ise Grand Shrine. By nationalising the Grand Shrine and by gaining 
support from the local shrine administration, the Campaign led to further success in the 
diffusion of state-defined S hintei sm. 6°  
The movement permeated Japan through preaching conducted by trained priests, and 
was highly influential in making local people see ShintO as a state religion. Eto 
Shinpei issued two principles for the teachers of Shinto: reverence toward the Deity 
and patriotism, and the encouragement of loyalty, care and obedience to the Emperor. 
Thus the content was national ethics rather than theological doctrine, and the emphasis 
was on the reinforcement of the new Shinto value of loyalty to the nation-state. 
The Great Promulgation Campaign was politically successful. The forms of Shinto- ism 
associated with the Emperor gave pride of place to the ShintOists in overseeing the 
transformation of society within a national morality.61  However, this movement ended 
when the Department of Religion was degraded and placed under the newly established 
Ministry of the Interior. The ending of the movement was emphasised when the 
Shintoist leader of the Great Promulgation Campaign, Urata Chomin, resigned from his 
position as Commissioner for the Ise Grand Shrine.62 This change produced resistance 
from Buddhists and local Skint() believers. 
However, any criticism of the government and any movements for democratic rights 
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were prohibited by Imperial Ordinances. In the middle of the Meiji period, all the 
activities of the government were based on statutory declarations. This was seen in the 
cases of the proclamation and abolition of the Ministry of Shinto, the Great 
Promulgation Campaign and the 1886 Imperial University Order.63 There was no law 
in the modern democratic sense, but only the remnants of the Tokugawa legal system.64 
This meant that the characteristic feature of the growing Meiji government was that 
power was not clearly divided between the legislature, executive and judiciary. 65  
Judicial power was subordinated to executive power until the Supreme Court was 
established in 1875. 
This absence of the balance of three powers made it easier for the old bureaucrats to 
create new rules and institutions and reinforce their privileged position. The fact that 
most government officials were recruited from the former Bushi stratum contributed to 
the persistence of shizoku social statuses. This resulted in a strong sense that the 
government bureaucrats were placed above the ordinary citizens. Public administration 
was permeated by absolutism, the Home and Finance Ministries being the most 
powerful of all the ministries. In the 1870s, the bureaucratic institutions were growing 
in size.66 
Administrative reforms were continually devised to meet the needs of growing state 
power and specialisation within the government. By monopolising state honours, the 
bureaucrats were becoming a new privileged social stratum.67 Originally, bureaucrats 
came from the Bushi stratum, but a bureaucrat who came from the commoners was 
now promoted and awarded the title of a shizoka. This social rank was passed on to his 
offspring. In 1873, they were exempted from conscription. The privilege became 
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decisive when the 1876 bureaucracy law guaranteed the status of the bureaucrats by 
exempting them from punishment in criminal cases.68  
As the bureaucrats became privileged, there arose a political dispute about the 
bureaucracy within the government. In 1869, Kido Takayoshi, who was from the 
ChoshO domain and against the bureaucratic system,69 was deprived of his official 
position and was replaced by Hirose. This meant that, by 1880, the Bushi clique, who 
were new bureaucrats from the Satsuma and ChoshO domain cliques, represented by 
Okubo, came to hold real political power over the bureaucracy.7°  
The opposition group consisted of those who supported the establishment of a political 
party system, and was represented by Saigo Takamori and Itagaki Taisuke.71 Large-
scale resistance movements grew at grass roots leve1.72 The new government had for 
some time been attacked by both right and left opposition groups. The opposition from 
the right came from the middle social stratum of previous Bush! families, which were 
distressed by the loss of feudal privileges and by economic pressure. 	 This 
dissatisfaction led ultimately to the Satsuma rebellion of 1877. The opposition from 
the left demanded a more representative form of government, sponsored petitions and 
established, in 1874, Japan's first political party.73  
Itagaki protested against the bureaucratic and oligarchic government (hanbatsu) which 
was dominated by men from the Satsuma, Choshtt and Tosa domains. Given the 
increasing protest movement, the Meiji government responded to the first of these 
attacks by summonses against Kido, Okubo, Ito and Itagaki. On 24th April 1875, the 
government promised the population the gradual establishment of constitutional 
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government through the establishment of legislative judicial organs.74 The effort to 
meet this promise resulted in the emergence of the political party system and the 
opening of the Parliament. 
(III) The maturity of Meiji Japan (1890-1912) 
As indicated earlier, in the early Meiji period the leaders of the state had restored the 
ancient political Shinto system and the rights of the Emperor. In the late Meiji period, 
Shinto was continuously used as a convenient device for the justification of political 
and social change.75 Although the new constitution was influenced by the German 
advisor, Hermann Roesler, many of its supporters stressed that it was in line with 
distinguished Japanese traditions adapted to modern times. For example, the acclaimed 
historian Shigeno Yasutsugu, professor at the Imperial University, gave a lecture 
entitled "The Constitution of our Country since Ancient Times and the Situation of the 
University".76 Overall, the ideology of the Meiji Renovation and okuni' s notion of a 
centre of power (mow) emphasised the continuity of the rituals and the symbolism of 
the Emperor. Shinto priests came to be paid by the state, according to Article 28 of the 
1889 Constitution.77  
However, many other changes limited freedoms. 	 Article 10 prescribed the 
fundamental characteristic of bureaucrats as the servants of the Emperor. The legal 
independence of the military from civil bureaucracy encouraged the army to assume a 
dominant role in politics. Article 11 defined the Emperor's military role, stipulating 
that he "has the supreme command" in practice. The Emperor's supreme power meant 
that all functions of the army were disconnected from civil bureucracy.78 In fact, the 
Emperor himself had little in the way of real power, but great importance in the 
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performance of symbolic observances.79 The change of the political position of the 
Emperor in relation to the military resulted in the reinforcement of the political power 
of the military bureaucracy over the civil bureaucracy. 
The traditional values were reinforced in the civil bureaucratic institutions in a different 
way.80 The traditional role of the Bushi as warriors, administrators and judges ended, 
and a new group of bureaucrats emerged, educated as experts specialising in 
administration or legal affairs.81 The study of law rapidly developed, due to the need to 
train the bureaucrats and to the government project to compile a legal code.82 
By establishing these state education systems, the old bureaucrats rapidly created a new 
privileged bureaucratic elite stratum. In July 1884, a new Peerage Ordinance declared 
that, in addition to the previous landowners of the domain and the court nobles, one 
hundred leaders of the Meiji Restoration were to be ennobled as a reward for services 
rendered.83 This measure was designed to unite the old aristocracy of court nobles and 
Daimyo and the new oligarchy of Restoration leaders in a House of Peers which would 
be strong enough to offset the influence of the proposed popularly elected House of 
Representatives. 
Thus the cultural traditions of Shinto and Bushial5 values were institutionalised in the 
peerage system. The 1887 Discipline of the Bureaucrats (kanrifukumu kiritsu) was an 
indication of the old bureaucrats' plan to establish the bureaucracy as a privileged 
stratum of "servants of the Emperor." 
By 1900, the elderly state leaders were replaced by new technocratic bureaucrats, and 
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so the power of the bureaucracy continued and was defended by the new political party 
groups. Article 55 of the Meiji Constitution blocked the joint responsibility of 
ministers, by prescribing the responsibilities of each minister." Political, social and 
cultural struggles over the consolidation of political parties were evident in the 
oligarchic reaction to the new party groups, and in the establishment of a solid state 
education system before the opening of the parliament and the promulgation of the 
Constitution. 
Thus the cultural traditions of Shinto and Bushido values were renegotiated throughout 
the Meiji period. ShintO values were consolidated in the early Meiji period and were 
mixed with Confucianism, which was also a constituent of Shint5ism in the late Meiji 
educational system. The life of citizens changed as the state modernised. The 
modernisation of society developed through resistance to state modernity. 
Shinto and Bushidd renegotiated 
(IV) The emergence of Meiji Society (1868-1872) 
The years 1868-1872 were marked by cultural leaders challenging the state projects for 
Shinto and Bushida The political and social struggles were intense. 
The development of new technology, industrialisation, the conscription law and the tax 
reform had changed the local social structure. Many of the Bushi found it difficult to 
adjust themselves to the new society. The 1877 Seinan war, led by Saigo Takamori 
and organised by the shizoku, was the last collective resistance movement against the 
government.86 The government's policy on agricultural land ignored the perception of 
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land as belonging to the community. Dissatisfaction in the countryside led to uprisings 
by the farmers.87  
Social resistance to state Shintoism also emerged. As described earlier, the state Shinto 
movement affected Japan as a whole.88 The ideology of the saisei-itchi was promoted 
• in society,89 but Buddhism was recognised only as a private belief and its leaders were 
excluded from the right to conduct funeral rituals. As a result, the Buddhist temples 
lost their social position." 
Subsequently a resistance movement emerged among the priests and local people who 
were believers in the Shinshri Buddhist school of thought, in many domains such as the 
Sado, Matsumoto and Toyama prefectures, and they linked with the central temples, 
Higashi and Nishi Honganji in Kyoto.9I This movement made the government retract 
the order to destroy the temples in the Toyama prefecture.92 
As counter-pressure to popular resistance, the Great Promulgation Campaign was 
accelerated. Preaching in local areas aimed to unify the consciousness of the 
population.93 Preaching took place immediately after the ritual of the drinking the holy 
sake. It emphasised gratitude for the tolerance of the Emperor who protected peace, 
security, the crops and welfare.94 The leaders of the festival activities taught people to 
respect the elders.95  
Thus, as was suggested in Chapter One, the modernisation of society by the 
government resulted in the loss of local religious autonomy and in excluding the 
previous religious leaders from central political participation. What was required 
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furthermore was the dissemination and consolidation of the new belief system through 
the institutions of formal and informal education, so that it would achieve popular 
acceptance96 
The law of Tokugawa Japan had prohibited religious association under suspicion of 
rebellious tendencies, and as a result, new religions in Meiji Japan had to seek the 
sponsorship of local elites in order to escape persecution. The new religions could not 
operate satisfactorily on the model of popular preaching. Ministers' counselling, 
healing, and congregational meetings were important; the new Shinto religious 
associations, such the Kurozumi-schools and Konkg-schools, needed permanent 
buildings and ministries. For these two associations, participation in the Great 
Promulgation Campaign provided the keys to growth and to avoiding suppression.97  
During the lifetime of the founder, Munetada Kurozumi, the Kurozumi-schools were 
established in Okayama rural society mainly through the patronage of rich farmers,98  
but after the 1850s priests began to become ministers of the group.99 During the Great 
Promulgation Campaign, Kurozumi-school meetings were held using entirely the forms 
of Shinto. The Kurozumi-schools performed funerals incorporating the name of 
Munetada Kurozumi into the ritual.m 
The Kurozumi schools as well as the Konko-schools tried to legitimise themselves in 
the eyes of the state, so as to assume the position of educators of the population. To do 
this, they made significant compromises, agreeing to change their deities, to call 
themselves Shinto, to submit their organisations to government supervision, to be 
distinct from Buddhism, and to harness their ways of self-cultivation to such state goals 
55 
as tax-paying, compulsory education, and the idea of the formation of a rich and strong 
nation-state.101 Both groups mediated the relation between the state and the rural 
populace, introducing themselves as extensions of state authority.102 
The Great Promulgation Campaign gave Kurozumi and Konko-schools groups a place 
in an ideological order called (after 1875) Shinto. Recognised by the Meiji state, both 
schools committed themselves deeply to ShintO and to the socio-political order. 1°3 
They did not seek to become leaders of the political order but saw their mission as 
providing pathways to salvation within society.104 Thus in Meiji Japan, Shinto and the 
subsequent study of the Japanese classics (kokugaku) continued, and leaders of new 
religions attempted to appropriate them. 
Post-Meiji Shinn-) was no longer the restored ancient religion of Japan, as ShintO was 
responding to situations which the Meiji influenced. 
Similarly, Bushicki was renegotiated by the state and became a code of national ethics, 
emphasising loyalty to the Imperial nation-state, which was institutionalised as the 
central political value. The traditional Bushicki leadership was caught up in the 
pressures between nation-state priorities and traditional requirements. These tensions 
were resolved in different ways. The new leaders either moved away from the 
previous role of Bushi as loyal warriors, administrators and judges or became civil 
servants.105 
Traditional relationships between leaders and the government were, as Yoshida ShOin, 
Inoue Tetshujiro and Nitobe Inazo emphasised in their books, based on personal 
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independence in relation to society in general and to personal authority in particular. 
Fukuzawa Yukichi emphasised the importance of mutual relations between private and 
public virtues. Explaining these relations, he expressed the basic idea of education and 
learning in the context of independence and self-respect as the general principle of the 
education of virtue. Fukuzawa further interpreted the spirit of independence among the 
population as the spirit of civilisation.'°6  
Fukuzawa's concept of the education of leaders, as his own life-style showed, aimed to 
nurture good citizens who could stand and speak for their personal autonomy and 
knowledge in relation to social and political obligation. Claiming that individual 
independence leads to the state becoming independent, Fukuzawa admonished his 
readers to consider that those who do not have the spirit of independence do not think 
about the state deeply, do not have the ability to develop independence in relation to 
the foreigner, depend on other people, and do bad things, for example, betray the 
state.107 
The way Fukuzawa, as a nationalist, defended the formation of the Imperial state was 
based on his concept of the conflation of intellectual Bushiclei values and Western 
knowledge. In his books The Encouragement of Learning and The Outline of the 
Theory of Civilisation, he pointed out that there are two distinct aspects of civilisation. 
One is the form and the other is the spirit. Emphasising the spiritual aspect of 
civilisation, he suggested that the fundamental value of civilisation resided in the 
reform of the human heart and the development of wisdom and virtue in the 
population, and therefore, to construct a modern nation, the people, particularly the 
new generation, were important. In his book The Outline of the Theory of Civilisation 
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he emphasised private virtue as the highest life principle.'" He perceived Bushidei as a 
new model for leadership and vitality, suggesting that the current independent shizoku 
should follow the previous law of Bushi to make great achievements.109 
 
Seiyo Jijo (The State of Affairs of the West) written by Fukuzawa, influenced members 
of the shizoku stratum through informing them about Western political systems, values 
and knowledge. Ueki Emori, an active organiser of the People's Freedom and Rights 
Movement (PFR Movement), was among them. Reading Seiy5 JijO, Ueki learned that 
there were different political systems as well as the dominating political system 
operated by the Satsuma, Chosha and Tosa cliques. Having joined the PFR 
Movement, led by Itagaki Taisuke in his Tosa domain, and having opposed the state 
education system, Ueki became an active liberal advocate of the new education.11° 
(V) Society and the Meiji Imperial State (1872-1890) 
It is argued that during this period the consolidating bureaucratic system was 
challenged by the new cultural leaders. They struggled over the institutionalisation of 
Shinto-BushidO values in the PFR Movement. This section focuses on the process of 
transformation of BushidO values and the emergence of new leaders and new 
educational institutions in society. 
As described earlier, the PFR Movement developed by resisting bureaucratic privilege 
and coercion. The leaders at the beginning of the movement were former state leaders 
such as Itagaki Taisuke, GotO ShOjirti and Fukushima Tanenomi. Their appeal affected 
the 1874 petition for the opening of the Parliament and the rights of political 
participation and social welfare, and for the practice of 'public discussion' which was 
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recognised in Article One of the 1868 Imperial Oath and Five Articles.111  
Differences between the anti-government movements in the early and the middle 
period were marked in two ways. In the early period, revolts were concerned with a 
deteriorating life-style, and therefore there was little networking among the different 
cultural leaders. In the middle period, revolts led by the cultural leaders reflected their 
concern about personal autonomy and social obligation. New Western knowledge and 
new learning circles (kai) were introduced during the PFR Movement, in networking 
activities at study meetings (gakushii-kai) and speech meetings in public (enzetsu-kai). 
The speech meetings were where state power and the PFR Movement directly 
confronted each other. I 12 
A society for the study of debate (gakushii toron-kai) was established in 1882 in the 
city of Itsukamachi. There were participants from 16 cities and villages. Among them, 
six parties developed. Associations of this kind emerged throughout Japan, aiming to 
find the new styles of knowledge and political thought which would suit the new era. 
There was a modern style of debate with a chairman and secretary; opinions and 
decisions were written down. The activities of the speech meeting movement created 
learning groups. The participants, who had been passive, in time became active leaders 
of the movement. By the early 1880s, throughout Japan, speech meetings were 
flourishing. 113 
However, these activities were threatened by the government. The April 1880 Law of 
Assembly forbade the attendance of the police, military men, teachers and students at 
any public assembly. Journalists who were active in the peoples' rights groups were 
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often imprisoned. There were many cases of the interruption of speeches. Meetings 
were stopped or dispersed. Any assemblies and associations needed to avoid violating 
the law, which regulated discussion or debate on current political and legal matters.114 
In the case of Mito prefecture, the 1880 Regulation of Assembly restricted local speech 
meetings. However, the demand for open 'speech meetings' was strong and in June, 
the Mito Association for the Study of Law (Mito hogaku kan) was established. This 
association published a newspaper. Every Saturday and every second Sunday of each 
month, the association held a meeting for debate. There were 2000 in the audience on 
17th March 1881 at the theatre of Kamiichi in Mito prefecture, but after the speech of 
Miyachi Mohei, the meeting was ordered to stop and dissolve. 115 However, the 
movement was not weakened by the restrictions, but spread in many different forms 
throughout Japan in the 1880s and in the later Meiji period.H6 
(VI) Meiji Japan (1890-1912) 
Meiji Japan developed with a combination of cultural, educational and intellectual 
struggles. The 1890s were marked by increasing political networking associations and 
publications, the establishment of the political party system and the opening of 
Parliament. 
At the same time, academic leaders struggled over the institutional independence of the 
educational system. The scholars in Tokyo University claimed independence. 
According to the 1886 Imperial University Order (Teikoku Daigaku rei), Tokyo 
University was under the immediate control of the Ministry of Education, so that the 
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government could interfere in the academic affairs of the university. Consequently the 
institutional independence of learning and research were the focus of discussion. 
At the end of the 1880s, when Niijima JO campaigned for the establishment of 
Doshisha University, intellectuals called for the expansion of higher education. Takada 
Sanae, the editor of the Yomiuri newspaper, criticised nationalistic education, and 
supported the establishment of Waseda University.' 17 
There were disputes between the state and the cultural leaders on how the new 
knowledge and technology could be applied to leadership in daily life. 118 The 
intellectual struggles within the political debates on the new style of politics resulted in 
an increase in public demonstrations. In 1881, Fukuzawa in his newspaper (Jiji 
Shinpo) said: 
Politics is important, but the civilisation of the country is not systematised 
by politics only. Politics is one phase of civilisation and so must go parallel 
with the enterprise of the learning of technology and conunerce."9 
Fukuzawa's suggestion was intended to encourage a sense of a distinctively Meiji 
political and cultural community that would bridge the many particular identities of the 
citizens. In July 1882, he published articles in Jiji Shinpo, emphasising the importance 
of those scholars who stood outside political parties for the development of civilisation 
and of Japan. He stressed that the use of knowledge should not be separated from the 
development of the spirit of freedom and independence.12° 
But the tensions were severe. For example, there was an emphasis on the study of 
Germany. Yamagata Aritomo supported the study of the law and politics of 
Germany. 121 Against this, the scholar Nakamura Masanao, in his Zanbun Gakukai 
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Kaisetsu Kokubun, explained the necessity of restoring the study of Chinese classics 
and other traditional learning. Fukuzawa Yukichi in his "Suggestion to the Member of 
Literary Circles (bungaku-kai)" showed a critical attitude towards the movement to 
restore Chinese classics, and stressed the necessity of practical learning by criticising 
the existing tendency which separated learning from daily life.122 
Like Fukuzawa and Ono Azusa, many cultural leaders were aware of their role of 
balancing the old and new knowledge. For example, in 1887, an article by Nishimura 
Shigeki "Perspectives on the Study of the Oriental Association" presented to the 
Philosophy Association emphasised the importance of learning both Western and 
Japanese as well as other oriental knowledge. In his book Nihonkotoku ron, he 
supported Western learning without losing sight of Confucianism.123 
Conclusion 
In the Meiji period, the previous cultural traditions were redefined and institutionalised 
by the state and leaders in the society. Structural political and social changes were 
introduced. Firstly, a rapid change in the social structure was made by replacing the 
previous state leaders through the abolition of the domain system, integrating the local 
leaders into the central government and establishing a new political power centre based 
on the Chosha, Satsuma and Tosa Bushi clique. The abolition of the domains led the 
Bushi status groups to adjust themselves to the new political and public or private 
services. 
Secondly, the Meiji state legitimised itself by redefining Shinto and BushidO traditional 
values, establishing political ideologies based on these, and institutionalising them 
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rapidly in the new state education systems. The Shinto state emerged by redefining the 
Emperor as a centre of power in the world, rather than as a sacred and divine figure. 
Simultaneously, shrine rituals and Shinto education became state institutions. This 
state Shinto reinforced the traditional conformity between the state and religious ritual. 
Renegotiated Shinto was politicised and legitimated in the 1868 Charter Oath of Five 
Articles and re-legitimated in the Constitution (1889), positioning respect for the 
Emperor and ancestors in the state's policies. 
Within four years after the Meiji Renovation, as the state modernised, a shift from a 
Shinto-oriented to a privileged and Bushi-oriented state was made by repositioning the 
Department of Religion. Renegotiated BushiclO values became politicised as a code of 
national ethics, and were institutionalised in the bureaucracy to support obligation and 
loyalty to the nation state. These new values were used to strengthen the ideologies of 
a rich and strong nation-state and industrial and economic development. Thus in the 
process of the modernisation of the state, the cultural traditions were legitimised in 
highly centralised symbolic and ritual forms, and were pragmatically reinforced in the 
new state institutions. As the redefined national morality reinforced the state's 
ideologies, which called for modernising the state and the society, state education was 
shaped by the redefined religious and BushidO values. The education systems 
reinforced these values by using a textbook on the national morality based on Shintii 
mixed with Confucianism. The Tokugawa legacy of Shinto and Bushiclii traditions 
continued in the modernity processes, functioned as a part of the state projects and 
reinforced the political ideologies which allowed the Imperial nation-state to emerge. 
The traditional Bushi leadership was caught up in the pressures between nation-state 
priorities and traditional requirements. Criticisms raised by the cultural leaders first 
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attacked the Meiji administrative reforms which rationalised and consolidated the 
privileges of the civil servants. In 1874, Itagaki, Goto and Fukushima supported a 
petition calling for the opening of a parliament, the establishment of a constitutional 
state and the right to have a political party system. These cultural leaders developed 
the PFR Movements linking religious, academic and human rights issues, raised 
citizens' political consciousness. In particular, Fukuzawa remarked the importance of 
mutual relations between private and public virtues. As Yoshida, Nitobe and Inoue 
emphasised, Fukuzawa interpreted the spirit of independence among the population as 
the spirit of civilisation. 
The voices calling for a democratic and independent Japan expressed the cultural 
leaders' social alternative to the Imperial nation-state vision. The redefined Shinto and 
BushiclO valued by the state leaders emphasised personal loyalty, while the cultural 
leaders emphasised personal autonomy. 	 Both groups struggled over the 
institutionalisation of these values and knowledge in the different education systems. 
The education of leaders in Meiji Japan became a new part of the modernity projects. 
The tensions between the state and the cultural leaders were intense, but there were 
mutual efforts to resolve the issues between them through dialogue and negotiations. 
The social modernity projects had strong political, social and intellectual implications 
for the institutionalisation of the redefined traditional values in the private education 
systems. For example, at the end of the 1880s, when Nijima JO campaigned for the 
establishment of Doshisa University, academic cultural leaders called for the expansion 
of higher education. Takada and Ueki struggled over the institutional independence of 
the private educational system. As a cultural and Shinto leader, Kurozumi did not seek 
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power by becoming a leader of the political order, but saw his mission as providing 
pathways to salvation within society. Thus Shinto and the study of the Japanese 
classics (kokugaku) continued, and leaders of new religions attempted to appropriate 
them. 
Meiji Japan was oriented towards becoming a democratic society with major changes 
in personal status. This meant that social modernity in Meiji Japan developed in civic 
society by transforming state modernity into cultural, social and private educational 
projects in terms of the rights of free and independent individuals, the society and the 
citizens to participate in the political life of Japan. Political and social changes were 
simultaneously structural and symbolic; hence they were rapid and dynamic. 
Differences among the new state and cultural leaders were marked in their routes to 
leadership positions and in their education. As was seen in this chapter, one core 
problem was how to redefine and institutionalise concepts of merit and what was 
counted as 'good' knowledge. The next chapter focuses on how this issue was 
reflected in the educational institutions of Tokugawa and Meiji Japan. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CONCEPTS OF MERIT AND THEIR INSTITUTIONALISATION 
IN THE EDUCATION SYSTEM IN JAPAN 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the changing concepts of merit and what was 
regarded as good knowledge in the Tokugawa (1603-1868) and Meiji (1868-1912) 
periods as the state institutionalised them in the education system. In parallel to the 
subsequent analysis of Iraq, this chapter offers an interpretation of these changes and of 
the implications of the political, social and intellectual struggles over the nature of 
merit in Japan. 
The first argument is that the concepts of merit were negotiated and renegotiated 
throughout the Tokugawa and Meiji periods at state and social levels. The merit 
valued in Tokugawa Japan was not fully politicised. People who had merit possessed a 
balance of knowledge, morality and obligation. 
The second argument is that the new Meiji government redefined the concept of merit 
as loyalty and obligation to the Imperial nation state, and absorbed it as a part of the 
state modernity projects. The state project institutionalised the redefined knowledge 
and morality in the state education system, but overlooked the Tokugawa legacy of 
what was counted as good knowledge, morality and sense of obligation. However, in 
society, the Tokugawa legacy of the concepts of merit was maintained and developed 
by cultural leaders in private educational institutions. 
66 
The concepts of merit and education in Tokugawa Japan 
This section describes the development of the concepts of merit and its 
institutionalisation in social practices. It is argued that the concepts of merit were 
taken up and defined within a political ideology but not seen as a matter of state policy. 
However, merit was socially valued for the purposes of status group mobility and 
personal cultivation. 
It is suggested that one of the ways in which merit became a political concern was 
through the demand within the government for a meritocratic principle based on 
Bushiclo, ShintO and neo-Confucianism as part of the search for national identity and 
anti-Sinocentrism. The isolation policy of Tokugawa Japan, marked by strong anti-
Sinocentrism and the containment of foreign influence, led to the emphasis of neo-
Confucianism, a revival of historical studies and the development of the learning and 
teaching of kokugaku [the study of Japanese classics] based on ShintO values. There 
was a struggle over balancing the neo-Confucian idea of the Way of Heaven with the 
practical application of this idea to personal and social mobility and within the different 
status groups. 
In the seventeenth century, in Kaibara Ekken's view, understanding the Way of Heaven 
showed that morality was allied to merit and vice versa.' Kaibara called his teaching 
concept "the Way of Heaven" (Ten no Mick) or "the theory of heaven and earth" 
(Tenchi no Ri) which meant the 'Way' of human beings throughout history. The 
emphasis was that a human being can be both taught and required to be creative.2 An 
example of this teaching can be seen in Kaibara's concept of the way of human being 
and of learning: 
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All this entitles man to be called the 'most spiritual of all creation'. Tenchi 
[heaven and earth], which loves all creatures (as demonstrated by the fact 
that it brings them into existence), especially loves mankind as a creative 
being who, when he might have been any one of ten thousand other things, 
is selected to be a man and is thereby under a great obligation to Tenchi, 
which can only be fulfilled by serving Tenchi all his life. This is therefore 
the duty—the 'way' of man.' 
Kaibara especially emphasised the five fundamental virtues required to realise the way 
of man: human kindness, a sense of justice, knowledge of correct social conduct, 
wisdom and trustworthiness.4 Tokugawa intellectuals searched for a way to teach and 
learn the Way of Heaven.' According to Kaibara, such learning was to start with the 
acquisition of the way of practising these five virtues and the five human relations, then 
that of the way of managing a home and governing a people: 
To learn for ourselves is true learning, while to learn for others is 
ostentatious learning. The main object of learning is not to become famous, 
but to discipline ourselves and thus become true men. Always study 
yourself. Seek good friends and follow their best advice. Since the object 
of learning is to correct our faults, let us not be afraid to admit them, as well 
as our mistakes, before others. We are not sages, and we cannot always be 
right.6 
Thus his understanding of virtue in learning included practical educational knowledge, 
which was based on disciplining oneself in relation to society. 
Ito Jinsai had a different idea from Kaibara about virtue. For Ito, the aim of learning 
was the improvement of human life: 
In science, one should look for living principles, and not cling to dead ones. 
Withered plants and dried roots, bronzes, stones and pots are called dead 
things because they have a fixed form and change no longer. But man is 
not like that. When he does not advance, he recedes; not to recede, he must 
advance; there is not a moment's halt, for man is not like a dead thing. 
Therefore the superior man values not the fact that he does not err, but that 
he can improve.' 
After handing over his business to his younger brother, Ito Jinsai established an 
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academic group and school in KyOto. He considered merit in relation to practical and 
useful education (jitsugaku), and suggested that the Way of the human being (jindo) is 
to honour the teacher as a means of honouring the Way: 
Therefore the teacher should show the justice which reigns between the 
ruler and subject and the parental love of a father for his child. The teacher 
who rejoices when his pupil excels him is a true teacher. He who hates to 
be excelled is a bad teacher. The pupil shall look upon his teacher as upon 
a father, and though his learning should surpass that of his teacher, he 
should always honour him and never fail to honour his duty towards him.' 
Thus, in the early Tokugawa period, there was a discussion of the concepts of merit 
which revolved around good knowledge. Neo-Confucianist teaching emphasised the 
importance of understanding oneself in relation to one's surroundings .9 
This ideal was blended with Bushidii values, which were personal independence 
through self-cultivation in relation to social obligation. 
The ideal model of merit for the Bushi stratum was first defined by the 1615 Law 
Governing the Military Households (Bukeshohatto). The article on 'Learning' was 
placed first in the law. Article One called upon the Bushi to devote themselves to 
balancing learning (bun) and the military arts (bu): 
[The way of] the arts of peace and war, including archery and horsemanship 
(bunbu kyfiba no michi), should be pursued single-mindedly. From of old 
the rule has been to practise "the arts of peace on the left hand and the arts 
of war on the right"; both must be mastered. Archery and horsemanship are 
indispensable to military men. Though arms are called instruments of evil, 
there are times when they must be resorted to. In peacetime we should not 
be oblivious to the danger of war. Should we not prepare ourselves for it? 1° 
This injunction was passed down by the Daimy5 leadership to their own retainers. The 
law was piously re-enacted over the succeeding centuries by later Shoguns." There 
69 
was a constant interest in the study and practice of the concepts of Bushido throughout 
the Tokugawa dynasty. Article 13 of the first Bukeshohatto states: 
The lords of the domains should select officials with a capacity for public 
administration. Good government depends on getting the right men. Due 
attention should be given to their merits and faults; rewards and 
punishments must be properly meted out. If a domain has able men, it 
flourishes; if it lacks able men it is doomed to perish. This is the clear 
admonition of the wise men of old. I2 
The concepts of merit and of the ideal Bushi, 'the right men' (literally, the correct or 
true men) were established in the basic Tokugawa rule that regulated the relationships 
between the central government and local domain administrations run by the Bushi 
stratum. The way of Heaven as taught to Bushi emphasised the importance of practical 
and useful learning. Jitsugaku, based on a study of Japanese classics (kokugaku) and 
neo-Confucianism, was one of the Tokugawa concepts of academic merit. 
This merit, which was knowledge combining philosophical and practical learning, was 
encouraged by the Shogunate throughout the Tokugawa period. This is seen in the 
encouragement of the study of western science through Dutch learning and astronomy 
by the Shogun Yoshimune (reigned 1716-1745).'3 Jitsugaku was applied by various 
social strata and professions and developed as a method of learning. 
In the early Tokugawa period, the attempts to translate the merit principle into practice 
were within a feudal social order based on heredity. Despite the limits on mobility in 
Tokugawa society, new ideas about merit were developed, as can be seen in the 
emergence of the bureaucratic system and its operation at state level. At Tokugawa 
government level, due to the long peace after the 1600s "Inland War" period, there 
were increased administrative responsibilities for the Shogun and the lords of domains. 
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Finding competent officials with managerial ability became the government's continual 
concern. Selection based on a hereditary ranking system was no longer sufficient. 
Promotion was particularly open to the lower class of Bushi. 14 
Ogyii Sorai, who established the Ken-en academic group, argued that a person's ability 
was a good reason to promote him to a position of responsibility. He favoured a 
system of government whereby men of lower position, if they possessed ability, could 
rise to positions of administrative power and influence. Ogyu also argued that if men 
of merit were not recruited to the government and rewarded with high office, then the 
collapse of that government was both predictable and imminent:15 
When men of talent and wisdom are no longer at the top, it signifies the end 
of a regime; confusion and disorder will open the way for men of talent and 
wisdom to rise up and overthrow the dynasty. Being profoundly aware of 
this truth and solicitous of preserving the dynasty, the sages instituted the 
system of punishments and rewards in order to raise up men of talent from 
below.16 
The concepts of merit in relation to the concepts of learning linked personal, 
pedagogical and nationalistic perceptions. 
Although the concepts were applied in the feudal system, this period was a time of the 
strong cultural influence of family ties,17 and so merit was not legitimated as a political 
concept. Although the attempts to translate the merit principle into practice were kept 
firmly within the bounds of the traditional social order (for example, in dispute 
reconciliation) knowledge came to be considered a necessary quality for successful 
political leadership.18 The ideal meritocratic principle of Bushi was applied to the 
bureaucratic Tokugawa government, and domain bureaucrats had administrative and 
judicial knowledge as well as Bushido values.19 The Tokugawa regime governed the 
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population through 'rule by status'. Status was recognised by the populace in the form 
of the authority of personality (the person of character) and the obligation of duty (nin). 
The Bushi, farmer, artisan and merchant and priest had distinctive social statuses 
according to their different social responsibilities and professionalism.20 
The consequence of this was the emergence of the new status group and its group 
communities which promoted self-regulation, such as the community of Bushi and the 
community of the farmer. As John W. Hall argues, the impersonality of administration 
and law guaranteed a kind of equality of opportunity within the confines of status and 
self-regulating groups.21 The legal vacuum was filled by self-regulating communities, 
which saw to the administration of justice. 
Conciliation was a prominent feature of Tokugawa law. Much has been made of the 
strong value attached to harmony. The positive value attached to harmony is evidently 
an aspect of social control. There was also a demand for ethical guidance, spiritual 
support and solutions to the disputes between groups that occurred in daily life.22 It is 
suggested that in the Tokugawa period, there were five distinctive characteristics of the 
legal system. 
First, there was the absence, until the later Meiji period, of any definition of law as a 
distinct symbolic and institutional arena.23  
Second, no strong emphasis on criminal law as part of the Imperial or Shogunal 
administration developed.24 
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Third, there was no system of law courts apart from various administrative bodies. The 
legal ideology of the Tokugawa regime assumed the "Rules for the Tokugawa House" 
as the basis of social order.25  
Fourth, the legal system which epitomised the essence of Tokugawa centralisation was 
represented by "status law" which combined a high degree of regulation of relations 
between statuses with a relatively low level of interference in the internal life of each 
stratum or domain 26 
Fifth, there was a lack of national or state law for conflict resolution.27 This legal 
vacuum was central to the transformation of Shinto-BushiclO values and neo-
Confucianism and to some extent also of Buddhism in Japan. 28 The solution of 
disputes which occurred in daily life was the social responsibility of the residents. 
The concepts of merit, based on philosophical, practical and useful knowledge and 
moral values, were a functional contribution to the needs of a society at peace rather 
than an individualistic conception and was integrated into the notion of political loyalty 
within the Bushi stratum.29 There was a political and social and legal obligation to 
show moral values, which related individual loyalty to personal authority. 
The idea of social ranking changed and developed when the Tokugawa isolation policy 
collapsed under foreign pressure. The arrival of the warships of Commodore M. C. 
Perry at Uraga in 1853 and the treaties with Britain, America, Russia and Holland 
made the Tokugawa government recognise the need for new talented personnel in 
senior administrative offices and for supplementing the principle of appointment 
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according to general talent and honesty with that of demonstrable merit." 
The new concepts of merit had important political implications. The appointment of 
individual Bushi to offices in the ShOgunal government implied the collapse of 
traditional lord-vassal relationships. The decline of human relationships based on 
loyalty within Bushi stratum meant the collapse of Bushi society as a whole. The late 
Tokugawa period was characterised by the origins of the educated leaders who figured 
prominently in the transition from the Tokugawa to the Meiji regime. 
Despite the limitations on mobility in Tokugawa society, concepts of merit were 
institutionalised in the establishment of educational facilities and training for the 
central and local government as well as at the social level. Tokugawa Japan had no 
organised national education system,31 but the concepts of merit as the way of Heaven 
were institutionalised and taught in many schools through the learning of Bushido and 
neo-Confucianism. 
Tokugawa education was characterised by separate types of institutions for education. 
Education reflected the distinction between social status groups, hence it was socially 
hierarchical and varied according to occupational differences. In general, there were 
separate schools for the nobility, for the priests, for the Bushi stratum (hanko), for the 
scholastic village dwellers (gogakudo), and for the scholastic town dwellers 
(shijuku).32 Among these types of schools, the schools for Bush! and the town 
dwellers formed a major foundation for the new high educational system of Meiji 
Japan. 
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The hanko, domain schools for Bushi, were run by the local Daimyo. The schools were 
established in each domain in the mid-eighteenth century. This was due to the need for 
talent in the bureaucratic system of administrative offices within each domain. 
Tokugawa scholars were clear about what was a good curriculum for future leaders. In 
the late seventeenth century, Kumazawa Banzan, a bureaucrat who served the Lord of 
Okayama and who was one of the leading writers on education in Tokugawa Japan, 
considered that the school was a place for teaching the way of human beings (jthdo): 
Upon men schooled in righteousness the peaceful government of a country 
is based. That is the first principle of government. A man of virtue and 
intelligence should be elected as the principal of the school. The school 
should give the Bushi literary and military education. The Chinese classics 
should be learned from the eleventh or twelfth year. Music lessons should 
be given every day... Archery and horsemanship should be commenced 
from the fourteenth or fifteenth year. Mathematics should be studied 
gradually either at home or at school, during leisure hours, when days or 
evenings are long 	 Thus youths are to be disciplined in both mind and 
body from eight to thirty years of age.33 
For the Bushi stratum, the study of neo-Confucianism was a prerequisite, but other 
curricula were freely chosen and developed differently according to the domain's 
policy. In Me irindo, a domain school in Owari (the present Nagoya prefecture), had a 
private library, a statue of Confucius, the classroom and regulations. The school 
curriculum included, first, literary subjects, such as reading, rhetoric, and 
interpretation; poetic composition, mathematics, music, etiquette, Confucianism, 
divination, law, medicine, Japanese classics (kokugaku), and Chinese classics 
(kangaku).34 Secondly, the curriculum included martial arts, the use of guns, rifles, 
spears, swords, wrestling, artillery, the study of military affairs and military 
engineering and law and politics. In contrast, in the case of Katokukan, a domain 
school in Eccha (the present Toyama prefecture), major attention was given to 
composition, penmanship, the Chinese classics and etiquette.35 
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The concepts of merit in Tokugawa Japan came to include social, political and 
educational training. Developments at Hagi School in ChOshil are a case in point. The 
term for a person of talent (jinzai), first appeared in a document which announced a fief 
loan to the school to enable it to enrol additional dormitory students. Opening 
positions to jinzai became the fundamental principle of fief administration. The belief 
was held that if there were more students then a greater proportion of talented men 
would be produced.36 The aim of the school's founders was to have it serve as a 
national model of standards for training potential leaders: 
Henceforth (it declared) everything that happens in the school shall be 
considered as outside the system; differences of rank shall be ignored and in 
all matters precedence shall depend on the extent of a student's ability and 
achievement, and on his accomplishments in the various skills?' 
As educational expansion increased, there were many debates among the educated 
about how far the social and political system might be opened to merit. 38 Fujita 
YUkoku emphasised the ideology of loyalty which was important in forming political 
attitudes.39 Fujita Tao who was instrumental in the establishment of the KOdO kan, a 
Mito domain school in 1841, condemned the practice of 'prudent behaviour', which his 
term for the outward display of virtue and blind obedience, and called for 
administrators who would pursue their duties with intent, certainty, devotion, and 
selflessness. 
Thus in the middle period of Tokugawa, the idea of merit itself changed. In Fujita's 
opinion, this notion of merit was the single most important criterion in recruiting men 
to serve the government.40 
The government aimed to restore a strong feudal society in response to the crises of 
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central and local government caused by local economic developments. Over two 
hundred and fifty years, the government imposed three main reforms, namely the edicts 
of the Kyoho year (1716), Kansei year (1789) and the Tempo year (1837).41 Among 
these reforms, the KyOho Edict involved the renovation of the Bushi leadership 
position. Shogun Yoshimune, who imposed this edict, made an effort to implement the 
traditional ideology of merit by opening up senior posts to able men from the lower 
Bushi class, and incremental stipends were offered to individuals who occupied key 
positions in the central administration. Parallel to this governmental reform project, 
the landlords in many domains took steps towards economic and educational reforms 
in the areas which they governed without any intervention by the central government. 
The reforms, which led to talented men from the lower class of Bush! being appointed 
in these domains, in many cases strengthened the economic power of such domains. 42 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, recommendations of the new merit principle 
became standard among reformers.43 The Tokugawa central government aimed at 
reinforcing feudal society through the three reforms of 1716, 1789 and 1837. 
However, in spite of the reformers' intention, the outcome amid economic 
development was pressure on the Bushi stratum, and society began to change. 
Both the central government and the fiefs were forced to modify their systems of 
recruitment. Over the two and a half centuries of Tokugawa rule, there were 
continuous modifications.44 In its mildest form the growing emphasis on ability carried 
no danger to the status system; 'promoting ability' merely meant 'honest 
appointments'.45 The turning point came when the local domain government began to 
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open up appointments to lower class Bushi without intervention from the central 
Tokugawa government. 
In rural Japanese society, many farmer-scholars or scholarly rural officials who were 
originally lower Bushi in pre-Tokugawa Japan, advanced locally by learning kokugaku. 
Although there was a restriction on travel to other domains, within the domain there 
was protection for villagers who visited and stayed in the towns. Thus the farmers 
could move to the towns to study. In the seventeenth century, there were farmer-
scholars who developed new practical agricultural scientific methods. Miyazaki 
Yasusada, who wrote The Compilation of Agriculture (Nogyo Zensho), is one example 
of these.46 Many supported agriculture by defending the culture and moral virtues of 
the farmers. 
For the scholarly rural officials this concept of merit expressed their desire for the 
official promotion of the group in the feudal political structure. Despite the farmers' 
balanced knowledge and their contributions to the development of rural societies, the 
political position of these farmer-scholars was not changed. However, they were 
socially recognised as leaders of the village teachers who provided good and useful 
knowledge and action in peace keeping and consultancy. 
In the late Tokugawa period, educational development was seen in the fact that 
hierarchies and education systems became more open to other social strata. Although 
there was not much development of the popular arts, there were constant debates about 
the construction of new life in Japan and so there was much development in learning 
and thinking, and in the networks within and between social strata. 
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Networks of scholars and commoners developed rapidly in the mid and late Tokugawa 
period, and thus many active scholars were leaders of learning and morality; hence 
trust emerged among the various strata of professionals.47 For example, Yamazaki 
Anzai was a Confucian scholar and at the same time a Shintoist and earlier a Buddhist 
and a teacher. The Confucianist, Ito Jinsai, was originally a merchant. The nationalist 
Kumazawa Banzan was an administrator, and advocated schools for administration and 
curricula that emphasised etiquette and good manners. Ogyu Sorai was a notable 
Confucianist, and a teacher. The scholar of the Japanese classics (kokugaku), Hirata 
Atsutane, was a physician as well as an astronomer. 
In the late Tokugawa period, as the autonomy of the domains increased, the feudal 
hank5 education system was opened to the non-Bushi townspeople. Many sons of 
Bushi, Confucianists, medical practitioners and experts in the martial arts travelled to 
gain new knowledge across domains. Changing networks within and among the 
schools, scholars and students and the intellectuals made it possible to study across the 
domains. 48  
During the 265 years of the Tokugawa period, according to the position and the role of 
professions there were three interrelated ideal models of merit; knowledge, loyalty and 
jinzai respectively. As Ito Jinsai, Kaibara Ekken and Kumazawa Banzan emphasised, 
knowledge meant philosophical knowledge combined with practical and useful 
knowledge (litsugaku) and moral values. The Way of Heaven was expressed in terms 
of the way of the individual human beings (find()) and the way of literary and martial 
art. This knowledge, based on the idea of the Way of Heaven and on neo-
Confucianism within Shinto and Bushicia values, was reflected in the Bukeshohatto [the 
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Law Governing the Military Households], the domain schools and the conduct of 
scholarly rural officials and farmer scholars, such as Miyazaki. Thus the concepts of 
the Way of Heaven penetrated the whole political and social order. 
Throughout the Tokugawa period, a strict ranking order was observed among the 
Bushi. This order prohibited the lower-ranking Bushi from offering allegiance to a lord 
other than the one directly above him. This feudal relation was crucial to maintaining 
the social order of the Bushi stratum.49 
As Fujita Tao and Kaibara Ekken stressed, fidelity and loyalty were related to the 
individuals' autonomous determination to fulfil their duties or responsibility.50 The 
concepts of the Way of Heaven and jind5 were based on personal autonomy and the 
acceptance of responsibility. To accept social obligation was to behave morally in 
Tokugawa society. The rules of the relationship between the lord and his retainers and 
political benevolence and responsibility were described in the Bukeshohatto. 
The term jinzai' was a new invention in the Tokugawa period. It referred to a person 
who had talent (knowledge of skill) but also included the moral qualities of virtue, 
wisdom and honesty. As Ogyu Sorai emphasised, the concepts of merit related to the 
notion of bureaucracy, continued in particular within the lower Bushi stratum. Ogya's 
support for men of talent and wisdom was based on his argument that a person's ability 
was a good reason to promote him to a position of responsibility. The Tokugawa 
legacy of the obligation of duty (nin) was based on philosophical and practical 
knowledge together with loyalty as a moral obligation. 51 This balance included 
personal autonomy as well as accepting obligations within the status society. 
80 
However, as described earlier, the concepts of social values were politically and 
socially integrated by the concepts of the Way of Heaven based on Shinto-BushidO 
values blended with neo-Confucianism. It can be suggested that Tokugawa education 
was far from stagnant, even in its purely formal development, because there was a 
variety of principles which were acceptable. As indicated earlier, the merit valued by 
the educated during the Tokugawa period was not a concern of the government. The 
accepted concepts of merit emphasised its contribution to social mobility as much as to 
individual life, but social action was confined within the status group. During the 
Tokugawa period there developed, in fiefs of the various Daimyii and in that of the 
Shogun himself, many groups of people who would play important roles in the 
subsequent overthrow of the Tokugawa government system. Most were educated in 
the numerous Confucian academies that were founded in this period - some by the 
Shogun, the Daimy6 or the merchants - and they drew members from different strata, 
especially from the two ends of the spectrum, Bushi and merchants. 
To summarise, concepts of merit were negotiated and renegotiated throughout the 
Tokugawa period at state and social levels. There was a national demand for a 
meritocratic principle based on Bushidii, Shinto and neo-Confucianism. This demand 
resulted from the search for national identity and from anti-Sino-centrism. The 
concepts of merit were not fully politicised, but they were related to the notion of 
bureaucracy, in particular within the lower Bushi stratum. The moral code of 
philosophical learning (the Way of Heaven based on Shinto and BushiclO values 
combined with neo-Confucianism) was combined with practical and useful knowledge 
(jitsugaku). The study of Japanese classics (kokugaku), Chinese classics (kangaku), 
Neo-Confucianism (shushigaku) and Western science (rangaku or yagaku) were used 
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for the maintenance of the ethical communities within the different strata. 
Overall, the notion of the Way of Heaven meant personal autonomy within a concept 
of social obligation. Accepting social obligation was part of the moral code of merit in 
Tokugawa society. The concepts of merit in Tokugawa Japan was social, within a 
status society. This moral codes of merit and what was regarded as good knowledge 
continued in the Meiji period. Two ideas of the way of Heaven and jinclei were 
combined by Fukuzawa Yukichi and expressed as tenri-jinde [Reason of Heaven and 
the Way of the human beings] to explain the relation between state and the 
individuals.52 
The concepts of merit and education in Meiji Japan 
The Tokugawa legacy of concepts of merit and education were renegotiated and 
transformed as the Meiji state modernised itself and the Tokugawa legacy of the 
personal-social moral code, the Way of Heaven, was renegotiated at state and social 
levels in different ways. Within the political vision of becoming a strong and rich state 
equal to the west, the concepts of merit changed: the new emphasis was on merit 
acquired through state education. The concept was deliberately taken up within the 
state modernity project and was legitimised and institutionalised in the new state 
education system, which — in turn - functioned as a reinforcement of the new state 
system. 
['I Of course, the meaning offinclii was changed. Kaibara's perspective on the Way of Heaven 
was redefined by Ito as the Way of human beings (jindo) which requires practical and useful 
knowledge (jitsugaku). Kumazawa and Ogyfes definition of that was used to define the moral 
code for the government officials. The Way of Heaven and of human beings were redefined by 
Fukuzawa and expressed in his 'Encouragement of Learning' in terms of individual autonomy, 
social obligation and egalitarianism. 
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The requirements of the Meiji state were new western knowledge, national moral 
guidance, new human talent and a new modern education system. The idea of grafting 
the new western knowledge on to traditional concepts of learning was central to 
struggles to promote the Meiji state and social modernity projects. 
Among those who advocated the adoption of western ideals and values were Sakuma 
ShOzan, Yoshida ShOin and Fukuzawa Yukichi. In the early Meiji period, they 
preserved the Tokugawa legacy of merit as a Way of Heaven. They were eager to 
introduce western knowledge, but their primary attitudes were based on the values of 
personal autonomy in relation to Meiji Japan and to the rest of the world. 
Sakuma advocated in a well-known poem that in Japan Eastern morality should be 
retained, with room for the introduction of Western technology: 
Eastern morality, Western technique 
Mutually complete a circular pattern: 
The girth of the earth is ten thousand Ri: 
Half of it should not be missing! 53 
Yoshida Shein, a disciple of Sakuma ShOzan, ran his private school, sholcason-juku. 
Ito Hirobumi, the first Prime Minister, and Yamagata Aritomo, a founder of the 
Japanese Army, and other loyalists to the Emperor learned from Shoin. He used the 
classical term `yamato' (the Japanese) and emphasised the responsibility of Bushida. 
Yoshida's emphasis in the pursuit of learning was "not the ability to read classical texts 
and study ancient history, but being fully acquainted with conditions all over the world 
and to having a keen awareness of what is going on abroad and around us".54 
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Fukuzawa considered the concept of learning as referring to a way of understanding the 
relation of oneself with heaven: 
In the pursuit of learning, the important thing is to know one's proper 
limitations. What is meant by limitations is conformity to the reason of 
Heaven and humanity, and attaining one's own freedom without infringing 
upon that of other men. 55 
Fukuzawa pointed out that what was lacking in Japanese society was the application of 
science as jitsugaku [practical and useful learning], and spiritual independence. 56 
Fukuzawa determined to disseminate spirit of individual independence as the basis of 
social morality, and called this kid [ethos].57 In his autobiography, he stated that a 
nation's destiny depends upon the education of its people; there must be some 
fundamental differences in the education of the western and eastern peoples. 
Fukuzawa's idea of the relation of the state and the society was that while it was 
important for the government to have capable people, it was equally important that 
some capable people remain outside of government to carry on the work of civic 
society, and to function as an independent check on official action. He wrote this for a 
magazine, Meiroku Zasshi.58 
The new merit system could eliminate the previous social class system and create the 
equality of the four classes. In his book The Encouragement of Learning, published in 
1871-2, he argued that: 
A man will be defined only by his ability and the position he holds. It is 
proper, for example, to pay respect to a government official, but this is not 
respect to the man himself. We respect the fact that he holds his position 
because of his ability and administers the precious laws for the benefit of 
the people. It is not the person that one is to respect, but rather the law.59 
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By law, Fukuzawa meant the state law and personal spiritual principles which lead to 
Way of Heaven through the concept of "independence" and "self-respect" in each 
profession. He advocated equality of access to learning for the whole population: 
The movement to make the four classes-Bushi, fanner, artisan, and 
merchant-equal has been placed on a firm footing . There will be no such 
thing as rank by birth. Heaven did not create men above men nor put men 
under men.60 
He believed that the progress of Japan depended on its accepting the principle of 
equality: "On the basis of equality, if an individual pursued knowledge and learning, 
Japanese society would be both enriched and strengthened"6I The two ideas of the way 
of Heaven and jind5 were combined by Fukuzawa and expressed as tenri-jindo 
[Reason of Heaven and the Way of the human beings].62 
Unlike Yoshida Shoin, Fukuzawa was an advocate of merit as shown by ability 
assessed through the examination system. 63 The ideas of the encouragement of 
learning among all social strata and of merit as ability assessed through examination 
influenced the early establishment of the education system, as can be seen in the 
Preamble of the 1872 Fundamental Code of Education (Gakusei). A full national 
school system was projected." 
This Gakusei Code took a while to develop. The Ministry of Education, which was 
established in 1871, set up a study group to investigate western educational systems 
and prepare the draft of the Gakusei.65 Twelve persons were appointed to draft the 
Gakusei. Minosaku Rinsho who had studied modern Western medicine and natural 
science through the Dutch language became student in France. Seven persons were 
from the Kaisei government school and the medical school, and they had studied in 
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France, Germany, the Netherlands and Britain. Tsuji Shinji and Uchida Masao were 
scholars of the Japanese and Chinese classics. Nishi Amane, who came from the 
government, co-operated.66 The returning overseas students played a key role in 
determining the modernisation of education. 
The Gakusei called for the encouragement of learning among all social strata for the 
attainment of life's goals, and a concept of merit which embraced personal and social 
mobility. This is seen in the first part of the Preamble, which states the reason for the 
establishment of schools: 
It is only by building up his character, developing his mind, and cultivating 
his talents that man may make his way in the world, employ his wealth 
wisely, make his business prosper, and thus attain the goal of life. But man 
cannot build up his character, develop his mind, or cultivate his talents 
without education - that is the reason for the establishment of schools.67 
Talent was perceived as merit which could promote individual life-chances through 
education: 
Language, writing, and arithmetic, to begin with, are daily necessities in 
military affairs, government, agriculture, trade arts, law, politics, 
astronomy, and medicine; there is not, in short, a single phase of human 
activity which is not based on learning. Only by striving in the line of his 
natural aptitude can man prosper in his undertakings, accumulate wealth, 
and succeed in life.68 
The meaning of learning was focussed on the practical aspects of life. Practical 
learning (jitsugaku) became the content of education as a whole. 
In the early Meiji period, the state educational system had an egalitarian starting point. 
The legitimisation of personal and social promotion, opened to all social strata through 
educational achievement, was a challenge to the previous feudal system. This became 
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the national principle of equal access to education and subsequent mobility for all 
social strata. 
The Meiji government's first major effort was to organise state education. Articles 48-
57 of the Gakusei dealt with the examination system and stressed that egalitarianism in 
pursuing learning for attaining personal and social merit had to be guaranteed through 
the educational system and competence through examinations. The examination 
system became the means of promotion from one grade to the next. Admission to 
secondary and higher institutions was based strictly on ability, and on the development 
of human resources to realise the national ideology. Superior talent shown in scores 
was accepted without regard to class or status, and students upon graduation found the 
way open to high positions. 
Among the provisions of the Gakusei, Chapter 39, on the creation of normal schools 
was considered of particular importance in assuring the effectiveness of elementary 
education. All graduates were required to pass an examination of academic 
competence as well as an evaluation concerning personal character as requirements for 
receiving a new license for the next seven years. The Gakusei established 31 chapters 
of regulations for students studying abroad and students on scholarships (chapters 58 to 
88). The consequence of these regulations was that personal-social merit was changed 
into merit defined by the state. 
As the state grew and strengthened its military and civil bureaucracy in the middle of 
the Meiji period, there was debate over the Gakusei and the degree of government 
control and intervention. Ito Hirobumi was among those who strongly advocated the 
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amendments of the draft. The Gakusei was replaced by the 1879 Education Order 
(Gakko-rei). 
Against the view of education as an institution in the service of the state, Mori 
defended his preference for private and local initiative and expressed his suspicion of 
control by central government and politicians: 
the law should leave the establishment of middle schools solely to private 
scholars who are willing to operate them 
	 I consider it desirable that 
elementary education be free of control by politicians....... in the making of 
educational policy, highly qualified people should be brought together in 
conference to work out measures of improvement.69 
The Education Order explicitly stressed national revitalisation. The state required 
patriotism and the establishment of a school system. The 1879 Education Order 
reshaped the school system in an attempt to counter persistent popular opposition to 
educational centralisation and the imposition of national standards on local areas." A 
second reform, the 1880 Revised Education Order, stressed the new vision of state 
education, which became more nationalistic than the 1872 Gakusei and the 1879 Gakka 
rei. 
By the 1880s, state leaders wanted the training of reliable and technically competent 
persons with a spirit of loyalty to the nation-state and the Emperor. State education 
was a tool of the state, rather than provision for the development of young minds for 
participation in life as well as the provision of opportunity for political and social 
promotion:71 The Tokugawa legacy of a concept of learning which encouraged a moral 
code of philosophical and practical knowledge of some individual independence was 
replaced by national moral guidance emphasising loyalty to the Emperor and the nation 
state. 
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The educational policy of Mori was to position the Gakusei within the state vision of 
the formation of a modern, 'strong and rich' Imperial nation-state. In contrast to 
Fukuzawa's ideas of the establishment of education in relation to cultural tradition, 
Mori considered the formation of a modern education system necessary, and 
educational values should be moulded within this state system. 
In the two decades after 1870 in the late Meiji period, under the leadership of Mori, the 
structure and orientation of Japanese education were reversed from local to central 
control, from an individual to a state-centred orientation, from a pro-western ideology 
to nationalism and from personal obligation to loyalty to the state. Thus Meiji state 
education set goals and structures for Japanese education tied directly to the interest of 
the state.72 
The aim of the Meiji state included raising academic standards and the use of the 
school as a primary agent of moral and political socialisation. Despite the intellectual 
struggles over the Tokugawa legacy of merit and over honouring the Way of Heaven, 
the concepts of merit were now redefined by political ideology and state educational 
policy. The new concepts of merit were institutionalised in a new selection of 
knowledge and within the state education and political systems. 
Although the ethos of the earlier reforms was discarded, the practical gains of the 
educational reforms of the previous two decades were carried forward by reinforcing 
the education and training of the bureaucrats. Education at every level was greatly 
expanded to provide for the rapidly growing bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the 
new industrialisation.73 The concept of merit based on achievement through education 
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in the new knowledge was parallel with processes in the construction of a modern 
nation-state. These projects encompassed new conceptions of ideal personal relations 
and of the family, of the political realm and of public space. All were grounded in the 
distinctly modern legitimisation of the state.74 
The year after the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyoiku Chokugo), the Minister 
of Education Oki Takato called upon local government to take full responsibility for 
the establishment and maintenance of elementary schools. However, local government 
could not independently formulate policy.75 It was the central political oligarchy and 
the central bureaucracy that shaped the institutionalisation of the concepts of merit in 
education in the highly centralised Meiji society. 
The state modernity project institutionalised education for the promotion of a state 
moral code. Shinto-Bushiclo values were institutionalised as a national system. The 
school became a major agent within a hierarchical political ideology that sanctified the 
relationships among children, their parents, ancestors, and the Emperor. 
The 1872 Gakusei required children over the age of six to attend schools. As Minister 
of Education, in 1885, Mori Arinori solidified a centralised educational system, an 
eight—year elementary school programme, a four-year middle school course and a 
three-year higher school, which was preparatory for the state university, The Imperial 
University.76 The primary school was compulsory, comprehensive and coeducational, 
and within a hierarchical order: each primary school was connected with a specific 
higher school and thus with the university. 
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However, after the six years of elementary schooling, it became extraordinarily 
difficult for students to proceed from the middle school to a higher stage. For example, 
only one out of 13 middle school graduates could expect to enter higher school, and 
only one out of 25 was admitted to the prestigious higher schools that opened the way 
into the Imperial Universities.77 One of the main reasons was that the competitive 
examination was decisive. If one failed in the examination, there was no opportunity 
to take it again.78  
The government aimed to increase meritocracy through the examinations. These were 
competitive, and their content was indicated by the types of leaders which were 
produced in the new state educational training system. The training focussed on 
western knowledge. The 1880s marked an increase of bureaucratisation and at the 
same time, the legitimisation of the examination system for the selection of civil 
servants. As the new state bureaucrats acquired privileged social status, though only 
for a short time, there prevailed in the society the notion of lanson minpu' [respect 
the governmental bureaucrat and despise the commoner].79 
Many private schools (shijuku) held examinations, such as the Teki-juku run by Ogata 
KOan. Fukuzawa, as his student, was a supporter of selecting human talent through the 
examination system. Many social leaders from the private schools perceived the 
examination system as a means of breaking down the system of four social classes and 
also the bureaucratic system. For the state leaders, the examination system was a 
practical means to produce new talent and to reinforce their position in the 
bureaucracy. The examination system brought about the neglect of the Tokugawa 
legacy of a moral code of knowledge. 
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To promote state and social modernity and to cultivate human talent, Western 
knowledge became important in the new education at state and social levels. The 
encouragement of the introduction of western knowledge was first made clear in 
Article 5 of the 1868 Imperial Oath of Five Articles: "Knowledge shall be sought 
throughout the world in order that the welfare of the Empire may be promoted". 
However, Western knowledge was institutionalised in the form of control of the school 
curriculum which, became a channel for the recruitment of the technocratic civil 
servants. 
Following the proclamation of the 1872 Fundamental Code of Education, reforms of 
the method and content of education became urgent. The Ministry of Education issued 
the 1872 Regulations for the Course of Study for Elementary Schools. The contents of 
curricula and textbooks were regulated. 	 Spelling, calligraphy, pronunciation, 
arithmetic, oral instruction in morals and recitation were to be taught for the first 
semester, and many subjects such as 'science' based on Western models, were to be 
gradually added as the students were promoted to the senior levels. 
The middle school curriculum was regulated when sixteen subjects were approved for 
the secondary school by the provisions of the 1872 Code. These included Japanese 
language, mathematics, calligraphy, physical geography, history, foreign languages, 
science, drawing, the classics, geometry, bookkeeping, natural history, chemistry, 
morals, surveying and Western music. The Outline for the Course of Study for Middle 
Schools issued by the Department of Education in October 1872 indicated that the 
middle school was organised to prepare students for a university education.8° 
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In September 1872, the Department of Education issued regulations for the Course of 
Study for Middle Schools with foreign teachers. These regulations also provided for 
one-year preparatory courses in foreign languages to be taught in the middle schools. 
The high school curriculum included fifteen subjects: Japanese language, mathematics, 
calligraphy, foreign languages, science, mechanical drawing, the classics, algebra, 
geometry, book-keeping, chemistry, morals, surveying, economics, mechanics, and 
zoology, botany, geology and mining. The emphasis on the sciences and other 
Western knowledge was new.8I 
The curriculum was outlined in the Education Order. Ito Hirobumi argued that: 
It is science that, together with politics, brings about prosperity. In law and 
politics, examinations should be stricter, the number of students limited, 
and only the best students granted admission.82 
As a result of the emphasis on the acquisition of western knowledge, and education 
leading to prestige through the examination system and the strengthening of the 
bureaucracy, there was an awareness among the cultural leaders of the loss of morality 
in the educational system. This awareness was demonstrated in the criticism of the 
bureaucratic government within the people's freedom and rights movement (The PFR 
Movement). In the mid-1870s, an ambivalent attitude to the bureaucracy arose among 
the civil servants. 
Inoue Kowashi, Privy Councillor, the Minister of Education (1894), admonished the 
bureaucrats on their lack of morality. 83 He pointed out that there was no legal 
distinction between the private and public conduct of the bureaucrats. In 1884, General 
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Regulations for Middle Schools were issued stressing the need for these schools to deal 
with the moral development of their students. 
Consequently there were debates among the state leaders and between the state and 
cultural leaders about the institutionalisation of moral education. Inoue Kowashi and 
Nishimura Shigeki, the companion of the Emperor and a Confucian scholar, asserted 
the need for moral discipline in the educational system. Mori, as well as ItO Hirobumi, 
was aware of the importance of education in virtue, but Mori did not approve of 
introducing Confucianism into the school curriculum. He opposed the idea of creating 
a school text defining national morality (shashin) as part of the Education Order. 
Fukuzawa, Mori and many Meiji leaders in the society were against the idea of 
controlling morality by specific rules. For the cultural leaders, moral values should not 
be specified by particular persons or groups. 
The disputations over the institutionalisation of redefined moral values in the education 
system ended in changes. A particular interpretation of Confucianism, the national 
morality of loyalty to the Emperor, was introduced in the education system. This was 
suggested by Motoda Nagazane. A patriotic Confucianist, Motoda replaced the 
Tokugawa legacy of philosophical learning and the virtue of merit by national morality 
(kokumin dotoku). 
The moral code of knowledge valued in Tokugawa Japan had reflected the concepts of 
the Way of Heaven and had promoted individual and social mobility. This code was 
replaced by a state moral code of knowledge, which reflected the concept of the Way 
of the Emperor. The 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education, proclaimed: 
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The essence of education, our traditional national aim, and a watchword for 
all men, is to make clear the ways of benevolence, justice, loyalty, and filial 
piety, and to master knowledge and skill and through these to pursue the 
Way of Man 	
 In the Meiji Restoration the abandonment of the 
undesirable practices of the past, and learning from the outside 
world.....had a serious defect: it reduced benevolence, justice, loyalty and 
filial piety to a secondary position.84 
Moral teaching, as emphasised in the Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyoiku 
Chokugo), was used as a tool to guide young children to develop loyalty to the nation 
state and the Emperor. The renegotiation of the cultural traditions emphasised loyalty 
and piety. These two concepts were institutionalised in the school curriculum as moral 
education and were included in the textbook for moral teaching.85 
A certified copy of the Imperial Rescript was transmitted to every school, where a 
ceremony for the respectful reading of the Imperial Rescript was to be carried out.86 In 
the following year, Inoue Tetsujiro's commentary on the Imperial Rescript on 
Education (Chokugo Engi) was published and was used as the textbook for morals 
(shiishin sho) for the middle and normal schools.°  
The aim of morals was the cultivation in children's consciences of the principles of the 
Imperial Rescript on Education. It stressed that the subjects, filial piety, brother and 
sisterhood, propriety, friendship, benevolence, self-cultivation, sincerity, courage, 
humility and other moral qualities were to be taught. In particular, the spirit of 
Reverence for the Emperor and Love of the Country was stressed. 88 Thus the 
acquisition of knowledge was directed to the state's interest rather than to personal and 
social merit and mobility. 
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The elementary school textbook for morality based on the Imperial Rescript on 
Education was subject to strict examination. The authorised morality was called the 
"philosophy of virtues". Teaching hours for it in the elementary school increased from 
one-half hours per week to three hours for the ordinary, and two for the higher 
elementary school.89 For the Ministry of Education, the teaching of morals was a 
practical and useful tool to realise the Imperial Rescript on Education. 
From the 1890s to 1912, the curricula of the various schools were consolidated and 
standardised throughout Japan. Traditional classical music and Bushido martial arts, 
which had been prerequisite educational backgrounds for a Tokugawa leader, became 
obsolete. 
By means of school rituals, courses of study, and extra-curricular activities, the 
principles of the Shinto and Confucian moral order and BushiclO, such as loyalty, filial 
piety, cleanliness, physical strength and perseverance, were reinforced. The role of the 
school was defined comprehensively and broadly; it extended to supervisory rights 
over student behaviour outside the school. Almost all elementary and the secondary 
schools had prescribed codes on such matters as clothing and places where students 
might go by themselves or only with adults. By 1900, the government's merit system 
incorporated compulsory knowledge defined by the examination system and an 
emphasis on the transmission of compulsory moral principles in the education system. 
Conclusion 
The concepts of merit in the Tokugawa period were negotiated and renegotiated but not 
fully politicised. People who had merit possessed a balance of knowledge, morality 
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and obligation. The Bushi concepts grew out of domain education based on the 
principles of Confucius and neo-Confucianism, in particular, as Kaibara, Kumazawa 
and ItO emphasised, the moral code of philosophical knowledge combined with 
jitsugaku related to the Way of Heaven. In these circumstances, as well as due to the 
economic reforms, the development of the local domains, and foreign diplomatic 
pressures, acquiring Bushi virtues as a condition of promotion became a focus of the 
late Tokugawa government's concern. Jinzai [skilled knowledge with moral qualities] 
and benevolence and responsibility were perceived as new concepts and entailed the 
notion of bureaucracy, in particular within the lower Bushi stratum. 
Scholars of the Japanese classics, the Chinese classics and a Dutch scholars were not 
confined to the Bushi stratum but also came from the merchants' and the farmers' 
strata. Learning networks in the towns and rural areas and for scholars in different 
social strata emerged and developed. 
In the Meiji period, the Tokugawa legacies of the concepts of merit were transformed 
in different ways at state and social levels. The honoured Way of Heaven was 
redefined by Sakuma, Yoshida and Fukuzawa in terms of "Eastern Morality and 
Western Technique", and was endorsed in the 1872 Fundamental Code of Education. 
However, as the modernity projects advanced, the importation of Western technical 
and professional learning was emphasised. The competitive examination systems were 
deliberately taken up within the modernity projects. A new concept of merit was 
institutionalised in a new selection of knowledge within state education and the 
bureaucracy, and functioned as a reinforcement of the new state system. However, the 
expansion of the opportunity to compete for positions of leadership through the 
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examination system was limited. The meritocratic talent policy produced the 
kansonmimpu attitude [respect the governmental bureaucrat and despise the 
commoner]; a new privileged group emerged. 
Through the 1879 Education Order and the 1880 Revised Education Order, the 
education system was shifted from local to central control, and from individual 
cultivation to a state-centred orientation. The Tokugawa legacy of the concept of 
learning shifted from teaching autonomous personal obligation to teaching loyalty to 
the Emperor, and from a moral code of philosophical and practical knowledge, with 
some individual independence, to nationalist moral guidance. The notion of national 
loyalty and fidelity to the Emperor and the nation-state was legitimated in the 1890 
Imperial Rescript on Education. Moral teaching was used as a tool to guide the lower 
classes in the primary school into loyalty to the nation state and the Emperor, with 
emphasis on filial piety and sacred power. Mori Arinori, as the Minister of Education, 
established an educational system that was intended to create individuals loyal to the 
state. 
Such a definition of loyalty was challenged, and the cultural leaders debated new 
philosophical and practical moral values in public, resisting the state's education 
reforms. For the cultural leaders, morals and ethics implied personal, social and 
national autonomy and institutional independence.  
In the process of using traditions for modernising purposes, reinforcing the central 
value system and changing the relations of leaders to the state and society, there were 
interrelations between the state and the cultural leaders and between the cultural leaders 
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and the citizens. Hence a cohesive society emerged, and the new knowledge spread 
widely. In these ways and in this sense, the historical legacy of the concept of merit 
was transformed, and continued by changing its forms and contents at state and social 
levels. 
The next chapter discusses the effects of these changes on the education of leaders. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE EDUCATION OF LEADERS IN JAPAN 
The chapter identifies what will be defined as leadership positions for the purpose of 
this chapter, and then analyses new forms of the education of leaders for those 
positions. The chapter also examines the Tokugawa legacy of the education of leaders. 
The education of leaders in Tokugawa Japan (1603-1868) 
Leadership positions 
During the 260 years of the Tokugawa period, Japan had no constitution which defined 
the locus of supreme power. The Tokugawa government had only a small institutional 
basis for its authority, and depended on a highly developed household system, which 
developed during the inland war periodsl . 
Leadership positions in Tokugawa Japan were held by the Emperor (Tenn), the 
Shoguns, and Daimyo. The Tokugawa government accepted the premise of a sovereign 
the Emperor. The Shogun was a generalissimo and exercised military power in Japan 
in the name of the Emperor. The Shogun had authority over his peers and the Daimyo, 
who were the landlords who governed over 10,000 koku, granted by the Shogun. 2 
The Tokugawa government entered into the lives of the people through four main 
institutions: the imperial court, the religious houses, the Shogunate and the Daimyo 
domains. However, the imperial court and the religious houses covered only a fraction 
of the population of the registered territory of Japan: over 98 percent was administered 
by Danny5.3 
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As indicated earlier, the education of leaders in Tokugawa Japan emphasised morals, 
martial arts and refinement. The socialisation of leaders was framed by Shinto-Bushicio 
combined with neo-Confucianism. There was a balance between a philosophical and 
moral code on the one hand and practical, useful knowledge on the other. Learning 
and networking communities developed for the different status groups and in local 
domains. 
Having a strong sacred role in the Shinto religion, thTennei symbolised moral virtue!' 
The Shoguns were lords of the House of Tokugawa (bakufu). Their role was to govern 
the country as leaders in administrative offices, the law, the military and the executive 
committees of the Shogun Council.5 The Shogun and the Daimyo used education to 
stabilise their own position by learning morality, Bushiclo literacy (bun) and martial 
arts (bu), which were blended with neo-Confucianism. 
The education of Bushi leaders 
The institutions for the education of the Tenni Shoguns and Daimyo were similar. All 
of them were educated in their own private study rooms, which were used for political 
and cultural gatherings. By promoting private relations between the teacher and the 
students, the Japanese tradition of the school system emerged and developed as one of 
the most effective methods of socialisation in moral values and knowledge. This 
private study could also promote academic education. ShOguns and Daimyo 
summoned Confucian scholars and military and other specialists to give lectures, which 
their chief vassals were required to attend.6 
This well-established learning system began to undergo changes in the late eighteenth 
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century. 
In the time of the Shogun Iemitsu, the concepts of the education of leaders, of the neo-
Confucian philosophical and moral code and of practical learning became matters of 
political interest. Hayashi Razan's private school, established in 1690, came under 
Shogunate control in 1797.' The majority of the students in his school, named 
sholteiko, were sons of Daimyo and Bushi from the domains. Bushi of the various fiefs 
were required to attend the neo-Confucian schools in the domains.8  
The institutions for the education of Bushi leaders developed in three ways: through 
Tokugawa government schools (shoheiko), the local Daimyei' s domain schools (hanko) 
and private schools (shijuku). As the Shoguns opened Shoheiko, Daimyei built and ran 
their domain schools. In 269 domains, there were around 300 domain schools. 
Learning institutions spread rapidly throughout the country.9 
Some of the domain schools admitted people from non-Bushi status groups, except for 
learning the martial arts.10 After the abolition of the domain system in 1871, these 
schools developed into the middle and higher schools.11 Most Meiji reformers received 
their education in the domain schools and shijuku. 
Although each domain school in principle selected its own topics and curriculum, most 
of the schools provided Chinese knowledge for the Bushi status group. Instruction 
focused on Chinese classics, the study of neo-Confucian doctrine and the history and 
literature of China.12 
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Meirindo at Owari and Kanazawa, was permitted access to the DaimyO's private 
library. Libraries were instruments of learning where Daimy5, for example Tokugawa 
Yoshinao, Owari Daimy5 who owned over 1000 books, used to read and allowed their 
companions to study.13 In this way the Daimyo educated himself and at the same time 
facilitated the development of educational institutions.14 
One area of Western learning which received the attention of Daimyei was medicine. 
The study of Western medicine developed primarily in private schools. The first state 
institute of Western medicine was an immunisation centre, founded in 1858, which 
continued to the end of the Sh6gunate as the leading centre for Western medicine 
(Seiyo Igakujo). Following the Meiji Renovation it was re-established by the new 
government.15 The Tokugawa legacy of various styles of schools continued in the 
Meiji period. 
Knowledge 
The most important knowledge for the Tenn() was Chinese classics (kangaku) and 
music. The content of learning was moral and religious.16 The basic educational 
obligation of the Shogun was the promotion of Bushicki, neo-Confucianism, and the law 
governing Bushi families (bukeshohatto).17 Within the central and local government, 
there was no prohibition or restriction on the educational activities of the retainers as 
long as Daimy5 remained loyal to the learning of neo-Confucianism and the 
development of Bushic/O. Shoguns took initiatives to combine their moral code with 
practical learning (fitsugaku).18 
The eighth Shogun, Yoshimune (reigned 1716-1745), encouraged the acquisition of 
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practical learning of foreign knowledge, and of Western sciences, in the medium of the 
Dutch language. 19 
The eleventh Shogun, Ienari (reigned 1787-1837), opposing Sino-centrism and seeking 
to confirm national identity, introduced in 1790 a law which prohibited the study of 
classical Confucianism (kansei no igaku no kinshi no rei). Instead, neo-Confucianism 
was stressed. Neo-Confucianism came to be officially advocated by the government as 
its ideas were seen as useful for governing the country, for the law and for the 
military.20 They helped to legitimise the Shogunates' political leadership and to rebuild 
the highly centralised feudal society through the unifying force of neo-Confucian 
thought.21  
In the executive committees of the Shogun's Council, the Shoheik5 became the 
authority for teaching neo-Confucianism and Chinese classics. Many Confucian 
scholars were employed by the domain.22 The development of the Shoheiko was thus 
closely linked to the 1790 law prohibiting the study of any philosophical thought, with 
the exception of neo-Confucianism. This law applied to all Daimyo throughout Japan. 
For example, in the entrance examination held in 1792 for the ShOheiko, Daimyo who 
did not accept neo-Confucianism were not allowed to be candidates.23  
In the last five years of the Tokugawa period, studying in other domains became the 
top political and educational priority. The purpose of the provisions dealing with 
students studying in other domains was to encourage the learning and enlightenment 
brought to the domain by these returning students.24 The subjects which most Daimyo 
encouraged students to study at the domain's expense, but outside it, were basic 
military science and medicine. 	 After these, the subjects stressed were neo- 
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Confucianism and Japanese and Chinese literature, which included poetry and ethical 
philosophy. 25  
Neo-Confucian education emphasised the cultivation of the moral qualities of learners. 
The emphasis was on the combination of achievement with the extension of trust and 
harmony. 	 These moral principles, together with philosophical and practical 
knowledge, were further cultivated in kakun, the primordial family discipline, and 
applied in Bushi families over generations.26 
The political principle of ninsei [the politics of benevolence and responsibility] was 
based on the education of leaders in family principles.27 This tradition continued in the 
Meiji period. 
At the end of the Tokugawa period, the education of leaders were based on moral 
values and a diverse selection of jitsugaku; these defined the education of leaders in the 
family, and leaders encouraged newcomers to take up individual obligations within 
status groups.28 Hence the top vassals' views on politics and on status groups were 
based on a sense of family principle. Education was not designed to stabilise 
individual positions. The purposes of learning for Bushi families were to promote self-
cultivation and the discipline of the peer group, and to maintain control of their own 
domain governments.29 This Tokugawa legacy of the education of leaders shifted into 
different forms and directions in the Meiji period. 
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The education of leaders in Meiji Japan 
Meiji Japan (1868-1900) 
Leadership positions 
The Tokugawa legacy of the education of leaders shifted as the Meiji state modernised 
its political leadership. By the time of the establishment of the new Meiji government, 
the promulgation of the Constitution in 1889, and the opening of the Diet, the highest 
positions in the state were held by the TennO, the prime minister and cabinet ministers, 
the president and members of the two aristocratic institutions, namely the Privy 
Council and the House of Peers, influential political parties, and the admirals and other 
leading military officers. Among them, it was Ito Hirobumi, a peer and the first Prime 
Minister of Japan, who consolidated the bureaucracy and the structure of the Imperial 
state. 
Under ItO's leadership, the Meiji government redefined the Tenno's position as 
symbolic, turning it into a sacred ritual institution. Tenno-symbolism assumed 
institutional importance, particularly in education and higher education, and occupied a 
central position in the political consciousness of wide sectors of Meiji society. After 
the rise of the political parties, Ito, as Prime Minister, created a privileged aristocratic 
social class (kazoku) by providing the five ranks of aristocrats with titles; they became 
dukes, marquises, counts, viscounts and barons.3°  
The first Meiji state leaders, who began the modernisation of the country, were the 
generation who negotiated the Meiji Renovation. 31 Many were Western-trained. 
Among them, there were Mori Arinori, the Minister of Education, and General 
Yamagata Aritomo, later the Prime Minister. 
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Both the first and second generation of state leaders, however, retained traditional 
Bushicki values, neo-Confucianism and indigenous nationalism: their slogans were 
`return to Imperial government' (osei fukko), 'honour the Emperor' (sonnO jiii) and the 
formation of the strong and rich nation-state (fukokukyohei). They remained in control 
of state policy for the next three decades. 
In the middle of the Meiji period, the second generation of leaders was Western-
trained, either abroad or in Japan at the Imperial University, with Western-language 
texts and sometimes Western teachers. The Law School of the Imperial University was 
a source of recruitment for the civil bureaucracy,32 and the Military Academy for the 
military officials. 
In 1899, at the time of the Yamagata Aritomo cabinet, thirty percent of the House of 
Representatives were Tokyo Imperial University graduates.33 The graduates from this 
university were thus important in both the bureaucracy and the political parties. 
The Bushi stratum moved into the new positions, particularly in administration, police, 
the press, transport, communication, education and the exploration of Hokkaido.34 The 
new state education of civil servants was important. 
The education of civil servants 
In the early Meiji period, the supply of well-educated bureaucrats was a prerequisite for 
the new government to realise a 'rich and strong Japan' in the international system of 
nation-states. This requirement put pressure on the leaders of the state to review how 
to educate its civil servants. In 1877, the state established Tokyo University by 
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merging the existing Shoheikii (the Tokugawa neo-Confucian Academy), the Medical 
School and the Kaisei-jo (the school for Western learning).35  
In establishing the Imperial University as a university for the state, the government was 
following the German model. However, the Imperial University included departments 
in the applied sciences, engineering and agriculture, subjects that were excluded from 
German universities but were seen as useful in Japan.36 
This role for Tokyo University, now as the Imperial University was explicit. In 1885, 
when Mori Arinori took office as the first Minister of Education, he gave this 
institution the designation of the Imperial University. Article 1 of the 1886 Imperial 
University Order stated: "The Imperial University has as its goal the teaching of, and 
fundamental research in, the arts and sciences necessary for the state".37 
The Imperial University began as the highest educational institution and as the most 
prestigious institution of learning for the civil service. The first and second generations 
of the civil servants were shaped by Western knowledge, through learning foreign 
languages with foreign teachers.38  
Knowledge 
In 1881, when the university established the faculties of medicine, science, literature 
and law, English was taught as the basic essential language. German was required for 
science, French for law and English for the literature course.39 The emphasis was on 
language skills rather than literature. The training had a vocational orientation. 
Between 1881 and 1882, the faculty of science expanded to include courses on 
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chemistry, mathematics, physics, astronomy, biology, engineering, geology and 
metallurgy. 4° Politics and economics (rizaigakka) were studied in the literature 
department. Beside these two fields, there were courses in philosophy and in kokugaku 
[the study of Japanese classics based on Shinto values] and Chinese literature. 
Tokugawa legacy of kokugaku was replaced by a study of wabungaku [Japanese 
literature] in 1886.41 Law students studied highly specialised Western law. In 1885, 
the study of politics and economics was incorporated into the faculty of law.42 
In the same academic year of 1881-1882, first-year students in the law department 
studied Japanese literature, Chinese literature and composition, and history. The 
Tokugawa legacy of studies in Chinese classics, including neo-Confucian and 
Confucian doctrine, continued. English literature and composition, the French 
language, logic and jurisprudence were added to the traditional subjects.43 Thus the 
future state leaders acquired proficiency in the French, English and Chinese languages 
and in classical Japanese literature. In the second, third and fourth years, the study of 
law focused on English law, British constitutional law, French law and public and 
private international law. The study of ancient and contemporary Japanese law was 
introduced, but the students had less time for this work.44 
Training the students for positions in the bureaucracy included studies abroad. The 
provision of overseas study was not new. In the late Tokugawa period, the enthusiasm 
of the government and the Daimy5 for the adaptation of foreign knowledge was 
reflected in their commitment to the dispatch of students overseas. Based on Sakuma's 
idea of combining Western knowledge and eastern morality, the missions aimed to 
modernise their own domains.45 Overseas studies in the Tokugawa period were 
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characterised by the choice of knowledge and of countries according to individual and 
domain interests. 
Between 1860 and 1867, such projects were organised in thirteen domains, and in total, 
153 students were sent to twelve countries. The Satsuma domain sent Mori Arinori 
and others to Britain and the United States. In 1864, the ChoshO domain sent Ito 
Hirobumi to Britain to study military science and the navy. At the time of the Meiji 
renovation, this flow of students studying overseas was increasing.46 
In the Meiji period, the delegation system was gradually integrated and overseas 
studies was monopolised by the state system, institutionalised and stabilised. The 
overseas studies projects went through three phases: the emergence of the state 
overseas studies project (1868-1874); the consolidation of the training for the 
bureaucrats (1875-1881); and meeting the need for academic professionals (1882-
1912). 
In the first stage, the new government centralised the overseas studies system by 
devising travel permits for persons leaving Japan. In 1870, the government allowed 
fifteen domains to send two inspectors from each as official government inspectors. In 
1871, the first Iwakura Mission group was sent to the United States. It aimed to 
inspect the way in which the Western countries were modernised. In the same year, the 
Grand Council established the Order Concerning Study Abroad (Kaigai Ryiigaku 
Kisoku).47 
In 1872, the Fundamental Code of Education (Gakusei) was promulgated, and 
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institutionalised the overseas students missions as a national system." The students 
selected by the university were young men between the ages of seventeen and twenty-
two. Among them, there were two types of students: those who were to receive a 
general education abroad for a Bachelor's degree, and those who were to study special 
subjects, primarily law, chemistry and engineering. The role of the returned students 
was to introduce Western knowledge and technology into Japan for her civilisation and 
enlightenment. Among them there were Ono Azusa and Kataoka Kenkichi, who 
became active cultural leaders of the People's Freedom and Rights Movements (The 
PFR Movement) and cooperators in the establishment of the private universities. 
In the second stage, overseas training met the state's needs for a modern civil service 
and the consolidation of the bureaucracy. Western knowledge and countries were 
deliberately selected. T6kyo University limited the chosen students to the graduate 
groups who had received a general education in Japan, and then majored in a special 
study abroad. In 1879, graduates from the law, literature and science faculties were 
sent to England and France. In the same year, three graduates of the medical faculty 
went to Germany.49 Graduation overseas became a prominent entry route to the civil 
service. 
The other group of overseas graduates played the role of primary organisers of 
academic societies and became the model for the overseas students in the third stage. 
The role of overseas students changed, when the bureaucracy was solidified and the 
foreign teachers and experts were gradually giving way to indigenous experts, and to 
returned overseas students. The overseas studies programme was limited to academic 
institutions and to graduates, researchers and university lecturers.5° The project was 
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reinforced by the reform included in the 1882 Overseas Student Law. The law applied 
the overseas studies system mainly to Tokyo University students, and helped to meet 
the state's needs for academic professionals, teachers of higher education, and a 
technocratic civil service.51  
The increase of students sent to Germany led to a change in the quality and selection of 
learning. The emphasis was not only on medicine but also on natural science, politics, 
pedagogy, philosophy, the humanities and social science. 52 Overseas study in 
Germany was institutionalised as one of the powerful avenues to success in academic 
life. 
Thus at the end of the Meiji period, the target of Article 1 of the 1886 Imperial 
University Order was realised. Nationalism played an important role in the 
development of the bureaucracy, the state university and the overseas studies project. 
New meritocratic bureaucrats and academic leaders were shaped by foreign knowledge 
and technology, and by a strong sense of national identity. New academic societies of 
arts and science were formed by the returned overseas students. Notably, the Japan 
Seismology Society was established by the group led by Hattori Kazumi in 1881. The 
Tokyo Biology Society was established by Minosaku Yoshikichi and Yatabe Ryokichi 
in 1883. Engineering societies in many fields were established, one after another.53  
In the 1880s, the Tokugawa legacy of the idea of education as being designed for self-
cultivation and social obligation shifted into education for the mobility of individuals 
and their education in Western knowledge. This was the particularly the case for the 
military leaders who had a slightly different educational experience from the civil 
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servants in relation to the acceptance of foreign knowledge and the consequences of the 
modernity project. 
The education of the military leaders 
In the early Meiji period, the establishment of the army and the navy, the supply of 
highly skilled officers, and the creation of a modern military system were urgent 
issues.54 In 1869, a military school and an attached elementary school were established 
in Numazu. The elementary school, which became a preparatory institution for the 
Military Academy, did not initially admit commoners, but after the introduction of the 
1883 Conscription Law efforts were made to open it to commoners who were 
exceptionally successful in the entrance examination." 
The Military Academy was established in November 1882. It aimed to train staff 
officers and to develop research.56 The Meiji army was modelled on the Prussian 
army, and the navy on that of Britain. In 1872, foreign military advisers from the 
U.S.A numbered sixteen, from Britain 119, from France, ten, from Holland two, and 
from Prussia, eight. The military overseas studies project started in 1870 and continued 
until 1883, when the military institutions were stabilised through the promulgation of 
the Conscription Law and a sufficient number of teachers had returned from overseas 
studies.57 
The impact of the returned overseas students in the Military Academy was evident. 
Katsura Taro, who had been an overseas student in Germany, became a teacher at the 
Military Academy in 1882. It was Katsura who invited Klemens Wilhelm Jakob 
Meckel (1885-88), a German major.58 
113 
Curricula valued in the Military Academy were greatly influenced by Meckel. His 
curricula emphasised military tactics, strategy and military history. The training of the 
army leaders focussed on judgement. To be an efficient strategist, quick decisions 
through the understanding of psychology, power, judgement and action in war 
situations were required. The study of history centred on European history and wars, 
and was taught by Western teachers. Education focussed on skills. Students were 
trained in these skills by teacher-students in one-to-one lessons, but they did not study 
the Japanese classics and history, hence they did not integrate their knowledge of 
tactics and manoeuvres into indigenous war history based on Eastern philosophy and 
Bushiclii values. New military officers emerged who were highly skilled in tactics and 
in the technical perspective of modern European warfare but lacking in the moral 
traditions of the original Japanese army and spiritual leaders.59 
The curriculum of the Military Academy between December 1914 and November 
1915, for example, emphasised foreign languages and practical Western knowledge. It 
included English, French, German, Russian, Chinese, transport, mathematics, statistics, 
public international law, national law, general knowledge about horses, horse riding, 
hygiene, accounting, the use of weapons, fortress construction, measurement, applied 
earth science, Western military history, manoeuvres, tactics in naval battles, the 
practice of war strategy and autumn field practice.6° Meckel's curricula continued until 
the end of the Second World War. Meckel's students were only junior officers in the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, but many of 
the military leaders in the 1940s had experienced his curriculum.61  
The new civil servants and military leaders thus had technocratic knowledge and 
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experience of life overseas. They aimed to modernise the state and to change the social 
structure. The state leaders put their loyalty to the state before their individual 
obligations. In contrast, what the thesis calls 'the cultural leaders' had different 
perceptions of foreign knowledge and the selection of knowledge. 
The education of the cultural leaders 
By the late 1880s, as the state modernised, there were various attitudes to the state 
modernity project for the formation of a Western education system. There were two 
main issues. 
Firstly, the Imperial University graduated only a few students. In 1888, there were ten 
graduates in English law, and thirty-four in the French law department.62 In the same 
year, the total number of graduates from the Imperial University was 127. As against 
these small numbers, the need for human talent in various social sectors was 
overwhelming.63  
Secondly, and more importantly, state education emphasised practical Western 
knowledge, and neglected indigenous knowledge and moral values in the education of 
leaders. This provoked a reaction. Cultural leaders included Nakae Chomin, Tokutomi 
Soho, and some academic leaders at the Imperial University challenged the absence of 
indigenous knowledge, Japanese learning, academic autonomy, and the dominance of 
the state in moral education and cultural leaders responded to this situation by 
establishing private universities. 64 In the process, several different styles of 
educational institutions and leaders emerged. 
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In the 1880s, at the time when there was an increase in the number of indigenous 
experts and returned overseas students, private institutions for education in law were 
rapidly established. Teaching Western knowledge in the Japanese language and by 
Japanese lecturers began. This was due to the shared interests in study and research on 
law and education in Japan among the cultural leaders and some academics. Among 
the new academic leaders (comprising most of the returned overseas students), there 
was a determination to forge Japan's cultural and intellectual uniqueness, through 
recreating the originality of its learning by combining Western and traditional 
knowledge. The achievements of these leaders came from networks based on the 
cultural heritage from the previous period, but the networks played new roles in the 
new society, drawing on what was learnt from the West.65  
One concrete outcome of the challenge to the state programme was the establishment 
of an institution which provided for the study of law. In 1885, with the support of 
Hozumi Nobushige, a dean of the law faculty of Tokyo University, the School of 
English Law (later, Chu() University) was founded. Hozumi was a returned overseas 
student from England, and one of the academics who resisted the state training of 
leaders and emphasised the significance of private education.66 Some of his graduates 
became judicial officials. 
In fact, in the early period of the establishment of the school, the number of graduates 
who passed the law examination for the civil service exceeded that of graduates from 
the state university, but very few officials from the School of English Law found senior 
positions.67 
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Under the auspices of Megada Shutarei, Aiba Eifu, Kaneko KentarO, Hatoyama Kazuo 
and Tajiri Inajiro, the Senshu Gakko (later, Senshil University) was established in 1880 
as of the specific educational institution for law and economics. 
In 1880, Keio Gijuku set up a faculty of law with the support of Aiba, Kaneko and 
Megada.68 In 1890, KeiO Gijuku University (Keio University) was established by 
Fukuzawa Yukichi as the first private university, with faculties of law, literature and 
economics. New commercial studies were based on jitsugaku, [practical and useful 
learning] in opposition to the previous abstract and theoretical Confucian and national 
learning. Consequently, the majority of the graduates followed careers in business 
rather than in politics.69 There were no science and technology departments, because 
of the lack of finance. Fukuzawa used the term jitsugaku' for science, by which he 
meant learning which was "closer to ordinary human needs"." 
Tokyo Specific College (Tokyo Senmon Gakko, later Waseda University) was founded 
in 1882 as a specialised college by Okuma Shigenobu, a scholar and state leader, and 
by his networking group of supporters including Hatoyama Kazuo and Ono Azusa, 
within a year after that they had left the government and moved into political 
opposition.71 Waseda University was intended to be a private coeducational institution 
of higher learning and the nurturing ground for future politicians. 72 Its core 
departments were those of political science, law, English, and psychology. In 1890 its 
faculty of literature was established.73  
The different features of KeiO(gijuku) and Waseda Universities reflected the different 
ideas of the founders. The knowledge valued by Fukuzawa was dokuritsu jison 
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[independence and self-respect], while Okuma valued the 'independence of academic 
institutions'. Fukuzawa encouraged graduates to be leaders in the new fields of 
`modern Japan', such as industry, banking, journalism, law, and philosophy, while 
Okuma encouraged graduates to be state leaders.74 
The spirit of Keio(gijuku) University, dokuritsu jison served as a model of jitsugaku, 
which continues today. Dokuritsu-jison is a mixture of traditional values, as described 
in the previous chapter, merit and knowledge based on the idea of the Way of Heaven 
which demonstrates individual autonomy and social obligation, but is enriched by 
knowledge of the foreign ideas of independence reflected in the American Declaration 
of Independence of July 1776. In 1866, Fukuzawa translated the Declaration of 
Independence and the United States Constitution, which appeared in his book, Seiyo 
JO [The state of affairs in the West].75  
The private higher educational institutions played an important role in society by 
selecting and combining the meaning of foreign knowledge with indigenous 
knowledge to realise national and personal independence. 
Knowledge 
As indicated, the knowledge valued by the cultural leaders was a combination of 
Western knowledge with indigenous philosophical and practical knowledge, in order to 
create a Japanese form of learning and to realise the independence of society which 
leads to the independent state in the world. The cultural and intellectual struggles over 
the institutionalisation of this knowledge were seen in the rapid establishment of 
private faculties of law and literature, work on translation, and the emphasis on 
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jitsugaku including the study of foreign languages. 
The English Law School aimed to spread the study of law in the Japanese language. 
The School aimed to promote the knowledge of English law, as opposed to French law 
which dominated the civil bureaucracy. 76 As indicated earlier, teaching Western 
knowledge in Japanese and by Japanese lecturers demonstrated the academic leaders' 
determination to form Japan's independent position in the international arena. 
In the 1890s, the cultural leaders' determination to emphasise the independence of the 
country and learning was reflected in the rapid formation of the faculties of literature. 
The private institutions redefined indigenous literature and foreign knowledge, but in 
different ways from the Imperial University and also from each other. 
Waseda University (Tokyo Senmon Gakko) established a faculty of literature in 1890. 
Unlike the Imperial University, Waseda University provided three literature courses on 
Japanese classics, Chinese classics and Western literature.77 The emphasis was on 
criticism and research rather than on teaching. The course was similar to that of 
Kokukgakuin University, which emphasised studies based on Japanese history, Shinto 
religion and classic literature and philosophy. Shinto, Confucianism and Buddhism 
were studied in the philosophy department.78  
In contrast, the faculty of literature in the Imperial University provided a course in the 
study of politics, economics, foreign affairs and history and philosophy. In 1881, 
curricula for Japanese and Chinese literature courses were established, but Western 
literature was not included. The literature course in Keiii University provided English, 
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German and other languages, and Japanese and Chinese classics. 
This was the time when criticism of state modernity surfaced, and indigenous kangaku 
[the study of Chinese classics] was re-emphasised, together with kokugaku [the study 
of Japanese classics]. There was constant criticism of the state overseas projects and 
their selection of knowledge for study. Overseas studies in other Asian countries were 
excluded from the state projects.79 
In the first half of the 1880s, there was a change in the understanding of the study of 
foreign knowledge among academics. Yoshino San Jin redefined the value of 
traditional kangaku by establishing a new approach to learning. Both Western 
knowledge (yogaku or rangaku) and Chinese knowledge were to be understood as 
learning about the world, and not as a study of the West or China, or of equal or 
opposing knowledge. Yoshino suggested in the Tokyo arts and sciences magazine 
(Tokyo Gakugei Zasshi) that scholars of the Chinese classics should study in China. 
His plan was to send 10 young men to China to study there for 15 years." 
In 1881, Keio University received two Korean overseas students. They came to Japan 
in order to absorb modern Western culture, rather than studying in the Western 
countries, because — it was argued - it was best to learn from Japan, which had chosen 
and imported practical and useful Western culture.81 According to the records of the 
overseas studies project of Tokyo Senmon Gakko [Waseda University], the total 
number of graduates from overseas studies between 1884 and 1900, the years from its 
establishment to its promotion to a University, was 53 students. Most of them studied 
in the United States, England, Germany, France and China. About 80 percent of the 
students were from the faculties of law and politics and obtained bachelors, masters 
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and doctoral degrees.82 
The work of translation of foreign knowledge demonstrated the cultural leaders' 
consciousness of the need to find the way to develop education to create an 
independent and democratic state in the international arena. Fukuzawa established a 
four-year course in translation and writing skills, while the law department of Tokyo 
University practised these in the first grade. 
In 1883, Fukuzawa reformed the method of teaching foreign knowledge by separating 
foreign teachers' lectures and oral instruction from the study of English language (the 
reading of original English texts). The students read large amounts in the original 
language, and Western textbooks were also translated into Japanese for wide use. The 
use of textbooks on Western geography and customs, technology, ethics and morals, 
and works on political economy and scientific thought was also encouraged. These 
texts served as popular guidebooks to the laws of natural phenomena, to enlighten the 
Meiji population in general.83  
Foreign knowledge was combined with indigenous knowledge through the 
development of teacher-student relationships, including those with the outstanding, 
leader Fukuzawa, and later spiritual leaders of the Keio group. 
Fukuzawa stated that Japan's institutions would not function well unless social leaders 
possessed high skills in applying Western values in speech, argument and verification. 
Applying this idea, Fukuzawa invented the word enzetsu' [speech] and wrote a book 
on debating skills." 
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In June 1874, the Mita Speech Hall (Mita enzetsukan) was established, and the Mita 
enzetsu kai [association] was formed. The first two debates were on the questions of 
the subjugation of Taiwan by the Japanese army and the protection of the traditional 
silk industry by the government. Thus the subjects were political, and focussed on the 
ambivalence and the accountability of the modernity projects. The distinction between 
scholars and state modernisers was argued by Obata Atsujiro on 19th July 1874.85 
Keio University maintained the new tradition of 'speeches' at Mita Hall as a significant 
part of the education of leaders. By June 2003, 676 speakers, including foreign 
scholars and professionals, had given speeches at Mita Hall.  
Tokyo Senmon Gakko began speech and debate meetings in 1884. The purpose was 
similar: to train the students in public speaking and at the same time to deepen the 
close relationships between the lecturer and the student.86 
At this time, a public discourse in support of the PFR Movement was growing, while 
the government's restriction on free speech was tightened. In February in 1883 the 
government prohibited judges, public prosecutors and professors at T6kyo University 
from participating in lecturing at the private law schools." Through networks, Miyake 
Kotoku, Hatano Tokichil and Seki Naohiko, lecturers at Tokyo Hogakko, helped to 
replace the cancelled courses. 
Parallel to the acquisition of academic knowledge, Fukuzawa advocated Bushicki based 
on the martial arts. Kei6 University emphasised sports as essential in the education of 
leaders. In 1889, the Taiiku kai [Sport Society] was established. It encouraged kendO, 
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judo, baseball, boating, archery, physical training (sOren) and walking. In every 
student group, the seniors were responsible for the juniors. This style of education was 
the Tokugawa legacy of the socialisation of the younger generations.88 
At the end of the 1800s, the cultural leaders were rapidly emerging. There were new 
opportunities for social success. At the same time, new kinds of bureaucrats and 
military leaders were also being formed. In this rapid transition, the real basis of 
morality in the state education system had not yet been reconsidered. Both state and 
cultural leaders challenged the state-dominated morality. 
Within fifteen years after the Renovation, the importation of foreign knowledge 
brought about the rapid emergence of highly skilled bureaucrats. These new and 
privileged state leaders were, however, restrained within a given identity as the 
servants of the Tenni)" in the government. 
A redefined version of Shintoism based on Confucianism was taken up politically as 
the national morality in the education system. This marked a shift in traditional moral 
values and the concept of merit. The 1880 Education Order was implemented to 
impose a Confucian moral education. Fukuzawa as well as Mori Arinori opposed 
Motoda Nagazane, a Confucian lecturer to the Emperor. He had suggested the use of 
the Imperial Rescript in compulsory education (Kyoiku Chokugo), and the 
reinforcement of Confucianism as a national morality. 89 
Fukuzawa emphasised the traditional moral value of independence and self-respect, 
and the creation of new Japanese individuals to advance civilisation. In contrast, Mori 
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wanted a modern education system linked to the state system, and the creation of new 
Japanese individuals for the sake of the country. Mori defined education as a means to 
serve the state's interest, the spirit of morality and nationalism and advocated three 
virtues: dignity, friendship and obedience. Although he granted the university relative 
freedom, Mori strongly controlled school education. The slogan "for the sake of the 
country" implied not only obedience but "training" as wel1.90 
Despite the public debate started by Fukuzawa and Mori, in 1879 Motoda Nagazane 
revived Confucian moral thought and institutionalised its values in educational policy 
by legitimising them in the Imperial Rescript on Education.91 The notion of loyalty 
and filial piety following neo-Confucian principles was confirmed in compulsory 
Japanese education. The Imperial Rescript on Education in 1879 argued that: 
the danger of indiscriminate emulation of western ways is that in the end 
our people will forget the great principles governing the relations between 
ruler and subject, and father and son. Our aim, based on our ancestral 
teachings, is solely the clarification of benevolence, justice, loyalty and 
filial piety. For morality, the study of Confucius is the best guide. People 
should cultivate sincerity and moral conduct, and after that they should turn 
to the cultivation of the various subjects of learning in accordance with their 
ability. In this way, morality and technical knowledge will fall into their 
proper places.92 
Thus the Rescript proposed a strengthening of traditional morality and virtue in order 
to provide a firm base for the formation of the Imperial nation-state. 
There was a dispute between the state leaders. Ito suggested to Motoda that there still 
remained an urgent need to seek new knowledge from the West.93 But Motoda rejected 
Ito's argument. 
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Thus most indigenous morality and knowledge were, as indicated earlier, firmly 
institutionalised in the education system in the form of ritual, the political ideology of 
national morality (kokumin dotoku), loyalty to the Tenna and nation-state, and the 
dissemination of a textbook for shrishin [national morality] in the schools. 
Shinto and BushidO based on Confucianism and neo-Confucian values were a 
convenient tool to realise the Imperial nation-state. In the late middle Meiji period, the 
military intervened in politics and took up a special place in the Meiji state by 
formalising the position of the national armed forces in the 1882 Imperial Rescript to 
Soldiers and Sailors. The TennO was designated as Commander-in-Chief of the armed 
forces. This had the effect of securing the independence of the armed services from the 
civil organs of government. At the same time the Tenno himself exercised little power, 
though his position was of great importance in ceremonial and symbolic observances." 
In the Constitution of the Empire of Japan (1889), education was not directly 
addressed, but Article 9 referred to the issue of the necessary administrative orders on 
the basis of the supreme power of the Emperor. Article 10 prescribed the power of the 
Emperor to establish various government organs. Based on Article 10, imperial orders 
set up central and regional bureaucracies for the administration of education and 
specified the salaries of higher and junior level officials.95 Thus, under the Meiji 
imperial orders rather than laws were relied on to create the system for the 
government's administration of education. 
The Constitution of 1889 endorsed the autonomy of the army and navy, and gave them 
the position they had until the end of the Second World War. Although the language of 
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unified Shinto and Bushiclei was distinctly Japanese, these developments paralleled 
similar struggles in the West, in particular Germany and Austria, to create a special 
bond between the ruler and the armed forces.96 
However, as described earlier, by this time the private educational institutions were on 
the increase and new practical knowledge was disseminated widely. The approval of 
Waseda and Keio Universities by the state signified the desire to provide educational 
facilities of a broader nature than those of the specialised schools 97 
It took 32 years for Keio Gijuku to be recognised as the first private university in 
Japan. The founder, Fukuzawa, had learned Western knowledge through Dutch studies 
and had established a private school for Dutch studies (Shijuku) in Teppozu, Edo, in 
1858. In 1863, the school developed into a centre for English learning. In 1868 the 
school was relocated in Shiba Shinsenza and was renamed as Keio Gijuku.98 From 
1858 to 1896, Keio Gijuku struggled. In 1868, there were 103 students at the Dutch 
school, the origin of Kei6 (Gijuku) University. (These students were delegates of their 
domains). In 1872, the number reached 317. However, the abolition of the domain 
system in 1871 reduced the number of these students. In 1873, the loss of support from 
the domains led to a reduction in the number of students to 240. As a result of the 
Seinan war, there followed a further drastic decrease, to 105 in 1877.99 
Overall, the new Conscription Order of 1883 reduced the number of students in private 
schools, from 331 in 1883 to 223 in 1884. This order did not apply to Tokyo 
University students, but only to private school students. Fukuzawa published 
arguments in the newspaper VijishinpO' against the conscription system enforced by 
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the state and also argued against the views of Yamagata Aritomo, the Minister of the 
Interior, and Oki Takato, the Minister of Education. In 1884, Fukuzawa made a formal 
appeal to the governor of Tokyo, to grant private university students exemption from 
military service. 1°° Among his supporters were Ono Azusa, Okuma Shigenobu and 
Nijima Jo and Nakamura Keiu.101  
Thus the struggle over the role of private education was part of a struggle about the 
nature of the State and its leadership. A double structure for the education of leaders 
was being consolidated, one for the state modernisers from the state universities, and 
the other for the social modernisers from private universities. Both groups absorbed 
Western knowledge. However, for the state modernisers, morality meant a political 
and educational obligation of loyalty to the Emperor and the nation state, while for the 
social modernisers, the emphasis was on social obligations. One group of leaders were 
the graduates from the state universities (members of new aristocratic families and 
either members of the House of Peers, Privy Council bureaucrats or members of the 
political parties). The other group was made up of those from the private universities. 
The struggle was particularly marked over consolidating the bureaucracy. Firstly, the 
traditional bureaucrats established state universities and cliques (gakubatsu). The 
culture of the leaders shifted from an immersion in morality and the arts, to Western 
knowledge. Secondly, they controlled the education of bureaucrats through a 
competitive examination system.1°2 The majority of the high echelon of civil servants 
were the product of a university education in law, had passed civil service 
examinations which demanded knowledge of Western languages, had knowledge of 
law and jurisprudence partly on the basis of foreign experience, and were assured of 
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tenure. Thirdly, by the law covering the Imperial University Order (Teikoku daigaku 
rei) and civil service recruitment, graduates of the Faculty of Law of the Imperial 
University were exempted from the entrance examination for the civil service.11" 
By 1900, the state leaders included civil servants, selected `meritocratically' in a state 
education system, who served the imperial nation-state loyally. 
Meiji Japan (1900-1912) 
Overall, the beginning of the twentieth century was the time when, based on 
renegotiated cultural traditions, the private universities developed curricula mixed with 
foreign knowledge and established their own overseas students' projects to send as 
well as to receive foreign students.1" In contrast, at state level, the shifts in the 
renegotiation of the values of Shinto and BushidO, the concepts of merit, and the role of 
the education system and its shaping of leaders were almost completed. 
Leadership positions 
The third generation of political leaders passed through the Meiji state elementary 
schools, which had been framed by the new version of the Imperial Rescript on 
Education completed in 1911. 105 The stress was on 'patriotism' through a 
consolidation of the curriculum in 1912. Elementary school textbooks were supervised 
by the state. 
There was a change in the nature of patriotism, which the educational texts sought to 
promote. From "love of country" the emphasis moved to "loyalty to the Tennii; the 
new texts dwelt not on each individual's membership of the nation and the need for 
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individual initiatives to promote that nation's material welfare, but on the need for 
spiritual solidarity within a nation-family loyal to the Tenni): 
Our country is based on the family system, and indeed our whole country is 
one vast family; the Imperial family our founding family, the stem family 
from which we are all descended. With the same sense of loving respect as 
the child bears towards its parents, we Japanese revere the Imperial Throne, 
descended in direct link through ages eternal. It is in this sense that loyalty 
and filial piety are one and indivisible.106 
This extensive legal framework for the educational system was a result of the state 
leaders' determination to stabilise the state education systems and bureaucracy and 
build a source of national identity by redefining moral values, and old and new 
knowledge. 
Between the years 1868 and 1912, 182 educational statutes (decrees, orders and 
regulations) were issued. There were also 15 cultural and scientific educational 
statutes.' 07 
The opposition group in the House of Representatives or the House of Councillors was 
from the private universities. By 1910, entry routes to the government bureaucracy 
were narrow for the private university graduates. For example, in 1910, sixty eight 
percent of graduates of the T6kyo Imperial University entered into the House of Peers, 
while nine percent were from Ky6to University, established in 1897. The graduates 
from the private universities were one tenth of the total members. The graduates of 
Waseda University had four percent of the total seats. Those of Kei6 University had 
five percent and Chao University had about two percent.1°8 
By 1910, entry routes to the political parties were also narrow for the private university 
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graduates. In the same year of 1910, the majority of the group who entered the 
political parties was also from the T6kyo Imperial University. They occupied 33 
percent of the total seats. Kyoto University graduates were six percent, while the 
graduates of Waseda University were sixteen percent, Kei6 University were eight and 
Chao University were seven percent.'°9 
 
Compared with Tokyo Imperial University graduates, among the private universities 
Waseda University had the highest percent of graduates entering the House of Peers 
and joining political parties, followed by Kei6 and Chao University. Other private 
schools, notably the schools which developed into the present Senshii, Meiji, Hosei, 
and Nippon Universities, were primarily concerned with training aspirants for official 
careers.
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Education in Tokyo Imperial University, in particular in law, was a tool to change 
social position. This phenomenon continued in the twentieth century. It was only in 
1915 that the law faculty was overtaken by the rest of the universities, though it 
continues to remain the largest single faculty up to the present time.111 It was also after 
1900 that the increasing new private specialised schools were recognised as having the 
same status as Imperial Universities, and their graduates were seen as qualified for the 
higher civil service.112 
The education of the civil servants 
The expansion of state higher education was slow. The Tokyo Imperial University had 
been established in 1877 as Tokyo University. By 1890, six colleges were established for 
130 
law, medicine, literature, science and engineering, and the College of Agriculture was 
founded.113 
The Imperial University system started expanding after the Sino-Japanese (1894-95) 
and Russo-Japanese Wars (1904-05). In June 1897, Kyoto Imperial University was 
established as the second Imperial University. Kyoto University consisted of the four 
colleges of law, medicine, letters, and science and engineering; the latter opened in 
September 1897 and the three other colleges between 1899 and 1906."4 At the same 
time, the name of the first Imperial University was changed to Tokyo Imperial 
University. 
The education of the military leaders 
In 1902 the Military Academy regulation was promulgated. Article 1 prescribed that 
the university selected the military officers. Article 1 further specified that the Military 
Academy should promote specific knowledge which concerned military 'research'. 
The emphasis in the recruitment and the promotion of students was on examination 
results."' Hence, personal upward mobility was possible through conscription and the 
examination system. 
However, the Military Academy lacked one important dimension. It did not offer the 
students interaction with the symbolic and moral personality of a mentor, such as the 
president of the Military Academy, because the principals of the Academy frequently 
changed. They changed seven times between 1889 to 1912. 
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The education of the cultural leaders 
In the early twentieth century, the number of specialised schools increased, and it 
became necessary to establish standardised rules for these schools. In 1903 there were 
39 specialised schools and eight specific vocational schools. 116 Through the 
Specialised School Order of 27th March 1903, the Minister of Education authorised 
nine private schools to become universities, and in the following year nine other 
schools were approved as universities.117 
Among them, there were Keio Gijuku, which had already established a university 
department in 1890, the School of English Law (Hogakuin, the present Ch5O 
University) and Waseda. 
In 1904 Waseda University acquired university status, with Schools of Political 
Science & Economics, Law, and Literature, English and the psychology department. 
Redefined traditional religious universities also emerged. The Sodoshil University and 
NichirenshO University were admitted as universities specialising in the study of 
Buddhism. Kokugakuin University introduced ShintOism and indigenous Japanese 
literature into the curriculum. A university for women, Nihon Women University, 
emerged. There was one specialised university. Taiwan kyOkaisenmonn gakko, which 
aimed to nurture jinzai who worked in other Asian countries. Also, Mori Arinori, at 
his own expense, established the Commercial Law Institute (ShOhO KOshi.ijo) in 1875. 
In 1920 this school became the government-supported Tokyo Commercial University, 
known today as Hitotsubashi University. 
The struggle over academic independence and freedom continued. At Waseda, the first 
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president's foundation address was a plea for academic freedom and the need to make 
education independent of government restrictions. At a time of rising nationalism, it 
was significant that he found academic independence and freedom important mainly as 
a condition for national independence:118 
Citizenship in the new world: the true aims of education of Waseda 
University are the realisation of the independence of study, the practical 
application of study, and the cultivation of model citizens. We must strive 
to pursue original research and to apply the results of such studies 
practically. According to present usage, the term "nation" has two parts. 
The one is the state, the other is society. If society does not develop in an 
orderly way, the nation cannot be stable. And at the very root of this 
relationship is the family. The family is the basis of the state. Morality and 
ethics find their source in family life. Thus, the fundamental principle of 
education must be the cultivation of character.119 
The curriculum of the law department in Waseda University between 1901 and 1902 
did not include the study of French law and English law, as at Tokyo Imperial 
University. But it included Roman law, and international private and public law. 
Besides the main study of law, curricula included a wide range of classical and modern 
subjects; the study of the state, sociology, the history of modern diplomacy, the history 
of the constitution and law, the history of Japanese literature, the history of English 
literature, Chinese literature, Japanese literature, the history of the East, rhetoric and 
psychology.120 
A university literary journal was important for the education of cultural leaders and the 
creation of new knowledge through a combination of old and new knowledge. Waseda 
Bungaku (Waseda Literature) was the first specialised literary journal, and was founded 
and edited by Tsubouchi Shoyo, a leader of the literature improvement movement 
which emerged in the late 1880s.121 The second series, between 1906 and 1927, 
became a major vehicle of Japanese Naturalism. Similarly, the journal Mita Bungaku 
(Mita Literature), founded at Keio University to compete with Waseda Bungaku 
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(Waseda Literature), was published from May 1910 and has continued to the present 
day. Under its first editor, Nagai Karn, Mita Bungaku joined forces with the magazines 
Shinshicho and Subaru against Japanese Naturalism. 
These cultural academic leaders struggled over the promotion of individual autonomy 
and institutional independence. The new concept of autonomy and independence was a 
mixture of the traditional 'way to Heaven' and the Western notion of independence. 
Their political, cultural and intellectual struggles concerned the provision of foreign 
knowledge, its combination with traditional values of balanced knowledge that is, 
combined epistemological, ontological knowledge with practical and useful 
knowledge. The consequence of this was the emergence of a cohesive society in Meiji 
Japan. 
Conclusion 
In the Tokugawa period, the education of Bushi leaders developed within a struggle 
about Chinese influence. Bushi identity began to be based on neo-Confucianism. This 
aim was institutionalised in the 1790 law prohibiting the study of classical 
Confucianism and other learning except neo-Confucianism, shijuku and domain 
schools. 
The Meiji Renovation was a time of challenges to political leadership. There was a 
threat to national independence from the imperialism of the Western countries. It was 
also a time of major change in the agricultural and industrial base and in social 
stratification. Leadership was not only based on cultural traditional values and 
knowledge, but also developed within the political process of integrating the local 
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Daimyo into the nation. Thus the education of leaders reflected the struggles of 
creating a new society. 
The shift in the education of state leaders was marked in the following three 
contrasting ways. 
Firstly, as the state and the society modernised, the state leaders created new cultural 
values, and subsequently new kinds of state leaders, by renegotiating the Tokugawa 
legacy of ShintO -Bushido values and neo-Confucianism. The previous values were 
replaced by a state morality which emphasised the Way of the Tenno. In particular, the 
notion of loyalty and filial piety within Confucianism was legitimised in the 1890 and 
1911 Imperial Rescripts on Education. The moral code for the education of leaders 
was framed by Shinto-BushidO combined with Confucianism. 
Secondly, the educational institutions were substantially reformed. The Tokugawa 
legacy of Shoheiko, which the Shogunate had operated, became Tokyo University 
(1877-1885), later the Imperial University (1886-1896), the Tokyo Imperial University 
(1897-1949) and finally Tokyo University. The Meiji state positioned the Imperial 
University as a research institution and as a place for the training of the new civil 
servants. The previous institutions of shijuku were officially abolished, although they 
continued in the form of personal learning and networking circles. As a consequence, 
two institutional structures of higher learning emerged: one provided higher education 
for the civil service and the military leaders, the other was for cultural leaders. While 
the state system for the education of leaders gave little space to academic 
independence, the private education of leaders was more autonomous in the selection 
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of what could be studied and in the internal and international networking between 
educational institutions. 
Thirdly, there was the problem of the renegotiation of the Tokugawa legacy of 
knowledge. The traditional knowledge of Tokugwa Japan, jitsugaku, was practical and 
useful knowledge, within a moral code of learning represented by the neo-Confucian 
idea of the Way of Heaven. The state university broke this structure of balanced 
knowledge. 
As the Meiji state modernised, the emphasis on the importation of foreign technical 
knowledge entailed the loss of indigenous knowledge and the moral code of learning 
from the education system. Motoda revived Confucian discipline and emphasised 
morality of loyalty to the nation-state in the education system. This provoked a 
reaction. The cultural leaders and some academic leaders at the Imperial University 
challenged the absence of indigenous knowledge, Japanese learning, academic 
autonomy, institutional independence and denounced the dominance of the state in 
moral education. The cultural leaders responded to this situation by establishing 
private universities. In the process, several different styles of educational institutions 
and leaders emerged. 
What was counted as good knowledge combined old and new knowledge, and was 
institutionalised in the private universities. In these, teaching offered gave access to 
Western vocational knowledge, the English language and the indigenous moral code of 
learning, the Way of Heaven. For example, Yoshino San Jin called for the study of 
both Western and Chinese knowledge, to be understood as learning about the world, 
136 
and not as a study of the West, or China, or of equal or opposing knowledge. Courses 
in kokugaku, kangaku and Western science (yOgaku) were set up, which had not existed 
in the state university. Western law was taught by Japanese professors in the Japanese 
language; this was a new idea. Parallel to the acquisition of academic knowledge, the 
establishment of sporting associations aimed to encourage the Tokugawa legacy of the 
socialisation of the younger generations through traditional Tokugawa and Western 
sports. The skills of speech valued by Western intellectuals were institutionalised in 
the KeiO and Waseda speech associations. Foreign knowledge was combined with 
indigenous knowledge through the development of teacher-student relationships, and 
through the work of translators. The new concepts of egalitarianism, autonomy and 
independence were a mixture of the traditional Way to Heaven and the Western notions 
of, for example, the American Declaration of Independence. 
The emergence of the cultural leaders was a consequence of the Meiji state's 
ambiguous modernity project. As was seen in the PFR Movement, cultural leaders 
were aware of their role in disseminating traditional values blended with new 
knowledge, which, they emphasised, would lead to the autonomy of Japan in the 
international world. Meiji cultural leaders in society were keen nationalists. 
However, until 1890, the private universities were not recognised as leading to the 
same careers as the state universities. Private university graduates had little access to 
the higher civil service. As a consequence of this blockage and of their differences 
over morality with the bureaucracy, the cultural leadership group, which included the 
former state leader Okuma Shigenobu, turned to political opposition against the 
privileged bureaucracy and the state modernity projects. 
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The main difference between the civil servants and the cultural leaders was that the 
bureaucrats perceived cultural traditions based on Shinto and BushiclO values and 
knowledge as convenient tools to reinforce the new political ideology, while the 
cultural leaders saw such cultural traditions as valuable in themselves and in relation to 
social obligations. The cultural leaders determined to develop their promotion of 
personal autonomy and institutional independence, which were dynamic and derived 
from the core cultural traditions of the Tokugawa period. 
Thus the complexity of the struggles over the state modernity project is found in the 
struggles within the cultural traditions over the concept of merit and what was counted 
as 'good' knowledge and over the new synthesis of old traditions and 'Western' ways. 
To the Meiji state leaders, the modernity projects were derived from their desire to 
construct a strong and rich Imperial nation-state. To do this, Meiji state leaders needed 
to establish a national education system and to consolidate the training and selection of 
bureaucratic leaders. In contrast, a private higher education system developed, with 
different definitions of good knowledge and merit and leading to different occupational 
opportunities. In this process the Tokugawa legacy of personal and institutional 
learning networks was practical and useful within the cultural leaders groups. 
Thus, differences between the state modernity project and social modernisation were 
marked in the routes to leadership positions, in the education of leaders, and in 
socialisation into differently valued knowledge. The main feature of the state 
modernity projects were as mentioned earlier, their ambiguity. The state leaders 
deliberately tried to integrate the society into the state modernity projects. Meiji state 
leaders created political instruments, including the privileged bureaucracy, and a state- 
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built higher education system, to modernise the state - and emphasised a synthesis of 
Western technique and Eastern morality. The education created by the state leaders 
was aimed at training bureaucrats selected meritocratically in the new education 
system. The second generation of state university graduates received general Western 
knowledge and specific study and training overseas. They were legitimised as a new 
privileged social class, but their identity as the bureaucrats of the Tenn() were shaped 
by the government. 
A new political group, opposed to this new state leadership position and education 
systems, emerged among the graduates from private universities. Their attitudes were 
derived from cultural traditional values (Shintei-BushidO values blended with neo-
Confucianism) and Western knowledge. The redefinitions of Meiji Japan were 
complete — but the tensions were visible over time and in the slide into militarism in 
the 1920s. 
Coda 
The section on Iraq will show that, as in the Meiji period in Japan, the struggles over 
the institutionalisation of cultural traditional values and knowledge in the education of 
leaders and disputes about the concept of merit were within and between different 
political and cultural leaderships. However, the two societies differed considerably in 
their specific mix of cultural traditional values and modernity. 
Iraq in the first half of the twentieth century was, like Japan, involved in political, 
social and cultural struggles over political power; these were among tribal leaders, 
Mandate officials of the British government, the military leaders and the sharifian [the 
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Arab officers in the Ottoman army] urban intellectuals who were educated in Istanbul, 
and the new young and educated Ba'thists, communists and free officers' groups. Iraq 
consisted of a mosaic of status groups, with urban notables, an Arab tribal and clan 
background and a dominant Sunni Islamic culture, together with Shi`a and many other 
religious communities and the Kurdish and other ethnic groups. 
The first revolution in Iraq was led by the tribal, religious and urban leaders. The 1920 
tribal movement was led by them against British control in Iraq, and influenced the 
British to establish their Mandate control of Iraq in 1921. In a formal sense, Iraq was 
not subject to colonial rule but was under a Mandate as part of the international system 
established by the League of Nations. 
The Iraqi state was new, and the cultural groups kept their traditional and fragmented 
identities. When Iraq became independent in 1932, the country had two main forms of 
Islam, a strong Ottoman legacy in its education system, and the British recognition of 
tribal leaders' power. 
The change of leadership was linked with the British Mandate and its modernity 
projects. As the state modernised, those who had been educated in Istanbul seized 
control of the government. In spite of the Mandate's legacy of a legitimised political 
position for the tribal leadership, it was kept out of political power at the national level. 
Cultural traditional values and modernity projects played important roles in the 
changes of the state leadership. Firstly, throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century in Iraq, the state leaders adapted Arab nationalism and Iraqi nationalism based 
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on Western knowledge, but neglected the traditional values of Islam and Arab tribal 
values in the modernity projects. No opposition was allowed. Secondly, there was a 
change in the political role which the Iraqi army assumed from 1936. Thirdly, the most 
obvious change in the state and the society was the changes of the supporting status 
groups whenever new regimes were established. 
Iraq is, like Japan, a country with strong cultural traditions. Historically Iraq had clear 
patterns relating to the education of leaders. 
Philosophical and Islamic colleges developed in the eleventh century in Baghdad, 
weakened when the scholars became salaried employees of the government. However, 
throughout the Ottoman Empire period and monarchical and republic Iraq, Islamic 
studies have been revived and reconstructed by Sunni and Sit-Va. ulama [Islamic 
scholars]. The private learning communities, majillis in the cities and diwan among the 
Arab tribal communities, heiya ulamt7 Muslim [the Association of Muslim Scholars] 
and hawza in Shia Islamic religious communities, were equivalent to the personal 
learning and networking private educational communities in Tokugawa and Meiji 
Japan. 
In Iraq, as well as in Turkey and Egypt, the secularisation of Islam and the 
modernisation of tribalism were parts of the state modernity projects and the social 
modernisation which reacted to these. The section on Iraq will look at Islam and Arab 
tribal values as the equivalent core cultural values to Shinto, BushiclO and neo-
Confucianism. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CULTURAL TRADITIONS AND MODERNITY PROJECTS 
IN IRAQ 1920-1968 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the ways in which the education of leaders 
was shaped through the redefinition of cultural traditions, namely Islamic and Arab 
tribal values, as Iraq itself modernised. 
There are two main arguments. Firstly, previous cultural traditions continued but were 
renegotiated by the state leaders and cultural leaders in the society. The traditional 
values were legitimised in highly centralised secular forms, and were embedded in the 
new state institutions to reinforce a political ideology. 
Secondly, the Islamic and Arab values institutionalised in the state education system 
and bureaucracy led to criticism of the state modernity projects. Cultural traditions, 
were also embedded in the Islamic religious and Arab tribal communities and their 
education of leaders. 
The consequence of the renegotiation and institutionalisation of the Islamic and Arab 
values was the emergence of new ways of educating leaders. 
To test these arguments, the chapter is organised into three parts. Firstly it examines 
the state modernity projects, which aimed to change the social stratification system, 
and the leadership patterns in Iraq inherited from the Ottoman period. Secondly, it 
identifies the historical and political contexts of Islamic and Arab tribal values. Then it 
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examines the redefinition, legitimisation and institutionalisation of these values, and 
how the state projects aimed to modernise the state through Western knowledge but at 
the same time to preserve much of the traditional values, social structure and leadership 
positions. Thirdly, the chapter examines the political and social struggles against the 
power of the state projects. 
Political and social structure 
This section examines efforts to change the social structure and leadership inherited 
from the Ottoman period. The changes in political and social structures began through 
the British Mandate's modernity projects, when the existing political and social leaders 
were repositioned and traditional knowledge was redefined. This affected the 
education of leaders. 
The modern state of Iraq was formed under a British Mandate from the League of 
Nations in 1920. Its constituents were the Ottoman vilayat (the Ottoman Provinces) of 
Baghdad, Basra and Mosul.' The proclamation of Prince Faisal bin Husain al-Hashimi 
as King of Iraq at the Cairo conference in March 1921 and his enthronement following 
the Treaty of 1922 did not give Iraq complete independence, but retained the 
provisions of the Mandate.2 In this treaty, King Faisal recognised the British Mandate, 
a two-chamber parliament, and the role of the civil service, the army and the police 
force. The British Mandate officials built the bureaucracy from three types of leaders: 
national, urban and rural. 
The first task of the Mandate was to establish a political system. In November 1920, 
an urban notable, Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Gailani, formed the first Iraqi government. 
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The Iraqi Constitution was promulgated in 1924. The legitimacy of the state was 
consolidated through the legitimisation of the leaders, who included former Ottoman 
military leaders and civil servants, former members of the Young Turks' group, the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), and of Ottoman families, as well as 
Sharifian Arabs who had been officers in the Ottoman army. CUP used the language 
of nations, patriotism and constitutions.3 Among the Sharifian leaders, Ja'far al-Askeri 
and Null al-Sald had been active in the Arab resistance to the Ottoman Empire before 
the First World War. Null al-Sald, the most frequent minister and the real power 
behind the Monarchy, was entirely in favour of the Sunni government regime. A 
characteristic of the new state structures was the absence of Shia appointees to senior 
administrative positions.4 The Ottoman legacy of a limit to the social mobilisation of 
the Shia Arab groups continued. 
The new leading status groups were based on the urban traditions of Sunni Islam, but 
were affected by the British Mandate officials' interest in integrating the local tribal 
sheikhs (Arab tribal notables) into the nation. The Mandate officials were ambivalent 
about the state modernity projects, but their main concern was to establish a 
recognisable state and state leaders, and to develop the social order.5 
The tribal sheikhs were newly accredited by the British Mandate officials. In 1924, 
these officials introduced the Law of Tribal Regulation (kintin nidham al-Asha- V). As 
a part of this code, the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation (TCCDR) 
(nidham chlwei al-Asherir) was introduced; through this legitimisation of the redefined 
roles of the tribal sheikhs and their tribes,6 the tribal system and structure were 
absorbed into the political system. Subsequently, the position of the tribal leaders 
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was strengthened.7  
The available national census of 10th October 1947 shows that the population of Iraq 
was 4,814,122. Of these, 78 percent were constituted by the tribal groups with 
agricultural or nomadic life styles.8 There were about forty main tribes with their 
sheikhs. There were now many different ways of being a member of a tribe. All of 
these diversified communities were to be gradually assimilated in the new state 
modernity projects.9  At the same time, the tribal affiliation system was weakening and 
the relationships between the tribal sheikhs and their members started to change due to 
the TCCDR and the process of agricultural and pastoral settlement. 
The second task was the establishment of the army. The young Iraqi officers, 
including some sharifians, Arabs officers in the Ottoman army, were graduates from 
the military college in Istanbul.1° The first stage of the state modernity projects was 
initiated by these officers, who took an active part in the public debate about the Sunni 
Arab state institutions. The establishment of the Military College in Baghdad in 1923 
was an important step for the modernisation of Iraq in terms of the expansion of Arab 
nationalism and the maintenance of the Ottoman legacy of 'a cohesive officer corps'. 
The real line of authority within the military was informally determined by the 
influence of certain individuals, such as Ja'far al-Askari and al-Sald, and groups.11  
These favoured the existing social order, leaving aside the Kurds and other religious 
and ethnic groups.12 However, new social and military groups were emerging from the 
Sunni tribal groups in the provinces and the overseas studies projects in Britain. A 
Conscription Bill was introduced in 1927, and the central and local political systems 
were rapidly formed. 
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Thus the leading status groups were those who had Sunni and Arab knowledge, the 
civil servants and military leaders, and newly accredited Arab tribal leaders. The 
political and social structures were characterised by the new political ideology of Arab 
nationalism, religious and ethnic divisions, and tribal affiliations, hierarchies and 
customs. As the state modernised, the political systems were also characterised by the 
patronage of the small groups in power, the marginalisation of many factions and the 
use of violence. 
The establishment and extension of the state education system were slow. 13 
Educational change was difficult, because the Ottoman legacy of education was largely 
confined to urban dwellers and geared to training for the government service or the 
teaching profession. In addition, there were problems of finance and the scarcity of 
skilled personnel. 14 The state was concerned about the education of medical and 
academic professionals and competent officials with managerial ability, as these were 
urgently needed to develop the infrastructure. The unbalanced and slow provision of 
state education for the citizens posed serious problems, and reflected a lack of social 
trust between the privileged and the excluded groups, in particular the rural, tribal and 
Shia groups, which lacked access to a sufficient education system. 
In the late 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, new social leaders, namely the Ba'thists (originally 
Pan-Arab nationalists), the communists (in the Iraqi Communist Party: the ICP) and the 
new military officers (who called themselves the Free Officers), were emerging from 
the new state colleges. These young educated groups, who had acquired Western 
knowledge, associated with individuals from the formerly disadvantaged social strata, 
particularly young Shia groups in the southern regions. In 1958, Abd al-Karim 
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Qasim, a military officer, with these groups, overthrew the Monarchy and established 
the Republic of Iraq .15 
However, unlike in Meiji Japan, there were difficulties for Iraqis in relating to the new 
state, because the life of the population was differentiated according to their religion, 
ethnicity and region, and redefined by new laws, rules and educational institutions and 
the political system. Different religious communities and ethnic groups had different 
histories, knowledge and views of what the state meant for them. Shia groups and 
many of the nomadic tribes found it difficult to adjust themselves to the new political 
environment and understand the new creature, 'the state', and foreign domination. 
There were difficulties within and between different social groups in finding a common 
vision and direction for the development of a new social structure, due to their different 
historical legacies. All these communities required the renegotiation of the values of 
Islam and Arab tribal traditions. 
Islam and Arab tribal values 
The state leaders in Iraq strengthened the Sunni political ideology, tried to shape 
national ethics, and framed bureaucratic government and education systems. The 
Ottoman legacy of Islamic values was continuously politicised in a highly centralised 
form. The Arab tribal system was legitimated and used as a part of the state projects. 
In the nineteenth century, imperial laws (karin) were introduced directly from the 
sovereign will of the sultans.16 The commercial aspect of contract law in the Sharma 
was replaced by karin, but the personal status law, that is the family law, of the 
Shari a was intact. On November 3, 1839, an Imperial Rescript, read by Reid Pasha 
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at Giilhane, initiated the era of reform: 
All the world knows that since the first days of the Ottoman state, the lofty 
principles of the Qur'an and the rules of the sharra were always perfectly 
preserved. Our mighty sultanate reached the highest degree of strength and 
power, and all its subjects had ease and prosperity. But in the last one 
hundred and fifty years, because of a succession of difficult and diverse 
causes, the sacred sharra was not obeyed nor were the beneficent 
regulations followed; consequently, its former strength and prosperity have 
changed into weakness and poverty. It is evident that countries not 
governed by the sharra cannot survive... Full of confidence in the help of 
the Most High, and certain of the support of our Prophet, we deem it 
necessary and important from now on to introduce new legislation in order 
to achieve effective administration of the Ottoman government and 
provinces .17 
This document was rendered in the form of a Decree, which applied to all subjects of 
the Ottoman Empire.18 
In the same year, the Tanzimat [the Reform] was introduced and continued for thirty-
seven years. The Tanzimat included Land Law (1858) and Vilayat Law [Provincial 
Law] (1864) and was a state project for the defensive modernisation of the state against 
foreign intervention.19 The traditional social policy based on Islamic law started to 
change. 
The Tanzimat brought about political, social and educational changes in the religious 
and ethnic communities. The Sunni `ulamei [clerics] lost their autonomous judiciary 
when the new state Hanafi court system was legitimated. The Tanzimat reforms 
weakened the independent authority of the Shia ',llama— and forced the Shia to 
respond to military conscription, tight control of the shrines and the acceptance of 
Ottoman nationality. Although economically and socially the shrine cities were 
absorbed into the larger Ottoman system, many Shia were not integrated socially with 
the civil servants or landowners.2° 
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The Shia clerics and the Shr a Arab tribal groups remained alienated from the official 
Ottoman culture, being much closer to the Iranian cultural milieu. Among these threats 
caused by the Ottoman modernity projects, the one which most seriously affected the 
independence and livelihood of the `ulaina-' was the abolition of Shia legal courts and 
the enforced monopoly of the government courts.21 Torn between conflicting political 
loyalties and obligations, secularism and identity struggles, the Shia continued to 
resort to their own theological learning communities (hawza), and developed their 
religious values in hawza. Hawza is defined in this thesis as the Shia learning 
community and theological madrasa.22  
In Iraq after 1922, the Ottoman legacy of Islamic values was redefined. In the Ottoman 
period, to be a Shia meant to have limited access to political life, the government and 
the state education system. 
When Iraq was established, the Sunni state leaders needed religious and ideological 
defences for the legitimisation of their regime and for the modernity projects. The 
political difference between the Sunni and the SM.' a brought about a gap between 
social and political leadership positions in the central and local administration caused 
by different access for the Sunni and Shia to political rights and state educational 
facilities. The subjugation of the Shia to the Sunni continued. This political 
environment continued during the British Mandate, the Monarchy and the Republic.23  
The Shia were excluded from the Military College, but conscription was enforced on 
them. Prohibiting Shia rituals in public, while politicising the Sunni clerics and 
training Sunni school teachers for the state educational institutions, became features of 
the modernisation of the state. The Shia modernised themselves by developing the 
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hawza, raising their consciousness of political identities, and by political debate among 
their clerical leaders. 
Islam and Arab values were historically and socially inseparable. Besides the 
politicisation of Islamic values, the Iraqi state leaders needed Arab traditions to realise 
the formation of a nation-state and legitimise themselves. The changes in the Arab 
tribal value system began through the British Mandate's modernity projects, when the 
existing values and traditions, in particular the Fasl tradition [the reconciliation of 
disputes between two parties] were redefined and institutionalised as a part of the state 
modernity projects. 
In the late fourteenth century, the Arab historian Abu-Zaid Abd al-Rahman Ibn 
Khaldun defined the Arab tribal community as a self-contained and autonomous 
organisation having socially protective functions through social solidarity. 24  
Throughout Arab history, each tribe formed a small state, headed by a patriarchal 
sheikh, with its own kinship, common descent, military force, code of justice and rights 
in the territory which it inhabited. The tribal federations were voluntary alignments 
from which each tribe was free to withdraw at will. Each tribe's political system was 
based on hierarchy and affiliation. In the twentieth century, tribes in Iraq, particularly 
tribes of nomadic origin, retained individual loyalties to family (a'i/a), clan (fakhiz), 
tribe (ashira), large confederated tribe (qabila), and then to the Islamic Arab 
community (umma), which were more important than loyalty to the state.25  
Before and during the Ottoman period, the traditional tribal systems retained their 
customary law. These systems functioned through a fairly democratic process of 
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consultation (shiira), and consensus (ijma'h) reached in the sheikh's diwan. This 
diwan was the tribal sheikh's private reception at his home, in which all matters of 
tribal issue and policy were discussed, tribal news and information were exchanged and 
studied, tribal judicial affairs were settled in accordance with Islam, and guests were 
received and honoured.26 
The sheikh was elected and had to be approved by the sub-sheikhs. He was not an 
absolute authority, because his decisions and actions were guided by the diwan system. 
Sheikhs and sub-sheikhs in tribal institutions were sometimes in tension. The diwan 
functioned as a tribal institution for education, and continues to do so today. It 
required group feeling or kinship and traditional knowledge of customary law and 
moral values.27 
The roles of the tribal sheikh related to tribal resources, to the traditional values of 
solidarity and security within the tribe, to alignments between the tribes and to 
jurisprudence based on the tribal customary law. Tribal jurisprudence (fiqh) and 
customary traditions constituted two aspects of knowledge: specific knowledge (qb 
kha-  s) and general knowledge (fiqh am).28 
Within the tribes, and between the various non-tribal communities, tribal fiqh was 
related to Fasl practice. This tribal fiqh included the Islamic forms of criminal justice: 
disputation (jadal), consensus (ijma h) and the creation of new law (ijtiheid). In the 
`Abbasid period, the study of criminal procedure under Islamic law (Shari' a) and the 
Islamic justice system were a concern of Islamic scholars, and in the education of 
political and theocratic leaders. 29 
151 
Fasl is a traditional Islamic and Arab tribal method of settling disputes by using 
mediators, and is based on customary law. Its traditional purpose was to pardon the 
offender, prevent revenge and maintain peace in Islam.30 The Prophet reconciled 
disputes as a judge in the mosque. Hassan Abdul Lail' el-Shan defined it as "one of 
the most important institutions in Muslim society; its concern is with the administration 
of justice, being the reason why prophets were dispatched and sacred texts revealed".31  
Fasl, as a system of tribal members' religious and social obligations, continues today. 
This system was redefined and proclaimed by the TCCDR in 1924. The idea of the 
regulation was introduced by the Mandate officials, who had learned the effectiveness 
of such systems from experience in India. The regulation was based on the 
Government of India's Act of the same name and encoded into Iraqi law in 1924.32 
The British were pragmatic in shaping the tribal hierarchies within all the occupied 
territories. The aim was to integrate the tribal communities into the state apparatus and 
to change the tribal structure by legitimising and hence promoting the sheikhs' 
position, and by institutionalising the tribal regulations within their communities. 
On the basis of the tribal customary laws, the TCCDR included a wide range of 
offences dealt with by the tribal judiciary. Cases for Fasl ranged from homicide and 
trespass to oral insult (hasham). The regulation emphasised the social significance of 
the mediation of disputes, the guarantee of security and the protection of individuals 
and families. It also emphasised the new roles of the sheikhs as the main final 
decision-makers on compensation (diya), and the roles, the aim of Fasl traditions and 
the diwcin system were redefined. Subsequently, the meaning of the Fasl traditions 
152 
was distorted by redefining the tribal sheikhs and the ethical power of diwan. Article 2 
(b) defined a 'tribesman': 
a member of a generally recognised tribe or tribal section, which has 
been accustomed to settle its disputes by recourse to the arbitration of 
elders or sheikhs and not by recourse to the courts of the land as 
ordinarily constituted.33  
By setting up Political Officers, the state decided to intervene in Fasl. Article 2 (a) 
defined a "Political Officer" as: 
an officer appointed by the G.O.C.-in-Chief to settle tribal affairs within 
such local limits as may be by the G.O.C.-in-Chief prescribed and includes 
any Assistant Political Officer, serving under the orders of the Political 
Officer, appointed by the Political Officer, by order in writing, to exercise 
all or any of the functions or powers conferred upon Political Officers by 
this Regulation.TM 
A state arbitration system was established, and named Fasl idari [literally, 
administration]. 'Mari was a new system, a governmental instrument which required 
no consensus, while Fasl riddi was a system of tribal decision-making which required 
consensus on the final decision at the tribal court.35 The new 'idari system appointed 
the arbitrator, normally a local governor, and gave him the right to the final decision. 
Taking orders from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and later from the 
Ministry of Interior, the local governors intervened in the tribal tradition, as arbitrators 
who acted as judges. Thus by redefining the traditions of the rid& i system, and by 
legitimising and institutionalising the new 'ideiri in the Fasl system, the government 
absorbed the tribal sheikhs and members into the state institutions. Both systems 
continue today. However, the `ideiri system eroded the tribes' traditional Fasl 
autonomy. 
Traditional Fasl was normally conducted at the tribal sheikh's diwan. Each case of 
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Fasl should be studied and checked with the customary law by the sheikh himself 36 
When a criminal incident occurred, it was necessary for the two parties to make efforts 
to exchange visits at their diwan in order to appoint an arbitrator, who would reach a 
final decision on compensation.37 
This procedure, in particular the Fasl process of selecting arbitrators by developing the 
tribal network system, was drastically simplified by the 1924 Law. Article 2 (c) 
defined the diwan as a majlis, and defined this as: 
any chief, sheikh, arbitrator, or body of chiefs, sheikhs of arbitrators 
nominated and appointed by a Political Officer under the provisions of the 
Regulation to settle according to Arab tribal usage any dispute in which a 
tribesman is involved.38 
By establishing the new Political Officers the state often intervened in the final 
decision-making process and weakened the sheikhs' rights. This contradiction between 
the values of the Arab tribal traditions and the TCCDR was due to the double roles of 
the tribal Fasl traditions, which now served the state value system on the one hand and 
dominated the original tribal value system on the other. 
The final decision of the sheikh, announcing the tribal consensus, was recognised as an 
official statement. According to Article 2 (e): 
A "finding" is the reply of the "Majlis" to an "order of reference. When the 
"Majlis" consists of more than one person, the unanimous opinion of the 
majority constitutes a "finding". A "finding" must be in writing and signed 
or sealed by those members of the "Majlis" whose opinion it embodies.39 
The state's intervention in the Fasl tradition disregarded the functions of the alliance or 
negotiation (hilj) for the tribal rights of peace, security and protection of the tribe, 
family and individuals. For example, the appointment of the third sheikh (the 
guarantor), who should defend the future peace of the two parties, was neglected. 
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Furthermore, the Fasl decisions made by political officers often did not satisfy the two 
affected parties. 
Overall, although altered by the TCCDR, the traditional education of tribal leaders 
continued in the diwein, and knowledge of Fasl was developing within the Arab tribal 
communities in Iraq. 
The advantage to the British authorities was that new leaders who were accredited and 
their communities were absorbed into the central administration. 	 The High 
Commissioner, MacMahon, drew on his experience in India and emphasised that in 
countries where tribal customary law exists in full force, it forms: 
an instrument for the suppression of crime which in simplicity and 
effectiveness can be surpassed by no other legal system which we can 
invent, for the simple reason that it is based on the character, idiosyncrasies 
and prejudices of the people among whom it has originated and by whom it 
has been evolved during long periods of time to meet their own 
requirements and remedy their failings.40 
The new state leaders succeeded in changing the social structure by repositioning the 
old and new political factions and retaining Islamic and tribal groups as their 
supporters. The new civil servants lacked knowledge of the tribal and Islamic legacies 
of Fasl conduct, skill in negotiating or allying for peace and public security, the ability 
to use networks quickly through verbal and intellectual skills in negotiation and 
knowledge of others, and the ability to take decisive action. 41 Nevertheless the 
government depended for regional peace on tribal and urban communities. Therefore 
Fasl, an independent traditional practice, was important for the state as well as the 
community. 
A significant by-product of the TCCDR project was that tribal leaders and members 
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sought trust and support, influence and the protection of individuals and families 
through justice in Fasl and made efforts to reinforce old tribal alliances or establish 
new networks. 
The tribal meaning of loyalty was related to the individuals' autonomous determination 
to fulfil their tribal obligations. The sense of honour and dignity of individuals, 
families and tribes was related to this. Although there are some differences between 
tribes, traditionally the sheikhs and tribal members are responsible for six tribal values: 
tribal obligations, tolerance, dignity or honour, trust and support (misdaqiya), 
leadership and Islam. There are five main tribal obligations: to support the internal 
members politically, socially and economically, to support and protect every tent, to 
protect any refugee, including political asylum-seekers (dakhil), to preserve alliances 
(tahaluj) and to keep face (wajih). Through these tribal virtues and obligations, the 
sheikh, sub-sheikhs and tribal members maintained multiple positions, networks and 
functions. Through diwan, tribal sheikhs governed the tribal system and ensured its 
welfare.42 
Overall, the Islamic and tribal groups had political and social difficulties when the state 
absorbed their cultural traditions and institutionalised them. 	 Islam was more 
politicised by state modernity projects than were the Arab tribal values, while the Shi`a 
traditions were excluded from participation at all levels. The different political 
positions of the Sunni, the Shi`a and the Arab tribes brought about the emergence of 
different styles of leaders and ways of education. The traditional leaders were caught 
up in the pressures between nation-state priorities and their traditional cultural 
identities. 
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The next section describes how Islamic and Arab tribal values were institutionalised in 
the civil as well as the military bureaucracy, and shows how these values were 
transformed, absorbed or contested, and how they affected the education of leaders. 
Subsequently, the section describes what kind of state leadership was produced and 
reproduced in the state institutions. The official modernity projects of the state 
required the establishment of the state education of leaders. 
Islam and Arab tribal values renegotiated 
There were three stages in the modernisation of the Iraqi state: the Mandate and the 
emergence of Iraqi state (1920-1932); the growth of the Monarchy (1932-1958); and 
the emergence of the Republic of Iraq (1958-1968). 
(1) The Mandate and the emergence of the Iraqi State (1920-1932) 
The years 1920 to 1932 were marked by the emergence of the Iraqi state and by 
struggles over the integration of the traditional status groups into the new Iraqi state. 
This sub-section describes how Sunni Islamic values were institutionalised in the 
bureaucracy and were resisted by Shr a groups, and how this affected the education of 
leaders. 	 It also describes the redefinition of Arab tribal traditions and their 
institutionalisation in the political system. 
It is suggested that, until the Iraqi state was created, there was no single Iraqi nation, 
and people had different views about what Iraq should be. The Iraqi state emerged in 
the process of political and social struggles over the redefinition of Islam and Arab 
tribal traditions and their institutionalisation in the political and education system and 
the bureaucracy. The traditional Ottoman conformity between the government and 
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religious creeds was replaced by the political ideology of Arab nationalism and the 
consolidation of the Sunni Arab military. The Sunni leaders educated in Istanbul 
transferred their loyalties from the Ottoman state to the new Iraq as a part of the Arab 
nation, and formed the privileged bureaucracy. 
The Constituent Parliament opened in 1924, and the Anglo-Iraqi treaty was passed. 
About one-third of the members of the parliament were sheikhs of tribes.43 The Shr a 
abstained from participating in the parliamentary elections, due to their rejection of the 
election system.'" A number of the influential Shia clerical leaders, the mujtahid, 
were estranged from political practice, turning back to Islamic jurisprudence and moral 
exhortation.45 This affected the development of the hawza education of leaders. 
The Mandate officials saw the tribes as distinct entities within the new Iraqi state. 
Among the British Mandate officials, there was ambivalence toward the modernity 
projects for framing the political and social structure. 46 However, their tribal 
modernity project was pragmatic in exploiting the tribal resources and value system. 
Tension arose between the centralising state power and attachment to the traditional 
Arab tribal communities. During the 1920s and 1930s, the TCCDR renegotiated and 
legitimised the values of the tribal cultural tradition and established new roles for the 
sheikhs and tribal members. These roles included the prevention of any violence 
against the government in their communities, the collection of taxes on cattle and the 
government's share from the agricultural revenues, the supply of wood, and also the 
provision of voluntary labour for building canals in an emergency. The 1927 
Conscription Bill forced the Sunni and Shia tribal sheikhs to offer fighters in times of 
war, whether the war was with other countries or an internal uprising. 
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In this connection, the new collective punishment of the sheikh and his tribal members 
was legitimated. The punishment of the sheikh for not paying taxation was applied to 
his tribal members. The tribal sheikhs were obliged to act as mediators between the 
state and the tribal members. This politically motivated tribal order continued until the 
1958 revolution. 
The consequence of these changes was that the meaning of kinship and the identity of 
the tribal members in relation to the sheikh and the nation state were changing in many 
ways. 
With the growing number of army officers in the 1930s, the state leaders perceived the 
tribal provincial areas not only as the basis of a traditional moral social order but also 
as an area of human and material resources which could be exploited for the benefit of 
the bureaucracy.47  
The tribal networking system was utilised to serve the bureaucracy. However, not all 
the tribal sheikhs were subjected to the modernity projects. 48 Disputes about 
supporting the government occurred within and between the tribes. Some sheikhs 
remained in relationship with their tribal members through the traditional organic 
group feeling, trust and support in the cause of tribal autonomous protection and 
traditional obligations. 	 Others, in particular those who became agricultural 
landowners, compromised with the state and set up authoritarian feudalistic 
relationships with their members. Subsequently, the new types of mechanical loyalty 
to the authority, new tribal obligations and the patronage system were used by the 
sheikhs in relation to the state leaders and the tribal members; hence, different styles of 
tribal leaders and tribes emerged, and their loyalty changed according to the regimes. 
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The tribes started to fragment, and until the present day there has been no official 
association of Iraqi tribal sheikhs. 
The Arab tribal groups were politically defined, and served as parts of the state 
modernity projects. When the tribal leaders and members resisted the political power 
and coercion which the state leaders operated, the sheikhs' diwem and diwein education 
provided an ethical code for the protection of members of their community. Hence the 
year 1924 was marked by the emergence of new positions of the Arab tribal sheikhs 
and new importance in the education of leaders. The educational movements within 
the Shia and the tribal groups became the roots of the social movements which began 
in the 1920s. 
After the independence of Iraq in 1932, with the intervention of the military in politics, 
Islamic and Arab tribal values were used to reinforce the competing political ideologies 
of Arab and Iraqi nationalism. This is discussed in the next section. 
(II) The growth of the Monarchy (1932-1958) 
The period from 1932 to 1958 was marked by the rapid emergence of different types of 
state and cultural leaders. The state leaders aimed at political and social changes by 
strengthening Pan-Arab nationalism (qaumiya), Iraqi nationalism (wataniya), and 
Western knowledge, by preserving Arab values and by institutionalising these 
ideologies in the state education system. The state leaders were ambivalent towards the 
formation of a new independent Iraqi state. There were disputes among them; hence 
power in the state was contested. 
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The establishment of the army was a triumph for the traditional Islamic-Arab martial 
spirit and for the independence of the country. After the British occupation was ended 
in 1932, the sharifians, who were Arab officers in the Ottoman army, and the Young 
Turks' group intervened in political affairs and took power twice, from 1936 to 1941 
and from 1958 to 1978, and tried to unite Iraq.49 They shared the common Arab 
national ideology of building an Arab state. In 1936, a military coup d'etat was led by 
General Bakr Sidqi, and Hikmat Sulaiman became Prime Minister. However, the lack 
of leadership after the assassination of Bakr Sidqi left the army divided, while different 
interests among the leading army officers made them patronise a different set of leaders 
in the society.5°  
The significance of this military coup was that militarism became a new factor in the 
politics of Iraq. The army continued to influence political decisions, and became 
virtually the deciding factor in Cabinet changes from 1936 to 1941. Until 1941, when 
the British army reoccupied Iraq, the military was used as a political means for gaining 
power over the opposition movements.51 There was no tolerance of opposition; any 
political opposition was immediately crushed by the new state's military power. 
As the state modernised, nationalism was used by the different leading status groups to 
enforce their modernity projects. The two political ideologies and the redefined 
Islamic and Arab and military loyalties were legitimised in centralised secular forms 
and institutionalised in the bureaucracy and the state school systems. The Arab 
nationalists supported the establishment of a united Arab nation to resist imperialism 
and Zionism. The Iraqi state was in their view a part of the Arab nation. Arab 
nationalism was pushed forward by King Faisal 1 in his last years, his successors, King 
Ghazi and the Regent Abd 	 the educationist Sati' al-Hush, the military, and 
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state leaders like Yasin al-Hashimi and al-Sald.52 On the other hand, Abd al-Karim 
Qasim and the Communist groups under his regime supported Iraqi nationalism; all 
efforts should in their view be directed to building Iraq with its different peoples, in 
particular the Arabs and the Kurds. 
The two political ideologies, Arab and Iraqi nationalism, were institutionalised in the 
state school systems by training the teachers, establishing the examination system, 
distributing textbooks and providing knowledge for Arab national leaders. One of the 
primary objectives of the project for an independent state was to legitimise Islamic and 
Arab loyalty to the Monarchy, and consolidate support from the urban and tribal Sunni 
leaderships. However, the project was not defined in terms of the indigenous Arab 
values of the cultural traditions. 
The state leaders had a different perception of the history of 'the glorious Arabs' from 
that of the Islamic Arab and rural tribal peoples, who were the leading groups in 
Islamic and Arab history. The Ministry of Education issued in 1941 a statement on al-
Muallim al-Jadid [the New Teacher] in an Educational Bulletin: 
The most characteristic feature of Iraqi education today is its nationalism. 
The term 'Iraqi nationality' is a cornerstone in the political foundation of 
the Iraqi modern state. But our thinkers universally agree that our people 
are insufficient; for small countries cannot afford to live in isolation in this 
recent and complex world of ours. Thus the cultured man in our country 
does not confine his national feelings and loyalties to the territorial 
boundaries of Iraq but tends to extend them far beyond that to a wider 
national association, namely the association of all the Arab peoples.5' 
The notion of 'the Arab peoples' meant a new imagined 'nation'. The 'nation' was 
interpreted in terms of relationships among individuals and groups. The history of the 
Arab nation was to be the history of the Arabs. Islam's role in history was to spread 
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and preserve Arabism as the identity of the Arabs; Arab culture and history were 
renegotiated as the focus of loyalty despite one's religious belief and communal ties. 
Hence nationalism separated Arabism from Islam as well as from Arab tribal values. 
The values of the Arab traditions were thus different for the state leaders and for the 
traditional and new urban civic leaders. What was emphasised was collective loyalty 
to the state and its modernity projects. Arab nationalism was used to unify the diverse 
society and as a defence against imperialism and Zionism. Iraqi nationalism was used 
for the unification of diverse societies, and traditional values of loyalty were 
renegotiated to emphasise selfless service to the state regime. 
Among the most important influences shaping the outlook of the emerging middle 
class was state education, especially at the intermediate secondary school level, which 
was the highest level of education which most Iraqis received. The history and social 
studies texts used through the 1930s until the British occupation of 1941 were intensely 
Arab nationalist, anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist. Although during the Second World 
War a number of Arab nationalist teachers were dismissed by the British officials, the 
Arab nationalist movement in schools continued.54 Iraqi students who went through 
school in the 1930s and 1940s emerged in the 1950s with sharply different views and 
aspirations from those of their elders. 
For example, from the mid-1930s on, while the military and civil bureaucrats were in 
conflict, political groups, including the alkili group and the Arab nationalists were 
emerging. 
In the 1930s, Kama al-Chardirchi, the new, young educated leaders and other returned 
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overseas students from the American University of Beirut set up the al-Aheili group 
[the People, literally 'family] in Baghdad. Among them there were Abd al-Fatah 
Ibrahim, Husain Jamil, and Munhammad Hadid. They called for "greater democracy, 
land reform and the legitimisation of trades unions". The movement was composed of 
college students, workers in key industries, lawyers, engineers, and other educated 
groups. The al-Ahali newspaper was edited at first, in February 1932, by a Marxist, 
Abd al-Qadir 
	 55 It incorporated the views of Marxists, liberals, Fabian 
socialists and reformers. It supported political freedom, parliamentary democracy, and 
moderate socialism, and was supported by the Istiqlal Party which owned the 
opposition newspaper Liwei-`-l-Istiqlcil [The Flag of Independence]. 	 Fa'iq al- 
Samarrri, a chief editor and a member of al-Aheiri group, opened public debate on 
anti-imperialist and strong Arab nationalist views.56 Al-Aix:di became the organ of the 
National Democratic Party after the Second World War. In the 1930s and 40s, a non-
political press developed. By 1958 there were about thirty such publications with a 
total circulation of about 100,000. 
In 1935, the Muthanna Club was established. The Club, headed by Colonel Sabbagh, a 
Pan-Arab nationalist, developed political gatherings and public debates to "disseminate 
Arab nationalism, to retain Arab traditions, to strengthen the sense of Arab manhood in 
youth (murt7 'a) and to create new Arab culture which is equivalent to the civilisation 
of the West".57 Although the British military intervention of 1941 led to the breaking 
up of the club, its leaders survived. Although they had contradictory tendencies and 
aspirations, their voices called for an independent Iraq. By 1947, there were no fewer 
than 5,450 members.58 There were various types of professionals in this club: Pan-
Arab military officers, anti-British officials, government officials, merchants, and 
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members of the professional middle class and the old aristocracy of officials. 
The Communist party group called in particular for the independence of the country, 
the amelioration or eradication of poverty and the realisation of greater social justice.59 
The growing frustration of the younger generation of Shi`a over their exclusion from 
the political process resulted in the massive adherence of the Siff' a to communism, 
particularly in the late 1940s and during the 1950s, as well as the revival of Shi`a. 
Islamic ideology in Iraq in the 1960s and 1970s.6°  
The semi-governmental Academy of Sciences was established by Salim al-Alousi in 
1947.61 From the 1940s to the 1960s, international associations such as al-Reibita [the 
League for the Defence of Women's Rights, literally 'the tied'], emerged and 
mobilised materially and spiritually to support Arab efforts for Arab and Palestinian 
freedom.62 The Muntad al-Adabi [club of literature], established by Abdul Kalim al-
Khalil in 1935, and international associations of al-Reibita reflected the citizens' 
confidence in the new social solidarity based on Arab nationalism. 
In this time of the growth of the cities, in particular Baghdad, Mosul and Basra, the 
traditional 'Abbasid legacy of learning networks, majtilis, was reinforced by both the 
state leaders and urban notables. A historian, Ibrahim al-Drabi defined majcilis 
[literally, the places for sitting or assembly] as "the people's requirement of tradition 
and identity".63 They were held in various places, including at diwein in private houses, 
which the heads of majalis considered 'the centre of knowledge' and 'the centre of 
family honour', and also in the religious institutions. Unlike diwein and hawza, the 
majeilis did not aim to nurture or mobilise political or civic leaders, but to strengthen 
academic associations and public debates. The majCdis run by cultural leaders supplied 
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common Islamic or historical and political knowledge to knit the separate small groups 
together. The Sunni gathering at the Abu-Hanifa and Sheikh Qadi mosques was called 
`Friday Majcilis 5 . 64 
Among the leaders of majcilis, there were Christian leaders, such as al-Abu Anstats al-
Karmeri, Muslim scholars such as Abbas Azzawi, and urban notables such as 
Mahmoud Deftari, Mahmoud al-Aloosi and Abd al-Wahhab al-Na'ib.65 The Mahmood 
Sobhi Deftari circle included many state leaders.66 Many of the circles contributed to 
historiography. Talikh al-Sha'iry's circle contributed to political history, and the 
origin of Arab letters was taught by Dr. Salim Alusi. The method of learning was oral 
disputation. The learning networks attracted the state leaders. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs opened a majcilis for a short time. 
The rapid development of these varied social groups, including the young military 
officers and the Ba'thists, was partly due to the fact that, as Tripp pointed out, the old 
social classes in the bureaucracy were indifferent to the emerging social solidarity but 
called for military loyalty and political docility.67  
These two decades were marked by increasing political power struggles between the 
civil servants and military bureaucrats. The emergence of the new types of leaders, 
Arab nationalists, communists and young military groups, from the 1930 to the 1950s 
was a consequence of the modernity projects, the new state education and the political 
condition in which they were placed. As in Meiji Japan, the pressure of state 
modernity was challenged by the new civic leaders. 
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For the new civic leaders, the nation was interpreted in terms of relationships among 
individuals and groups. By the 1950s, a number of cultural leaders who had obtained 
foreign knowledge from higher education had emerged. There were three different 
types of young nationalists: the Ba'thists, the Communists and the Free Officers. The 
struggles of these young leaders were political, cultural and educational, over 
nationalism, ethnicity and religion. They opposed the Ottoman legacy of the 
bureaucratic state and struggled for political participation and new visions in politics. 
Rejecting political loyalty and docility, the Ba'thists, the Communists and the Free 
Officers brought about the 1958 revolution. 
The modernisation of tribal communities by the new state resulted in the loss of local 
autonomy and in excluding the tribal members from central political participation and 
state education. In 1933 the 'Revised Tribal Case Regulation' was issued, and all the 
tribal members were excluded from the new 1933 Civil Law.68 Tribal criminal justice 
followed by 'ideiri system remained in the hands of the Ministry of Interior, the 
governors and political officers, whereas civil law and urban criminal cases among the 
urban dwellers were dealt with through the new institution of the civil court. This 
divide-and-rule policy towards the tribes continued until 1958. By establishing both 
tribal and civil law, the state leaders attempted to balance power and influence between 
tribe and town, to stop de-tribalisation and to prevent a nation-wide alliance against 
their authority. The tribal sheikhs and their communities were kept in their traditional 
places. There was a powerful continuity in Fasl tradition legitimised through diwan 
education. The traditional education of tribal leaders continued. 
Under the pressure of the state and its modernity project for tribal society, the 
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traditional tribal system for the preparation of leaders continued without changing 
much. The traditional communities did not create a new type of society by grafting 
themselves onto other communities. There was no access to dialogue with the state 
leaders on the new regulations, the establishment of modern schools in the village and 
the acquisition of foreign knowledge. 
Thus each national, religious and tribal group retained different forms of knowledge, 
different cultural traditions, and different approaches to the revolution. 
(IR) The emergence of the Republic of Iraq (1958-1968) 
The new state modernity projects led by General Abdul Qasim formed Republican 
Iraq. However, the legitimised political ideology and the authoritarian political system 
were re-creations of the previous period .  
Although the 1958 revolution was supported by the Ba'thists, the Communists and the 
free officers, power soon rested in Qasim's hands, supported by the army. Qasim set 
up a dictatorship. The new military regime was constituted by only fourteen free 
officers.' All executive and legislative powers were entrusted to the Sovereignty 
Council and the Cabinet. Ba'thists in Iraq and Syria as well as Egypt pressed Qasim to 
join the United Arab Republic. Qasim, as an Iraqi nationalist, found that the Iraqi 
Communist Party was useful for resisting the pressures of Arab nationalism. The 
Communists dominated most of the Iraqi press and radio, and students were heavily 
involved in the control of several ministries.70 Iraqi national identity superseded Arab 
national identity. 
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By 1960 an anti-communist movement had developed in Najaf, Karbala and Hilla, led 
by the grand mujtahid Muhsin al-Hakim. Exhortations to Muslims appeared in the 
non-communist press, usually signed by Jama'art al- `ulaincr' fi al-Najaf al-Ashrcif [the 
Association of Najaf Clerics]. On 15 October 1960, al-Fayha, a Hilla weekly, 
published a memorandum signed by the Islamic Party, which included both Sunnis and 
Shia. Muhsim al-Hakim issued a fatwa [judgement based on religious jurisprudence] 
asserting that communism was incompatible with Islam. Recognising the young Shia 
groups' involvement in the communist movements, Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei 
and Mujtahid, later Ayatollah, Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr devoted themselves to the 
modernisation of the hawza theological learning community. 
Among the Ba'th party members and the officers in the Qasim regime, tension 
developed, first between Qasim (an Iraqi nationalist), and Abd al-Salam Arif (an Arab 
nationalist), and then between Qasim and his military supporters. Having lost political 
support from the parties which he once supported, Qasim was overthrown by a military 
coup in February 1963. However, between February and November, personal tensions 
among the Ba'th party members reached an extreme point, and several members 
withdrew. 
Young Ba'thists had different ideas about what was important for the nation-state's 
formation. Some Ba'thists, who left the party before 1963 emphasised democracy, and 
others emphasised socialism. The Ba'thist slogan, 'Unity, Freedom and Socialism', 
was firmly embedded in the educational system until 2003. In November 1963, co-
ordinating their actions with the military Ba'thists, Arif s forces attacked the National 
Guard in Baghdad. Arif established his control of Iraq. The tension, accumulated from 
169 
the 1950s, ended in a massacre of the communist leaders in Mosul. 
The products of the Military and Staff College whose members mostly came from 
Sunni and particular tribal backgrounds rapidly consolidated a new, privileged military 
regime. The previous legacies of Sunni and Arab values were reinforced in the system 
of privilege, and used to support the power of the bureaucracy. 
It is now useful to summarise the relationships of the emergence of the various state 
leaders in the Monarchy and Republic of Iraq, the state modernity projects and the 
struggles over the institutionalisation of the cultural traditional values in the education 
system. Firstly, to the Iraqi state leaders, the ideas for the state modernity projects 
were derived from their desire to construct a united Iraqi state or a Pan-Arab nation. 
Arab and Iraqi nationalism were to be the sources of the national and individual 
identities. The projects were disputed and contested by the different state leaders, 
because these leaders were ambivalent towards the projects, and there was also a lack 
of trust among the state leaders. The diverse society was fragmented further. 
Secondly, Islamic and Arab values were renegotiated, and characterised by a Sunni 
emphasis. The emphasis reflected the fact that all Iraqi military officials were Sunni. 
Arab and military loyalty was again emphasised and embedded in the higher education 
system, and reinforced the official ideology.  
Thirdly, to realise the political ideology, the state leaders needed to establish a state 
education system and to consolidate the training and selection of nationalists. The 
education system was characterised by the formation of the identity of Sunni Arab 
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nationalists, and the social stratification system was determined by this system. 
The next section will discuss the conflicts over the state modernity projects, the 
subsequent emergence of various significant urban cultural leaders and of Shi` a clerical 
and Arab tribal community groups, and their struggles for the institutionalisation of 
cultural continuities in the education of their leaders. 
Islam and Arab tribal values renegotiated 
(IV) The emergence of Iraqi communities (1920-1932) 
This sub-section examines the political and social struggles of the cultural leaders 
against the domination of the British Mandate and over the institutionalisation of their 
renegotiated cultural values in their communities. 
It argues that the 1920 social movements (thawra ashrin: literally the 1920 Revolution) 
emerged through the political and social struggles of the tribal, clerical and urban 
citizens to create new social relationships and to form a new independent Iraq in spite 
of the institutional pressures of the British Mandate's modernity projects. In these 
social and cultural resistance movements, the traditional institutions reinforced the 
specific forms and contents of an ethical code of knowledge. New ways of learning in 
communities and of socialising their leaders emerged and developed. 
The 1920 social movements were supported by the different religious groups and the 
Arab tribes. Sunni and Shia tribal and religious groups co-operated in the cause of 
Iraqi independence. The Muslim leaders' purpose was to establish an Islamic 
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government, while the Arab tribal sheikhs aimed to establish a national and Arab 
government. Both types of cultural leaders determined to promote the independence of 
their communities from foreign powers and the state.71  
The new ways of educating leaders emerged in the social, cultural and political process 
of struggling over the institutionalisation of the redefined cultural traditional values. 
(V) Society in the time of the post-Mandate Monarchy (1932-1958) 
In the cities, the 1930s and 1950s saw cultural change. Pan-Arab nationalism and Iraqi 
nationalism were challenged by the new political and cultural leaders through public 
debates and the establishment of learning institutions and networks. At the same time, 
as described in Section II of this chapter, the exclusion of citizens from political rights 
led to criticism of the state modernity projects by the new cultural leaders. 
The urban, rural and religious communities remained fragmented, and separate majc1hs, 
diwein and hawza learning networks developed within these communities; hence the 
values and knowledge of the urban, tribal and religious groups were developing 
separately. After the 1958 revolution there was a conscious effort on the part of the 
cultural leaders to construct a new identity, which would minimise tensions and 
differences between the leaders in the different communities. 
(VI) The emergence of the Republic of Iraq (1958-1968) 
As in Meiji Japan, Iraq developed through a combination of cultural and educational 
struggles. Cultural leaders were aware that traditional values embedded in the 
education of community leaders reinforced the value of personal autonomy in relation 
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to social obligation as a part of an ethical code of welfare and protection. After the 
overthrow of the old political order and the radical political changes Iraqi political and 
cultural leaders, including writers and artists, expressed their ideas through public 
debates in books, journals and newspapers, as well as sculpture, painting and theatre.72 
Iraqi society became more fragmented than in the 1920s and 1930s, though there was 
dynamism within the small communities, through the emergence of new leaders and 
their education systems. Rural-urban relations and social stratification changed as 
people joined the Ba'th party and the Communist groups reacting against the new state 
modernity projects. 
In Baghdad in 1958, when Qasim abolished the 1924 TCCDR, the rural and urban 
leaders reacted differently.73 In Baghdad Zeki Saleh, supported abolition. Their reason 
was that the TCCDR prevented the development of loyalty to the state. Tribal people 
were loyal to the tribe; the system did not promote democracy and the development of 
tribal society.74  The Minister of Education, Matta Akarawi, who held a Ph.D from 
Columbia University, considered that since the state continued to control the tribal 
communities, it should keep the TCCDR, but at the same time a Western law court 
system should be adopted. A sociologist and writer on Fasl, Abd al-Razaq al-Tahir, 
suggested that if the Fasl system stayed there would be two laws in the nation. During 
thirty-four years, the tribal groups had lived without modern laws. Modern Western 
law and Arab tribal tradition could be mutarabita [interconnected].75 Tribal sheikhs 
supported the abolition of the TCCDR. However, both groups, urban leaders and 
sheikhs did not agree with the abolition of the Fasl tradition. That tradition, with the 
role of the tribal sheikh and diwein education has continued to be supported by the 
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people until today. 
To the Arab tribal leaders, the modernisation of the community was necessary to free it 
from the political pressures of the modernity projects. However, their vision of 
political participation, the protection of welfare and the code of justice and rights, and 
institutional autonomy was not realised yet. The continuity of hawza and diwan 
education was the consequence of the resistance to the dominant state modernity 
projects, and an expression of the wishes for the survival of their community. Among 
the cultural leaders, there was ambivalence towards the modernity projects and their 
social, political and cultural processes, but a number of Shi`a clericals, such as as-Sadr, 
were tolerant of other groups' values and knowledge and tried to harmonise Sunni and 
Shia. However, the modernity projects designed by the Shi`a clerical leaders brought 
about internal disputes between leaders, and these continue today. 
As the new Republic emerged, after the 1968 coup d'etat, and in the later periods, the 
three traditions, the tribal, the Shia and the urban Ottoman state tradition, and their 
institutionalised education of leaders continued. 
Conclusion 
The state modernity projects of Iraq were characterised by a re-creation of the Ottoman 
legacies of the Sunni-centred social structure and of government by the civil servants 
and military leaders. In both the monarchy and republican Iraq, power rested with 
these old urban social groups and, most of the time, with the military leaders educated 
in Istanbul. Thus the leadership patterns basically inherited from the Ottoman period 
continued. The exclusion of the traditional Shr a communities from central politics 
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was also a legacy of the Ottoman period. The traditional Arab tribal sheikhs were 
newly accredited by the British Mandate officials and their social relationships within 
and between the tribes rapidly developed. 
Each group of national, traditional and urban intellectuals al-Ahith and Muthanna club 
groups, the Ba'thists, the communists and Free Officers, imagined the state in different 
ways, and placed a different emphasis on the modernity projects and the 
institutionalisation of the cultural traditions; these differences were reflected in the 
emergence of different styles of the education of leaders. 
The state education system was characterised by the formation of the identity of 
Ottoman legacy of Sunni Islam and new concepts of Pan-Arab nationalism and local 
nationalism. The social stratification system was determined by this state education 
system. The Islamic and Arab values institutionalised in the state education system 
and bureaucracy led to contradictions in the modernity projects. Tribal traditions were 
legitimated in the 1924 TCCDR, institutionalised and functioned as a part of the state 
modernity projects. 
Tribal sheikhs reacted to these state projects by reinforcing the diwern system and 
diwan education of leaders when the Mandate state intervened in the traditional tribal 
system, in particular, the Fasl system, and forced the tribal leaders into new roles. The 
Shia leaders resisted the state modernity projects through the struggles over the 
instiuttionalisation of the redefined hawza community, in particular in 1924 when 
Ayattollahs were deported, and in the later 1950s, when the young Siff' a were involved 
in the Communist movement which Qasim exploited. Traditional tribal and Islamic 
values continued, and were reinforced in the diwcin and hawza eduation system. In 
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both Arab tribal and Shia groups, the renegotiated traditional Islamic and tribal values 
provided a moral code which supported personal autonomy within the community 
obligations and the protection of and security for the members of their communities 
and identities. 
Shr a leaders' struggles were to develop hawza by pursuing ijtihad and to overcome 
the exclusion of the Shi` a from the political centre. The tribal struggles concerned the 
balance between the state's requirement and tribal rights and autonomy. As a reaction 
to state intervention, the diwein education of leaders was revitalised to deal with the 
roles of Fasl and the new obligations given by the state to the tribal members. The 
form of Fasl associated with Islam and ijitiheid gave a sense of honour, dignity and 
authority to the tribal members in protecting their families and communities within a 
tribal morality. Hence they preserved the traditional values and knowledge without 
much development. 
Throughout the twentieth century, the voices calling for social change were oppressed 
by military power and coercion. The preservation of the traditional society was a 
consequence of the state modernity project. This meant that unlike in Meiji Japan, 
social modernity in Iraq did not develop civic society by transforming state modernity 
into private educational projects. 
The traditional Shr a religious leaders shifted from being traditional clerics, 'ulama', to 
being secularised, without losing their theological professionalism. 	 The tribal 
requirement for a leader changed from a reputation as a commander to a reputation for 
Fasl skill and an ability to keep sound relationships with the state. Two types of tribes 
emerged. One type was patronised by the state; the other was autonomous. All these 
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processes required diwein education. Both the Shi`a and the Arab tribal leaders 
required the entrepreneurial ability to develop hawza or diwein education and to 
promote the groups' welfare and protection. 
A significant by-product of the modernity projects was the different social groups' 
awareness of their political identity. Within the communities, the meaning of the 
modernity projects was based on their religious or tribal code of social obligation. 
However, there was a lack of knowledge shared with other groups. The historical 
legacy of the lack of trust between culturally deep-rooted Iraqi communities was a 
problem. 
Differences among the new state, traditional and cultural leaders were marked in their 
routes to leadership positions and in their education. One challenge was how to 
redefine and institutionalise, in a time of rapid political and social change, the 
traditional concepts of merit and what was counted as good knowledge in the previous 
time. The next chapter focuses on how this issue was reflected in the educational 
institutions of the Ottoman period, and of monarchical and republican Iraq. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCEPTS OF MERIT AND THEIR INSTITUTIONALISATION 
IN THE EDUCATION SYSTEM IN IRAQ 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the changing concepts of merit before and 
during the Ottoman Empire, especially in the nineteenth century, and in monarchical 
and republican Iraq in the period from 1921 to 1968, as the new state institutionalised 
them in the education system. 
The concepts of merit were negotiated and renegotiated throughout Ottoman, 
Monarchical and Republican Iraq at state and social level. The merit valued in the 
Ottoman period was politicised Islamic loyalty, moral obligation to the Empire, and 
foreign knowledge, which were institutionalised in the state education system. People 
who had merit within their communities possessed traditional religious and tribal 
knowledge, morality and obligation. 
The Ottoman legacy of the concept of merit and the new ideology of merit were 
embedded in the Iraqi education system as a part of the modernity projects. The state 
leaders overlooked what was socially counted as good knowledge, morality and a sense 
of obligation, but this other concept of merit was maintained and developed by cultural 
leaders in their traditional hawza and diwein educational institutions. 
The structure and sub-structure of the chapter are the same as in Chapter 3: it is divided 
into three sections. Firstly, it describes the concepts of merit before and during the 
Ottoman period, and their institutionalisation in the education system at the state and 
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social levels. Secondly, the chapter describes the struggles over the renegotiations of 
the concepts of merit and their institutionalisation as new educational ideas in Iraq. 
Thirdly, it describes how the renegotiated concepts of merit lost their effectiveness in 
the education system. It also describes the social context of the struggles over the 
nature of knowledge and its institutionalisation in the hawza and diwan education. 
As indicated earlier, for the purposes of this thesis, merit in Japan and Iraq will be seen 
as having two components, namely philosophical knowledge and practical and useful 
knowledge. 'Balanced knowledge' — it will be recalled - is defined in this thesis as a 
moral code which harmonises philosophical, practical and useful knowledge. 
The concepts of merit and education before and during the Ottoman 
period 
The concept of merit in the `Abbasids period was derived from Islamic morality and 
loyalty, and from ijtihcld as one way to follow the Way of God. The individual pursuit 
of the Way of God through intellectual searching was emphasised in the education of 
the Islamic clerical leaders, administrative and court officials and scholars. Those 
people who had merit possessed knowledge of the 'Straight Way' of God (strata 
mustaqim) which was emphasised in the Qur'an in the chapter Al-Fatih [The Opening]: 
Show us the straight way, the way of those on whom Thou hast bestowed 
Thy Grace, those whose (portion) is not wrath, and who go not astray.' 
The chapter "Thunder" reminds the Muslim of the Straight Way: 
God will not change the condition of a people until they change what is in 
their hearts.2 
This verse in the Qur'an suggests an orientation towards the ideal human society 
deriving from high morals and valued knowledge and based on the interaction of God's 
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goodness and individual human beings.' 
In the time of the `Abbasids, the study of Islam developed. To have the licence to 
teach Islam, a further study of ijtihad was required. Ijtihad is literally "exerting 
oneself" for new knowledge, and includes the independent interpretation of Islamic law 
(Shari a) and jurisprudence (fiqh).4 To reach ijtihad,  the study of reasoning (al-Aqii) 
and consensus on jurisprudence (ijma- h) was required. The person who reached ijtihad 
by using individual reasoning was called a cleric (mujtahid).5 
Islamic law (Shari a) was the rules guiding the life of a Muslim, and required 
knowledge of the science of jurisprudence. A study of jurisprudence [Islamic 
jurisprudence which involved knowledge of Islamic law and reasoning about causes] 
was not necessarily for a political or social leader, but was a prerequisite for being an 
Islamic leader. 6 The religious leaders' scholastic method of disputation (jcidal or 
mumizara) required a combined study of Islamic knowledge, law and traditions. In this 
connection the study of disputation and fatwa [legal judgements] was created as a new 
methodology for the learning of Islam, and became a fundamental source of knowledge 
for study in jurisprudence.7  
Fatwa and ijtihad became a source of merit for promotion within the clerical scholastic 
community. Subsequently, as philosophical disputation became the scholastic method, 
ability as a speaker became a prerequisite for leaders of academic and social 
communities.8 ljtihad was institutionalised in Sunni judicial training, Shia theological 
learning, and the Fasl system in the Arab tribal community, as described in the 
previous chapter. 
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The ideas of forming the ideal Islamic community (umma), Islamic morality, loyalty to 
Islam, and access to ijtihad as one of the direct ways to God were negotiated and 
renegotiated at the social level, while at state level Islamic morality and loyalty were 
renegotiated. 
The concepts of merit and education in the Ottoman period 
In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Sultans and bureaucrats modernised the Empire 
by defining the concept of merit to support the bureaucrats' position, and to legitimise 
and consolidate the bureaucracy. Merit was defined within a political ideology as a 
matter of state policy. The Islamic terms were explained in terms of the moral duties 
which were institutionalised and embedded in the text 'The Guide to Morals' (Rehber-i 
Akhkik). The result of the state modernity projects was an emphasis on foreign and 
traditional knowledge, but there was a loss of the traditional Islamic philosophy, 
knowledge and morality. 
However, in the society, within the Arab tribal and Shia communities, merit was 
valued as meaning the acceptance of personal obligations within these communities. 
It is suggested that one of the reasons why the concept of merit became a political 
concern was that the Empire needed a meritocratic principle to consolidate the civil 
bureaucracy and the military leadership in order to centralise the Empire, and to defend 
it against foreign political and economic pressures. The conquest of Syria and Egypt in 
the sixteenth century led the Ottoman Empire to unite through the re-vitalisation of 
Islam, historical studies and the learning and teaching of classics based on Islamic 
values. The Ottoman national idea, which first appeared in the mid-nineteenth century, 
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was marked by strong resistance to foreign influence, and this led to the emphasis on 
Islamic morality and loyalty to the Empire. 
The changes in the concept of merit and their institutionalisation in the education 
system may be divided into three stages: the emergence and growth of the golden age 
of the Islamic Ottoman Empire (1299-1566), the imperial decline in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, and the modernisation of the Empire (1808-1922).9 This 
thesis focuses on the third stage in particular the time when the Tanzimat [the Reform] 
system (1839-1876) drastically affected the lives of the three provinces of the 
Mesopotamia through the modernisation of education and the time when Abdulhamid 
II (reigned 1876-1909) redefined Islamic moral obligation in the education system. 
As described in the previous chapter, in the mid-nineteenth century the most effective 
Ottoman reforms, the Tanzimat, were introduced. Sunni Islam became a resource for 
nationalist identity and served to re-strengthen the Empire. The reforms were drastic. 
There was a growing determination to reform the state's administration, legislation, 
military organisation and training, economy and education, in large part on western 
models.1° The Tanzimat led to the emergence of a new style of education of leaders in 
the provinces of Mesopotamia. 
The provincial people had been little touched by the apparatus of the state. In 1869, 
Midhat Pasha, one of the ablest administrators in the Ottoman service, arrived in 
Baghdad as the governor of Baghdad; he aimed to reintegrate the Mesopotamian 
provinces into the Empire." The Land Law of 1858 and the provinces (wilCryat) law of 
1864, which were applied to the Danube province, were applied also to the province of 
Baghdad. 
182 
The new emphasis was on merit acquired through state education. A meritocratic 
principle based on personal and Islamic morality, that is loyalty to the Empire, and an 
examination system were required in order to consolidate the Sunni religious, civil, and 
military, bureaucracy. Hence a new achievement—oriented school system was 
instituted; it trained the future military officers, civil servants, teachers and tax 
collectors.12 
The Education Law of 1868 and the Regulations for Public Education in 1869 
promulgated four years of compulsory elementary schooling. These regulations 
legitimised the education of the general public. In the same year, two years of lower 
secondary schooling (rushdiya) and two years of higher secondary schooling (1 'dadiya) 
had been established for boys in Baghdad, Mosul, Basrah, Kikuk, and Sulaymaniya." 
Later, the educational ladder was fixed as a three years' elementary course and three 
years of upper elementary study, renamed as rushdiya. The higher secondary schools 
offered four years of preparation for higher education. These schools prepared students 
for training as military leaders and civil servants. In Baghdad since 1869, the civil and 
military rushdiya schools increased and, after completion, young generations 
proceeded to study at the Law Schools and the War College in Istanbul." 
Under the reign of Abdtilhamid II, in both sets of institutions, for official civil and 
military training, the students dressed in uniform, recited slogans such as 'Long live the 
Sultan!' and participated in a regimented daily routine. Whereas in non military school 
classrooms, maps were the only visual material apart from the blackboard, maps in the 
military schools were displayed along with pictures of military heroes drawn from both 
Ottoman and non-Ottoman history, including Mehmed the Conqueror and Napoleon.'5 
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There was a revival of historical studies and the absorption of foreign knowledge and 
languages, but, unlike in Tokugawa Japan, the learning and teaching of indigenous 
classics based on religious and ethnic values was ignored. 
A new curriculum of akhlak [literally, 'manners] was introduced in the schools and in 
the examination system. The instruction in national morality included the teaching of 
Sunni Islamic manners and the Sunni political system. Two textbooks, 'The Guide to 
Morals' (Rehber-i Akhkik) and 'The Science of Morals' (Ihn-i Akhkrk) were used and 
taught inside and outside the classroom. Ali Irfan Egriboz published the textbook, 
Rehber-i Akhkik, in the year 1899-1900. Each student acquired Western knowledge, 
and at the same time studied according to the traditional pedagogical practice of the 
Islamic world. Islamic terms, sources and concepts were explained in terms of the 
moral duties incumbent upon the young subjects of the Ottoman Empire.16 According 
to Fortna, "combining morals with chemistry and French derives from a different 
tradition from the one which linked grammar with logic, theology, and 
jurisprudence". 17 The Islamic legacy of the study of the didactic method, which 
emphasised theological disputation, revived, and prevailed in the form of the question—
response technique of teaching and learning.18 
Thus, during the rapid expansion of the Ottoman bureaucracy in the nineteenth century 
the concept of merit, institutionalised in the education of the bureaucrats, produced 
intellectuals with foreign knowledge and akhlak, and at the same time loyal servants of 
the Sultan. The state school system was designed to train such candidates. What was 
emphasised in education was redefined Islamic morality, akhlak. What was neglected 
in the renegotiation of Islam was personal learning and the ontological and 
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epistemological knowledge which led to ifiiheid. 
Among the Iraqi intellectuals in Istanbul, there were also the sons of tribal sheikhs who 
studied at the tribal sheikhs' sons' school (Asiret Mektebi) established by Abdulhamid 
II in 1892. Based on his personal views, this school aimed to educate the sons of the 
tribal chiefs and to centralise and control tribal power. The tribal sheikhs' involvement 
in Ottoman authority was apparent in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 
Abdalhamid II cultivated ties with prominent tribal leaders in the Iraqi provinces and 
with leading families of the notables (ashrcy) in order to revitalise the Empire in terms 
of his pan-Islamic world view.19 
In classrooms for the sons of sheikhs, the emphasis in lessons on Islamic morality was 
on the recitation of the Qur'an with melody [tajuvid], theology and stories of the 
Prophet. Within three years, students were to gain knowledge of Turkish orthography 
[imlcr` a] reading and writing and conversation, drill [ta 'Tim], Persian calligraphy and 
lexicology [lugat], Arabic syntax, Arabic and Turkish grammar, geography, French, 
drawing, engineering, first aid, and principles of accounting and arithmetic. The 
method of study was learning by heart.2° The graduates of the school for the sons of 
tribal sheikhs were entitled to enter the War College. 
The state's modernity projects aimed to transmit its power in Mesopotamia through the 
new education system, i'dcidiya and rushdiya and the colleges in Istanbul. The state's 
power was transmitted in Ottoman society through the state school system. Modern 
education consolidated Imperial education, and trained and privileged the bureaucrats 
in religious values and in loyalty, together with Western knowledge. The bureaucracy 
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had an advantageous position for influencing the process of change by controlling 
recruitment, training, promotion and the uniformity of education. 21 In the early 
twentieth century, to the young educated Turks and Iraqi military officials, the essential 
change in the modernity projects was to emphasise westernisation more than Sunni 
Islamisation.22 In this transformation, it was important to replace Islamic conceptions 
of identity, authority and loyalty with new concepts of Western or Arab origin. 
Among the military officers, a new group of young, educated Iraqis from the 
Mesopotamian provinces emerged, and opposed the Sultan's government. For 
example, Tawfiq al-Suwaidi, Naji Shawkat, Hamdi al-Pachachi and Hikmat Sulaiman 
took part in the debates raging in Istanbul about constitutionalism, liberalism, 
decentralisation and secularism.23  
Thus the concept of merit in the Ottoman period included foreign technical knowledge 
and a refined version of Islam in the form of the national morality, obligations, and 
loyalty to the Sultan government. As the Empire modernised, the new privileged civil 
servants and the military leaders worked for the consolidation of the bureaucracy and 
the unification of the Empire. However, Arab tribal and Shia communities which 
were excluded from the main Imperial modernity projects resisted them, and preserved 
different concepts of merit from the new state leaders. 
The Arab tribal and the Shra concepts of merit 
The Islamic and Arab tribal groups retained the concept of traditional merit within their 
communities during the Ottoman period, since the tribal communities retained their 
autonomy, and the traditional tribal order was in the hands of the tribal sheikhs. The 
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school for the sons of sheikhs in Istanbul were hostages in the political strategy for the 
control of Arab tribal communities within the Ottoman Empire. Despite the Sultan's 
offer, not all the Arab tribal sheikhs allowed their sons to study in Istanbul. Some 
preferred to send their sons to notable Islamic clerics living in Baghdad or other holy 
cities. Not all the returned sheikhs' sons were appointed as local administrative 
officials; some preferred to succeed to tribal sheikhs' positions. As long as the 
traditional tribal system and the customary laws protected the tribal members, diwan 
education was little affected by the institutionalisation of the Ottoman concept of merit 
and knowledge provided in Istanbul. 
As described in the previous chapter, the tribal concept of merit system developed 
through the reconciliation system (Fasl) in Islamic law and the Arab tribal 
communities. Merit implied individual honour and dignity (sharaj).24 Strong value 
was attached to peace (salam). The tribal members' obligations to Fasl and peace 
negotiation and the knowledge needed for these activities were institutionalised in the 
diwan education system. Each tribe was, as Ibn Khaldiin emphasised, bound by 
kinship solidarity (asabrya) based on the virtue of loyalty to tribal obligation. For 
Khaldan, from the educational point of view, asabiya required loyalty (wallei'h) in 
dealings with one's fellows.25 This did not mean selfless loyalty to the leader, but 
loyalty based on the person's autonomous decisions according to the dignity promoted 
by Arab cultural values. 
The main sources of diwan education were the Islamic concept of Obeid, customary 
law on the basis of Fasl traditions, tribal history and poetry which existed as an oral 
tradition from the pre-Islamic period. 
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The most traditional concept of tribal merit was that of a murii 'a. Murfi'a is the spirit 
of the ideal youth of the tribe. The term mum?' a was first used in Arabic poetry of the 
pre-Islamic period. Every tribal member is required to be a person of munl'a. The 
sheikh has to be a man of generosity (karcima) and courage (shija'a) recognised by the 
tribal members. Hence, personal autonomy within a concept of social obligation was 
retained in the community, changing its meaning, and continued in the twentieth 
century.26 
The tribal legacy of the concepts of merit (notably Fasl skill, ijtihad, asab-iya and 
munia) was reinforced as a reaction to the 1924 Law of Tribal Criminal and Civil 
Disputes Regulation (TCCDR) - a theme which is discussed in the next chapter. 
The Shia structure of learning which evolved during the nineteenth century was the 
product of centuries of Islamic tradition. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Usrdi 
doctrine, which recognised the single most learned mujtahid, developed a convention 
that the mujtahid in Najaf was to be the chief cleric of all the Shras.27 This position 
was supported by charitable and religious contributions from notables, governments, 
and merchants of the old markets throughout the Shia world. 
Hawza communities, as centres independent of the state, are best described as 
communities of learning. Students developed a sense of pride in their circle of study 
and shared a group identity, asabiya in Litvak's term, as disciples of a specific 
mujtahid. 28  
The invention of the three stages in reaching ijtihad, and of obtaining leadership 
positions of mujtahid, introduced a way of educating Shia clerical leaders. The first 
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stage of study was called the preliminaries (muqaddamiit) and lasted between three and 
five years, in which studies focused on achieving a firm knowledge of Arabic as well 
as basic concepts of logic and rhetoric. Optional subjects included mathematics and 
astronomy. The second stage lasted an average of three to six years. Jurisprudence 
(fiqh) and the principle of jurisprudence (usrd al-Fiqh) were the two main topics of 
study. There were also higher-level courses in logic and grammar. Each subject had 
its own specific universally-accepted texts, which were read successively. 
Classes in the first two stages were usually held in small groups of one to three 
students, who would choose their teachers. The latter were mostly students at higher 
levels or experts in specific fields who rarely advanced in the `ulamei' hierarchy. The 
highest stage of learning (al-Bahth al-Kharij, literally, research exceeding the book) 
was aimed at the attainment of ijtihad. "Exceeding the book" means that the mujtahid 
does not read a specific book from an assigned curriculum, but whatever he chooses. 
The teacher did not use specific books but discussed the various questions and issues, 
citing opinions of different `ulamci' and adding his own comments and criticism.29 
Most classes were held in the shrine courtyards, in mosques, or at the mujtahid's 
homes. 
Without state intervention, the hawza learning community developed the study of 
theology and played an essential role in consolidating the new networks of learning and 
maintaining traditional law and order in them. The key element in the community was 
the patronage tie between teacher and student, which extended beyond the period of 
study into networks of patronage encompassing the various Shia communities in the 
Middle East.3° Concurrently, the growing population of scholars and students came 
from different ethnic groups and classes.31 These communities of learning in the shrine 
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cities were little affected by the state leaders, compared with the Ottoman hierarchy 
based on merit which emphasised loyalty, akhkik as the national moral value, 
memorizing the Qur'an, and foreign knowledge. By emphasising philosophical and 
practical knowledge of ijtiheid, the religious leaders retained a form of Islam in which 
the communities and their members could grow. 
To summarise, the concept of merit in the Ottoman period was defined within a 
political ideology as a matter of state policy in consolidating the bureaucracy. The 
education of the military leaders and civil servants reflected the Tanzimat and was 
characterised by an emphasis on practical knowledge needed for the modernisation and 
unification of the Empire: Islamic loyalty, rehber-i Akhkik, history and the selected 
technical foreign knowledge and languages. As a result of this, education was also 
characterised by the absence of the encouragement of personal cultivation and 
indigenous ontological and epistemological knowledge which led to ijtihad. The 
institutionalised foreign knowledge was not combined with this traditional knowledge. 
The privileged military leaders and civil servants were the modernisers of the Empire 
but at the same time the servants of the Sultan. 
In contrast, the merit valued by the tribal and Shia leaders required personal 
cultivation and accepting obligations within the community. The socialisation of these 
leaders was little affected by the new Ottoman Tanzimeit system. The tribal merit 
system continued through the Fasl tradition in diwtin education. Both clerical and 
tribal leaders acquired the concepts of merit based on traditional philosophical and 
practical Islamic knowledge and social obligation, which implied individual and 
community honour and dignity. The concepts of merit valued by the Islamic clerics 
and Arab tribal leaders had the same root in the pursuit of ijtihad. 
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The late Ottoman concepts of merit shaped by the Tanzimat reforms were redefined 
and continued as a part of the merit required for leadership positions in the period 
following the foundation of the Iraqi state. 
The concepts of merit and education in Iraq 
The Ottoman legacy of the concepts of merit continued as the Iraqi state modernised 
itself. This legacy was deliberately absorbed into the state education system and 
reinforced the political ideologies in monarchical and republican Iraq. Merit was 
redefined within a new political ideology, Arab and Iraqi nationalism, and served to 
consolidate the bureaucracy. The Shr a clerical and Arab tribal leaders challenged the 
fragmenting society and developed the traditional concept of merit within their 
education systems. 
Immediately after the military occupation of Iraq in 1917, the civil authorities turned 
their attention to education. The state education of leaders continued the Ottoman 
legacy, except for the change of language and the replacement of the emphasis on 
Islam by Arab nationalism. The Turkish, French and Persian languages were replaced 
by Arabic. The state school system, instituted under Ottoman rule, began slowly to 
expand under British supervision. The educational provision in primary schools after 
1919 under the British Mandate stressed traditional Islam, Arabic, the English language 
and calligraphy from the first grade.32 
Subsequently the concepts of merit were institutionalised in the state education system, 
which were modelled on Western ideas in three areas: firstly, the establishment of the 
elementary schools, the colleges and later the university and the competitive 
examination system, secondly, curriculum control and thirdly, the expansion of the 
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education system. The institutionalisation of the concepts of merit in the education 
system most affected the control of the curriculum. 
Under the British Mandate projects, the Ottoman discipline of the school for the sons 
of sheikhs in Baghdad was not supported by the Mandate officials. However, the 
Mandate officials valued the education for the sons of sheikhs and therefore, though 
weakened due to its insufficient budget, there was a project to reconstruct this school in 
Baghdad. In the Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government on the Administration 
of Iraq for the period 1923-1924, the following statement was made: 
A residential school for the sons of sheikhs (in Baghdad) has been included 
in every budget since 1920. The need for combining tribes men and 
townsmen for political purposes into one harmonious whole is now greater 
than ever. An educated aristocracy among the tribes would do much to 
reconcile them to a more modern form of government. A Sheikh's school 
appeared for the fifth time in the budget for 1924-25. It would be costly, 
but the cooperation of the tribes in the government of the country is worth 
paying for.33 
The debate on the education for the sons of sheikhs continued until the end of the 
Mandate in 1932. 
Education at every level was expanded to provide for the rapidly growing bureaucracy, 
the armed forces, and the diffusion of the new ideology of merit. In 1920, the Iraqi 
Army was formed. Throughout 1921 the work of recruiting and training units went on 
rapidly. The country was divided up into recruiting areas, with a recruiting officer in 
each. By 1933, the total strength of the Iraqi Army was estimated at twenty thousand 
of all arms.34 The institutionalisation of military training in the schools began in 
Baghdad in 1932-33. The independence of Iraq was obtained in 1932, but the British 
advisers and officials continued at their posts, as well as the British military mission for 
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training the Iraqi army.35 As described in the previous chapter, the young Iraqi officers 
were graduates from the military college in Istanbul. However, new social and military 
groups were slowly emerging from the Sunni tribes in the provinces and the overseas 
studies projects in Britain. To the new monarchy, the army was the only instrument to 
consolidate the state and maintain social order.36 
The Iraqi military officials, unlike those of Meiji Japan, intervened in politics and 
education. The politicisation of the army officer corps had begun as early as 1932, 
when two army officers, Tawfiq Husayn and Taha al-Hashimi, propagated the active 
role of the army in politics on the model of Turkey. These Sharifians, military leaders 
in the Ottoman period, many from a lower-class background, were the core of the 
movement for Arab independence, and major political beneficiaries of the struggle in 
post-Ottoman Iraq. The civil servants and military officers had in common their public 
life at the centre.37 
The British officers, graduates of the Royal Military Academy, taught and trained the 
Iraqi military staff using the Sandhurst curricula, which included modern and 
traditional knowledge: imperial military geography, modern history, economics, 
languages, mechanical engineering or electricity and wireless technology and science, 
morality and leadership.38 However, this foreign knowledge was not combined with 
traditional knowledge. This issue is discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
In the Declaration of the Kingdom of Iraq, on May 20th, 1932, the mandatory regime in 
Iraq was terminated and guarantees were given to the Iraqi council headed by Nuri al- 
Said. Chapter 1, Article 8 stipulated: 
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1. In the public educational system in towns and districts in which are resident a 
considerable proportion of Iraqi nationals whose mother tongue is not the 
official language, the Iraqi Government will make provision for adequate 
facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools instruction shall be given to the 
children of such nationals through the medium of their own language; it being 
understood that this provision does not prevent the Iraqi government from 
making the teaching of Arabic obligatory in the said schools.39 
2. Iraq undertakes that in the said qadhas [local government] the officials shall, 
subject to justifiable exceptions, have a competent knowledge of Kurdish or 
Turkish as the case may be.4°  
3. Although in these qadhas the criterion for the choice of officials will be, as in 
the rest of Iraq, efficiency and knowledge of the language, rather than race, Iraq 
undertakes that the officials shall, as hitherto, be selected, so far as possible, 
from among Iraqis from one or other of these qadhas.41  
The merit required for modernising Iraq included competence in the Arabic language, 
but the languages of the non-Arab ethnic groups were excluded from state education. 
sate al-Husri set goals and structures for Iraqi education tied directly to the interest of 
the state, that is the education of Arab national leaders. Unlike Sultan Abdillhamid II, 
al-Husri, born in Aleppo (Syria) and educated in Istanbul, did not believe in Islamic 
political unity, due to the existence of linguistic and cultural diversities in Iraq as well 
as among Muslim nations, and he called for education for the Arab nationalists. 
Al-Husri' s idea of merit was based on Arab nationalism and opposed to ethnic 
separatism and sectarianism. Although the Kurds were outside the political ideology of 
Arab nationalism, Sunni, Siff' a, Christian and Jewish groups could accept it. Behind 
this, there was al-Husri's perception of education. His aim in education was to create 
the conditions for the cultural flourishing of the Arab nation and the creation of a 
united Arab state.42 He maintained that: 
the union of two spheres, language and history, leads to a union of emotions 
and aims, sufferings, hopes, and culture. Thus the members of one group 
see themselves as members of a unitary nation, which distinguishes itself 
from others. However, neither religion nor the state nor a shared economic 
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life are the basic elements of a nation, and nor is common territory. If we 
want to define the role of language and history for a nation we can say in 
short that the language is the soul and the life of the nation, but history is its 
memory and its consciousness.43  
By redefining the Ottoman legacy of a dominant Islamic identity, al-Hush advocated 
Arabisation, which became the root of Iraqi educational projects until 2003. 
Al-Husri advocated the acquisition of both foreign knowledge and Arabic. As a 
professor at the Higher Teachers' Training College, he shaped the thinking of a new 
generation of high school teachers. The primary school curriculum and texts for the 
academic year 1922-1923 were defined by al-Husri. The textbook for the Arabic 
language was called lhalduniya% named after Ibn Khaldfin. The Ottoman legacy of 
Islamic manners, rehber-i Akhlak, shifted into secular akhlaq al-Mudniya [civic 
ethics]; al-Husri preached egalitarianism and self-sacrifice for Arab nationalism. The 
study of akhlaq al-Mudniya included a study of the political system and was obligatory 
from the elementary schools to the university level. 44 Thus the emphasis on the 
acquisition of indigenous knowledge, the Arabic language, history and geography and 
civic ethics was a part of the state modernity projects. 
Despite the intellectual struggles over the Ottoman legacy of Islamic merit and over 
honouring Arab nationalism, the concept of merit was now redefined by political 
ideology. The new concept of merit was institutionalised in a new selection of 
knowledge and within the state education and political systems. To realise the 
establishment of the Iraq state and the Arab nation, and consolidate the bureaucracy, 
the acquisition of Western knowledge became important. In European history, the 
emphasis was on the study of Garibaldi and Bismarck. 45 This selected foreign 
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knowledge was a means to communicate and consolidate individual loyalty to the 
nation-state and strengthen national identity. 
Thus the concepts of merit were negotiated at state level by al-Husri. As in the case of 
the Ottoman legacy of education, his education system was an ideological training for 
the civil servants and Arab nationalist civic professionals. Arab nationalism and Sunni 
belief became sources of merit and promotion. The institutionalisation of traditional 
and foreign knowledge and languages in the new education system shaped the Arab 
nationalists, in particular civil servants, school teachers, academic scholars, lawyers, 
scientists and medical doctors. 
Al-Husil s new concept of merit, social solidarity based on Ibn Khaldtin's ideas, was 
secular, and he aimed to build a civic society constituted by Arab nationalists. 
However, his unitary notion of merit excluded non-Arab and non-Sunni status groups 
from access to the state merit system. This meant that there was no newly created 
knowledge to share with the urban, religious and Arab tribal groups. 
There was ambivalence among the state educationalists towards the modernity projects. 
Al-Husri was tolerant and opened dialogue with the British, the minorities, the Kurds, 
and the Shi`a groups. 46 However, his strong sectarianism and honouring of Arab 
nationalism brought about a lack of trust. Although his curriculum of Arab nationalism 
and akhlaq al-Mudniya continued in the educational projects until 2003, the unequal 
provision of education delayed the modernisation of the country. The education of 
leaders was affected by this lack of shared knowledge, feelings, languages, history and 
concepts of merit among the different communities. Eventually, the hostility of the 
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British and the Shia led to his resignation as Director-General of Education. He was 
replaced by Muhammad Fadhil al-Jamali in 1934.4-  
Although al-Jamali was a strong supporter of Arab nationalism, al-HusrT's view of 
cultural identity appeared to him as incompatible with the principles of pedagogy.48 
Opposed to al-Husri's Sunni Arab centralism, al-Jamali, an urban Arab nationalist, 
emphasised the importance of educational provision in the rural areas. By the mid-
1930s the Shia had come close to dominating the Ministry of Education. The removal 
of al-Husri from his position of influence in the Ministry paved the way for the Shia to 
push for the expansion of state education in the rural areas, beginning with the 1933-34 
academic year. 
In 1934 al-Jamali established directorates of education in each province in Iraq, and 
encouraged the directors to introduce reforms in the schools under their jurisdiction 
according to the specific social needs of their province. Emphasising a decentralised 
educational system, he ensured increasing SLIT' a access to secular education in the local 
areas and was responsible for an increase in the number of Shia in the student 
missions sent abroad.49 In 1934, he emphasised merit in education in the Islamic 
context: 
The Muslim educator should think again and evaluate his actual position. 
On the one hand, he should uphold his Islamic heritage and Islamic identity; 
on the other, he should adopt from the West elements of human welfare, 
power, science, industry and organisation. He should beware of distortion 
of his national and religious identity, and of the mistakes and ills with 
which the West is now afflicted.50 
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For al-Jamali, Islam and Arab traditional and western knowledge were a means to 
strengthen state ideology and to serve the nation-state. He proposed a role for a 'new 
man': 
The 'new man' will need new characteristics, and the educator can shape 
his work to produce them. First, integrity. Next, emotional control. 
Control of the right kind must be the whole truth, and that not merely in a 
scientific sense. Truth is greatly needed in human relationships. ...Only 
those who have been set free can free others. Only the loved can love. 
School life can make it clear that a position of any sort is an opportunity for 
service, not self-advancements' 
The education of new men was thus focussed on the practical aspects of life, 
overlooking the traditional concept of merit as requiring Islamic philosophy and self-
cultivation. Al-Jamali considered that character-training was necessary to equip a 
responsible "new type of man" that the state needed. However, the development of 
individual autonomy and social responsibility so as to ensure a person's success in life 
was hardly mentioned. 
Just before the end of the Mandate, in 1931, the Iraqi government invited Professor 
Paul Monroe of Columbia Teachers' College to prepare a report on the modernisation 
of education in the country.52 Al-Jamali was a member of the Monroe Commission of 
Enquiry, and he was Monroe's Ph.D. student. The Report of the Commission 
recognised the fragmented ethnic, religious and social components of Iraq and 
proposed the decentralisation of the educational system. 
Al-Jamali was aware of the educational problems of the separation between the Sunni 
and the Shr a, and between the urban and the rural groups and his emphasis in the 
Monroe Report was on the problem of tribal education. 
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The Report focused on two issues: first, the fostering of secondary education which 
would contribute to the training of the country's future leadership, and secondly, tribal 
education as the basic problem. State education was largely confined to city dwellers, 
and largely directed towards government service and the teaching profession.53 The 
Commission proposed the guiding principles for tribal education which they conceived 
as essential in carrying out any educational programme.54 The Report stated: 
It is important that, as far as possible, education should be directed among 
the tribes by people from the tribes. We see a great danger if tribal 
education is divorced from the tribal situation. Those tribal children who 
are sent to city schools certainly will not be happy in going back to live with 
their tribes. Moreover, the tribes should not be supplied with educational 
workers from cities and towns, for these are not well received by the tribes 
on the one hand, and on the other hand no city man can live comfortably 
with the tribes for any length time. The practical problem, then, is how to 
train educators from the tribes for the tribes.55 
Education must cherish the desert tradition of vesting leadership in the 
hands of the most able. Although theoretically hereditary, we have seen 
that chieftainhood in the desert is based on real merit and the ability to 
lead.56 
As a solution to the problem of tribal education, the Monroe Commission suggested 
peripatetic schools for the tribes. Knowledge about health and farming would be 
provided for the rural tribal members. 57 In 1935, the Training School for Rural 
Teachers was established in the Rustamiya district of Baghdad.58  
The Monroe Commission Report stated: 
There should be no separate provision for the education of the sons of the 
sheikhs. The sons of the sheikhs should not be brought up differently from 
the sons of the tribal members. Such favouritism will lead to serious social 
problems for the country in the long run. The leadership among those tribes 
should be natural rather than imposed. This has been the desert tradition 
and it is the best. If the sons of the sheikhs aspire to leadership they should 
get it by merit and not by adventitious factors. They should live and grow 
with the sons of the tribal members, and their capacity for leadership must 
grow from within. We lay down this principle to discourage such decisions 
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on the part of the educational authorities as were made in the past to start a 
boarding school for the sons of the sheikhs.59 
This report was written by al-Jamali. He was aware of a practical problem, which was 
that his support for democratic civic society contradicted the preservation of education 
for the tribes and the socialisation of tribal leaders. However he was not sufficiently 
aware of the knowledge and merit of the tribal leaders which was valued by the tribal 
members. 	 Al-Jamali tried to apply Western universal egalitarianism to tribal 
education.6° In fact, as described in the previous chapter, very few secondary schools 
were opened in the provinces. 
Al-Husri criticised the Monroe Commission Report as a foreign, hastily prepared, 
evaluation without an understanding of the cultural traditions and the politics of Iraq. 
Al-Husfi's request to open dialogue was rejected by the Committee and al-Jamali.61  
The cultural and educational separations of Sunni from Shia and urban from rural 
areas were not discussed with these opposing leaders. The varied state modernity 
projects, which contained different ideas on the state and civic leadership, paralleled 
the development of the state education system. 
Al-Jamali's education policy confirmed the fragmentation of ethnic and regional 
groups. The gap between civic and rural knowledge was strengthened by the 
separation of tribal and civil law in 1933. Shia Islamism and tribalism revived, and 
reacted against the state project. The socialisation of tribal and religious leaders 
strengthened. Through their life experiences, tribal and Islamic history, literature and 
philosophy were reinforced in the diwan and hawza educational systems within the 
community. Foreign knowledge as advocated by al-Jamali and his vision of new Iraq 
200 
were not combined with indigenous philosophy and practical knowledge. 
Like al-Husri and al-Jamali, Sarni Shawkat, a medical doctor, later the Director 
General of Education in 1939, and a Minister of Education in the 1940s, supported 
Arab nationalism. His concept of merit was based on the Islamic morality of loyalty, 
but was absorbed in a militaristic and pragmatic way in the education system and in the 
bureaucracy. This helped Shawkat and other state leaders to strengthen the political 
ideology calling for the formation of an Arab nation and an Iraqi nation-state, and to 
consolidate a military and bureaucratic government. The effect of his educational 
modernity projects was the emergence of a militaristic style of leadership. 
The militarisation of state education meant the assimilation of Western nationalist and 
Fascist models. By this time, nationalist youth organisations were already established 
in Italy, Germany, Bulgaria, India and Egypt. 62 However, unlike in the youth 
organisations of some other countries, memberships of the Iraqi youth organisation was 
compulsory for all male secondary school students 
As early as 1932, Shawkat and other Arab nationalists had envisaged the militarisation 
of Iraqi society by training the youth, and institutionalising their ideologies in 
education. This educational programme was called futiiwa (literally, the youth). 
Futfiwa was an Islamic term for the ideal youths in the Ummayyad and 'Abbasids 
periods. The traditional futuwa was redefined by Shawkat as having the spirit of 
chivalry.63 The vision of state education set goals and structures tied directly to the 
interest of the state: Sunni Islamisation, Arabisation and the militarisation of 
education." 
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In the 1934, a futftwa programme was developed jointly by the Ministries of Education 
and Defence.65 The programme was popular with the administrative bureaucrats and 
was supported by the Arab nationalist Muthanna Club and teachers at the Teachers' 
Training College. Among them, al-Sabbagh Amin al-Umari and \anis al-Sab'awi 
supported futuwa education for the unification of the Arab nation. The Prime Minister, 
Jamil al-Midfa`i, became the patron, and the Ministry of Education supervised further 
development.66 In 1935, under the Yashin al-Hashimi regime, the futtiwa programme 
was legitimised and was enacted as Widheim al-Fuhiwa [the Youth Chivalry 
Regulation]' .67 The magazine Al-Futiiwa [Chivalry] was established and continued for 
two years in high demand. This publication increased the popularity of the futuwa 
movement. Many professionals and teachers supported futftwa.68 
The compulsory futitwa curriculum was extended from all secondary schools, to high 
schools, and teachers' colleges and later to all other educational institutions and 
administrative offices. The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Defence led the 
establishment of a paramilitary youth organisation, Jaish 	 (the Youth Army), 
inspired by German and Italian youth organisations. 69 These organisations were 
developed by Shawkat and Taha Hashimi, who graduated from the Rushidiya in 
Baghdad, attended the War College in Istanbul and Staff college, and was later a 
general, a military scholar and the Minister of Education under Yashin al-Hashimi's 
regime. 
By 1936, the government had incorporated compulsory knowledge, defined by the 
examination system and an emphasis on the transmission of compulsory moral 
principles, in the education system. The merit which was institutionalised in the Youth 
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Chivalry Regulation was used to guide the Iraqi youngsters to develop loyalty to the 
nation-state and a sense of involvement in a historical mission aiming at a total 
renovation of Arab society. A whole political culture was built on their role as a 
national vanguard ready to restore the Arab tradition. Strongly influenced by German 
ideas of nationalism, and encouraged by Fritz Grobba, German Minister in Baghdad, 
Shawkat, the General Director of Education in 1939, defined history as a subject in the 
schools. He addressed high school students on the inauguration of military training for 
them: 
Iraq's ambition [literally 'hope] extends to all the Arab countries on the 
banks of this formidable [Tigris] river.....Hariin al-Rashid established his 
throne and 	 ruled over 200 million people. We shall not deserve to be 
proud of him and claim that we are his grandsons if we do not rebuild what 
he constructed. The spirits of al-Rashid and al-Ma'mun want that Iraq 
would have, within a brief time-span, half a million soldiers and hundreds 
of airplanes. To power [then], 0 youth, raising high the banner of [King 
Faysal 1], heir (khalifat) of Harlin al-Rashid.7°  
The military profession was regarded as the fulfilment of a religious duty.' The ideal 
soldier was the perfect citizen, retaining the traditional values. 
We wish every success for our soldiers and hope that Iraq will soon have a 
strong army so that the country may gain complete independence and true 
freedom.72 
This speech was largely based on both Iraqi and Arab history, using traditional classics 
to motivate nationalism. For Shawkat, Arab nationalism was a means to realise 
military politics, and, unlike in Meiji Japan, the military was the means to realise the 
independence and the freedom of the country. 
The Ministry of Defence assigned officers as teachers for Jaish al-Futiiwa. Resisting 
the view of education as a militaristic institution in the service of the state, al-Husri 
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opposed the idea of military bureaucrats teaching in the schools. There was no 
dialogue between al-Husri and Shawkat. Teaching was focused on the cultivation of 
the individual Islamic spirit, the English language and the militaristic values of the 
march and chivalry. Between 1934 and 1935, secondary school students completed the 
curriculum of military training for the infantry and cavalry, and the use of small arms. 73  
Educational ceremonies were students' parades and meetings, modelled on similar 
gatherings taking place in Germany and Italy. These events became frequent. Students 
were classified by military rank and wore corresponding chevrons and badges. They 
formed the audience of Shawkat's speeches. The militarisation of education was a 
reflection of Shawkat's personal educational background: 
I hereafter shall permit no one to make any propaganda for peace and shall 
oppose anyone who advocates peace. We want war. We should shed our 
blood for the sake of Arabism. We should die for our national cause.... It is 
our duty to perfect the profession of Death, the profession of the army, the 
sacred military profession.' 4 
Although this speech was criticised and ridiculed by the more moderate sectors of the 
population, the principle of individual sacrifice for the sake of national salvation 
remained a part of the state modernity projects.' Thus the military were fervent 
supporters of the futuwa in state education. Shawkat institutionalised the ideals of 
Arab nationalism and selfless loyalty in state education. 
In 1939, a new Public Education Law was promulgated. Article 5 forbade injury to 
national unity, and Article 31 allowed the authorities to close any private and foreign 
schools whose activities were seen as contravening of Article 5. Article 32 forbade 
private schools to accept financial aid from foreign sources without the approval of the 
Ministry of Education. Article 34 prohibited the use of books that were incompatible 
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with the spirit of Article 5.76 
In 1940, the law extended direct government control over all private schools, 
stipulating that only Arab teachers approved by the Ministry of Education could teach 
Arabic history, geography and civic ethics, and the establishment of a national 
examination system of baccalaureates for the primary (6 years) intermediate secondary 
(3 years) and preparatory secondary grades (3 years). 
As mentioned earlier, the state's educational modernisation and what was counted 
good knowledge were renegotiated by the British from the 1940s onwards. 
Changing the concept of merit 
After the British re-occupied Iraq in 1941, Professor Herbert Russell Hamley, an 
educator from the University of London Institute of Education, saw the necessity of 
promoting Western liberal democracy as a serious alternative to Arab fascism. Hamley 
was pivotal in the educational process of Iraq. His appointment at the Ministry of 
Education was a turning point in its history. With his coming, the Ministry came under 
British influence. He had two main objectives: first, to eliminate the fascism which 
was widespread at the Ministry and in the schools, and secondly to re-organise the 
curriculum of the schools, destroying the strong relationship between fascism and the 
curriculum. 77  
Both state and social modernisers were involved in the internationally influenced 
renegotiation of existing cultural traditions and knowledge. Hamley had to prepare for 
action and fill the gaps at the Ministry of Education. He had enough authority and 
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power to make changes. He brought in Sadiq Jawhar from Egypt, Hasan Ahmad al-
Salman from Basrah, and Abdul Fatah Ibrahim from Baghdad, and started his efforts to 
change the curriculum.78 The futuwa educational project was abolished in 1941. Sir 
Kinahan Cornwallis, the Ambassador, sent a letter to Mr. Eden: 
Professor Hamley has been able to make some progress with the reform of 
the Ministry of Education but it seems clear that he will continue to meet 
with serious obstruction until Dr. Sami Shawkat and Dr. Fadhil Jamali, the 
joint directors-general, are removed. The Prime Minister was trying to 
obtain an eminent Egyptian educationalist as a new head of the department. 
Meanwhile, Professor Hamley has enhanced his already high reputation by 
organizing a successful summer school for older boys in which he has been 
able to demonstrate the value of sane, healthy principles of education, while 
indicating at the same time the opportunities that exist for constructive 
youthful endeavour within the country. It is hoped in this manner to combat 
to some extent the pessimism that seems to cloud so many young minds in 
Iraq." 
The most important aspect of Hamley' s educational programme was citizenship 
education. The summer school for older boys was also called a summer school of 
citizenship.80  As Jamali had used summer military training for boys, Hamley used the 
summer camps for citizenship to empower the young democratic citizens. Their 
informal curriculum, including foreign knowledge, developed the socialisation of the 
learning network among the teachers. Cornwallis wrote that the actual running of the 
`Summer Schools of Citizenship' was wisely left in the hands of the Iraqi teachers.81  
Summer camps or summer military training camps, were also used for the socialisation 
of the ' al-Ahcili' groups — the origins of the communist group in the 1950s - and for 
Ba'th party members and the expansion of their membership. 
The Ottoman legacy of akhlaq and Husri's akhlaq al-Mudniya were now redefined as 
citizenship in terms of liberal education. During Hamley's stay in Iraq, he saw the 
importance of rural education, and of uniting the urban and rural groups.82 
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In the 1950s, Iraq, under al-Sald's regime, experienced industrial development 
assisted by the increase in oil revenues. Unlike education in the 1920s and 1940s, in 
the 1950s there was much more focus on technical education for the modernisation of 
the state and the society. Al-Said and al-Suwaidi established a new type of education 
for citizens. 'Civic ethics and national education' were provided for the students of the 
second and third grades in the intermediate schools. Al-Said encouraged civilian and 
military loyalties to the state and the Arab nation, and political docility among the 
students. Physical education, military training and civil defense were obligatory in all 
intermediate and preparatory schools and within both literary and science courses, and 
continued until 2003.83 In the 1950s, the education of military officers at the staff 
college in Baghdad continuously strengthened their training. The Ministry of 
Education sent the officers and graduates of the Military and Staff College to the 
Sandhurst Staff College. 
The clerical and tribal leadership were also pivotal in the democratisation process. 
However, during the Qasim regime (1958-1963), the educational system was 
politicised in a new form. The vision of education was stated in the 1958 Public 
Education Law. Article 1 declared: 
The duty of the Ministry of Education is the creation of an enlightened and 
conscious generation believing in Allah and in its own homeland, having 
confidence in itself and its nation, aiming at high ideals of individual and 
social conduct; tenacious of the principles of justice and good; possessing 
will-power for the common struggle, the ways and means of decisive 
action, and the ability to carry through positive policies. Armed with 
scientific knowledge and sound character, the Iraqi may thus be able to 
strengthen the position of his people as well as of the Arab nation among 
the nations of the world, and to establish the Arab nation's right to freedom, 
security, and dignified life.84 
To Qasim, Arab and Iraqi nationalisms were important sources of the national identity. 
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This law emphasised the ideal individual and social conduct to realise the formation of 
the Arab nation. In 1964, in Arif s period, the teaching of ideal "individual and social 
conduct" became part of the curriculum. The Ministry of Education called for a course 
in 'National and Social Education' to prepare citizens who were faithful to their 
country, the new nation and humanity at large. According to the intermediate school 
syllabus for this year, "national and social education should be effective for the 
acquisition of useful attitudes, good habits, noble emotions, moral values and a belief 
in the right of the nation to lead a dignified life and to contribute to the progress of 
human civilisation"." 
Nationalism worked as a part of the political system to strengthen state ideology, but 
also marginalised the tribal and civil factions through the use of violence and ethnic 
and religious divisions. The state leaders were intolerant of the Shia traditions, 
knowledge and values, and of certain tribal groups. These leaders neglected to apply 
the indigenous traditions in the state educational curriculum. The traditional Islamic 
study of ijahad was not included in the school curriculum, but was a core of the 
learning in the diwan and the hawza. Fasl traditions were not studied in the College of 
Law. The urban lawyers were ignorant of indigenous tribal jurisprudence. 
During the conflicts between the religious leadership and the communist party 
members who were supporters of the Qasim government, Mujtahid, later Ayattolah, 
Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr found himself in the midst of a bitter confrontation between 
traditional Najaf and the Communists. His world view was formed with this twofold 
intellectual background: a Socialist-Communist call which was affecting the whole of 
the Middle East and which permeated the concern in his writings with the 'social 
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question', and the traditional education of the hierarchy.86 In opposing communism, 
as-Sadr's redefinition of Shi'ism had a political dimension. 
Against the increase of communist support for Qasim's regime, as-Sadr defended in 
public Islamic knowledge which led to spiritual and material harmony. He recognised 
the existence of contradictions in society and in political ideology. In his Falsafatuna 
(Our Philosophy) as-Sadr gave an idea of Islamic philosophy at work, claiming that the 
idea of contradiction in the dialectics of Communism is redundant: 
Motion in its dialectical understanding rests on the basis of contradiction, 
and the opposition of contradictions. These conflicts and contradictions are 
the inner force, which pushes movement and creates development. In 
contrast to this, our philosophical understanding rests on a notion of 
movement, which is considered a course [of passing] from degree to a 
corresponding degree, without these corresponding degrees ever meeting in 
one specific stage of the course of the movement." 
The idea of the renovation of hawza began in the 1960s, through the efforts of 
Ayatollahs Muhsin al-Hakim, as-Sadr and Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei. Al-Hakim aimed to 
preserve the institutional independence of the community from the government and 
from the transformation of the system at the political centre. He expanded his 
influence by increasing enrolment in the hawza in Najaf and by developing plans to 
establish a Western-style Shia academy in Kufa for future Shi`a political leaders.88 
As-Sadr helped establish the Usiil al-Din College in Baghdad in 1964, and set up its 
curriculum. For first-and second-year college students, he wrote three textbooks on the 
Qur'an, the ustil al-Fiqh, and Islamic economics.89 
The method for the education of Shia leaders changed. It was as-Sadr who 
transformed the learning community itself. He institutionalised his redefined Islamic 
political thought and Islamic political movements by reinforcing new political parties. 
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First, he pursued the enlargement of Islamic political activities by including laymen. 
Secondly, he renovated the hawza by writing new textbooks, by changing the method 
of learning and by institutionalising academic promotion. 
As-Sadr believed in a new Islamic education, as an important part of his answer to the 
problems of the politically vulnerable hawza system. Rather than maintaining hawza 
scholar communities, he aimed at the establishment of western—style universities that 
would hold the student responsible for completing certain courses and passing regular 
examinations. 90 He allowed the intervention of the clerics in politics, which had 
occurred in a sporadic and individual way throughout the history of Shia communities. 
Thus as-Sadr's thoughts were institutionalised in the hawza and its enlarged Najef 
University. However, within the hawza, there was conflict over principles. As-Sadr 
and Shams-Din redefined Islam in terms of political thought, as-Sadr more widely in 
terms of economics, sociology and other worldviews. Al-Khoei supported non-
political Islam. Al-Khoei's message to the Shi'as was not an aspiration to set up an 
Islamic theocracy; all of the `ulamei"s emphasis was to be on encouraging individual 
access to iftihad. 
Conflicts over the cultural redefinition of Islam and the political actions of each groups 
affected the state. These conflicts and the state leaders' absence of social trust created 
difficulty for both the state and the society in developing the modernisation of the 
country. 
Unlike the Shia leaders, the Sunni leaders focused the education of leaders on the 
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training of judges, and have continued to do so in the contemporary era. The National 
Institute for the Training of Judges was supervised by one of the assistants of the 
Minister of Justice. This system continues today. 
Arab and Iraqi national identity was continuously a source of merit valued by the state 
for leadership positions. The redefined merit system, loyalty and Arab Islam were 
institutionalised in the education system. 
The education of tribal sheikhs and Shi`a leaders played a large role in forming their 
political worldviews. As in the case of Meiji Japan, the moral code within balanced 
knowledge encouraged personal autonomy within a concept of cultural and social 
obligation. Islamic and Arab tribal education remained fundamentally an informal 
enterprise revolving around the teacher-student relationship or the hierarchical 
relationship between tribal sheikhs and members. The traditional concept of merit 
which functioned in Islamic and Arab tribal communities could be combined with 
foreign knowledge, and create new forms of civic society. For this purpose, the private 
Najaf University was established in 1960. 
Conclusion 
The education of the Ottoman military leaders and civil servants started in the 
Tanzimat. During the reign of Abdillhamid II, the concepts of merit were characterised 
by an emphasis on practical foreign knowledge, history and indigenous morality, which 
was needed for the consolidation of the bureaucracy and the unification of the Empire. 
The subjects studied were selected areas of foreign technical knowledge, languages, 
and redefined Islamic loyalty, that is, rehber-i Akhlak as defined in the Guide to 
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Morals. The idea of rehber-i Akhlak was politicised. It called for national morality, 
national obligations, and loyalty to the Sultan's government. The Islamic legacy of 
theological disputation was continued in the form of the question—response technique 
of teaching and learning, but the pursuit of the ontological and epistemological 
knowledge which led to ij tiheid was neglected. Thus the Ottoman modernity projects 
shaped meritocratic intellectuals who were loyal servants of the Sultan. The new 
Military and Law College and the sheikhs' sons' school, as well as the school system, 
were designed to train such candidates. The redefined concepts of merit were based on 
recruitment, promotion and the competitive examinations. 
The Arab military groups educated in Istanbul were those who first raised voices of 
opposition to Ottoman Islamisation of the modernity projects and called for Pan-Arab 
nationalism and secularism. Under the Mandate's education policies, the state 
modernisers redefined rehber-i Akhlak as akhltiq al-Mudniya [civic ethics] and 
embedded it in a textbook, taught as a part of the compulsory curriculum and continued 
in Monarchical and Republic Iraq. The idea of loyalty to the state as a civic obligation 
combined with the two ideologies of nationalism and was institutionalised in the state 
education system. However, the different state ideologies of the centralisation of 
education advocated by al-Hush, decentralisation by al-Jamali and militarisation 
operated by Shawkat contested with each other in the first fifty years of the history of 
Iraq. These three controversial ideologies, though they declined in the 1940s, revived 
and co-exist in the state education system today. 
The establishment of modern curricula for the education of civil servants eroded the 
social values contained in the moral code of Islamic and Arab tribal knowledge. 
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The Sunni-centred Tanzimeit projects continued to exclude the development of the 
Shia community. As a reaction to this, the Shia religious leaders revitalised the 
hawza learning communities in order to protect their life styles and fulfill their 
theological obligations, in particular the pursuit of ijtihad. The exclusive political 
environment continued to oppress the Shi` a throughout the twentieth century. 
There were the constant debates about the construction of a new life in the 1920s and 
1930s and not all the previous sources of merit continued. For example, the Mandate 
officials struggled, for more than ten years, over the education of sheikhs' sons in 
Baghdad and the institutionalisation of tribal merit in it. Though the Mandate officers 
agreed on the rejection of the Ottoman educational policy, this continuous struggle was 
mainly caused by the insufficient budget, and disputes among the officers on how to 
reconstruct the education of sheikhs' sons. There was, as the Report for 1923-4 said, 
ambivalence towards the project among the officers, and after Iraq became independent 
in 1932, the education of the sheikhs' sons at the state level was not valued. In 
contrast, diwein education was defined by al-Jamali as a problem for the new Iraq as 
well as for his concept of the new man. His state modernity projects for rural 
education brought about the loss of shared knowledge and feeling which could lead to 
mutual understanding between urban and rural dwellers. 
Under the pressure of the 1924 law of tribal regulations, the tribal leaders reinforced 
the diwcin education for the protection and the welfare of their communities and peace 
with other tribes by using tribal knowledge of Fast The Shia leaders' resistance to 
the pressures of the exclusive state modernity project led to the emergence of 
differences in the ideas of as-Sadr, al-Khoei and al-Muzaffar about the Shia position in 
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relation to the state. Hawza education played an essential role in inter-communal 
protection and in fostering a new style of leadership. 
What was neglected in state education was the knowledge included in the cultural 
legacy which was maintained and developed in the traditional hawza and diwan 
educational institutions. The study of the thinking needed to reach ijtiheid [the one 
straight way to lead to Heaven] was overlooked in the Ottoman and Iraqi state 
education systems. The tribal knowledge of iphad, which was used for Fasl peace-
making, and Shia knowledge of ijtihad for the development of theology remained 
alien to the state leaders, as the state education system disregarded these subjects in the 
curriculum. The state modernisers, the nationalists and military leaders, ignored values 
and knowledge of the Arab tribal or Shia groups and failed in finding a new common 
goal across the communities. The study of ijtiheid developed gradually within both 
communities, in hawza and diwan, but it was not revitalised by a combination with 
foreign knowledge, or combined with other indigenous knowledge. The concepts of 
merit continued in different styles, and continue today. 
The next chapter discusses the way in which these varied concepts of merit and 
knowledge were institutionalised in the education systems and the effects of the 
changing education of leaders in the state modernity projects and within the different 
communities. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE EDUCATION OF LEADERS IN IRAQ 
This chapter, like Chapter 4, identifies what will be defined as leadership positions. It 
then traces the original forms of the education of leaders in Iraq, before and especially 
during the Ottoman period, and analyses the changing education of leaders under the 
Monarchy and the new Republic. The chapter argues that political and cultural 
struggles over the institutionalisation of what was regarded as good knowledge and 
moral values created new styles in the education of leaders. 
The changes in Iraq are divided into two phases, those of the Monarchy (1921-1958) 
and the Republic (1958-1968). The chapter offers four sections, but the titles of the 
subsections are not the same as those in Chapter Four. This is due to the fact that 
unlike Meiji Japan, Iraq did not experience public debates about moral values. 
The education of leaders before and during the Ottoman period (750-
1922) 
Leadership positions 
In the 'Abbasid period, there was an occupational separation between Arab political 
leaders and Islamic leaders. The caliphs were successors to the Prophet Muhammad 
and the political leaders of the Islamic community (umma), while the Islamic scholars 
('ulamil) and the judges were the religious leaders. Having a strong theocratic 
position and continuity with orthodox Sunni Islam, the caliphs were represented as 
symbols of sacred moral virtue. Their leadership position required Islamic virtues, arts 
and refinement. The roles of the caliphs were to disseminate Islam and encourage 
Islamic study as heads of the administrative offices and the military and justice 
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systems. Following Muhammad's example, the caliphs held the highest authority for 
the solving of disputes. 
The holder of the highest religious position in the caliphate's administrative offices 
was called 'mufti  [a legal expert who issues fatwa] and recognised by the caliph as the 
person who was familiar with fatwa in the context of religion. The mufti was the 
product of the 'Abbasid education of religious leaders and new professions. At the end 
of the 'Abbasid dynasty (750-1258), the Sunni clerics and mufti were defined as 
persons of talent. Opening positions to mufti became the fundamental principle of the 
caliphates' administration. The caliphs established posts for the mufti and the judges, 
appointed them and paid them. This was in the thirteenth century, when the concepts 
of the education of leaders, of the philosophical moral code and of practical learning 
became political concerns and the mufti became governmental bureaucrats. Among the 
Sunni mufti, there was resistance to the new system of obtaining salaried secular 
positions.' The clerical scholars were, however, gradually absorbed into the caliphate's 
offices. 
The education of administrative and Islamic legal experts 
In the 'Abbasid period, especially in the eleventh century, administrative, religious, 
military and academic leaders emerged through the new educational institutions. The 
education of these leaders took place in their administrative offices (diwan), madrasa 
[college of law and religious school] or in the mosque. The diwan developed around 
the caliphs and their scholarly companions, becoming places for the exchange of ideas, 
and reaching their highest popularity during the period of the Caliph Harun al-Rashid, 
who reigned from 786 to 809. Al-Rashid used the diwan for initiating debates among 
distinguished scholars on religion, theology, philosophy, rhetoric, grammar and poetry 
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(al-Qasida).2 The madrasa al-Mustansiriya [al-Mustansiriyya school], founded by the 
Caliph Mustansir in 1237, was the highest educational institution during the 'Abbasid 
period.3  
The term majalis was used in the first century of Islam to designate a sacred hall for the 
teaching of hadith [oral tradition and the records of the collections of sayings and acts 
of the Prophet and the first Muslims]. In the 'Abbasid period, many types of majalis 
emerged in Baghdad, for example as meeting places for poets, for consultations on 
jurisprudence (fiqh), and for legal disputations.4 Foreign works in Greek, Persian and 
Sanskrit gained in importance in bookshops and public libraries, the House of Science 
(the clar" al-11m), and the hospitals. The House of Sagacity (belt al-Hikma) encouraged 
the learning of Islam as well as new knowledge, and the translation of important Greek, 
Persian and Sanskrit writings into Arabic. 	 Literature, theology, philosophy, 
mathematics and natural sciences flourished.' 
Education through majalis developed learning networks. The official educational 
institutions were built by the waqf Waqf were Islamic charitable trusts based on the 
support of private property, and were established from the time of the Prophet. 
Property was dedicated to waqf for the advancement of education, which was 
synonymous with the advancement of religion. Supported by the caliphs and urban 
notables, the waqf distributed funds to the students of the College of Law and 
encouraged the new study of Islamic science and law. Thus the study of law was 
institutionalised in the education system. The legal justification of a waqf was its 
charitable objective. Islam and Arab moral values were seen in the system of 
scholarships, which were usually offered by the teachers and distributed among their 
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followers. Through their patronage, the community of teachers, students and other 
institutional personnel developed.6 
When the four Sunni schools and their jurisprudence were consolidated, and the mufti 
were absorbed in the bureaucracy as salaried clerics, the intellectual search for iftihad 
 
weakened.' The Sunni schools closed the door of the debates on jurisprudence, and the 
study of if tilled was interrupted. However, Shia leaders established new communities 
in Najaf, developing a separate Islamic identity from the orthodox who were centred in 
Baghdad. 
This 'Abbasid legacy of the education of leaders shifted into different forms in the 
Ottoman period. 
The Ottoman period (1299-1922) 
As the Ottoman state modernised itself, changes were made in political leadership. 
Political and cultural struggles over the institutionalisation of the redefined Islamic 
knowledge and the acquisition of practical foreign knowledge created new styles of the 
education of the Ottoman civil servants and military leaders. 
During the 613 years of the Ottoman Empire, the Sultans and their bureaucratic courts 
continued the Islamic legacies. The Ottoman leaders emphasised that justice and 
wisdom were needed in the leaders who were to harmonise society by standing apart 
from the different social orders.8 At the same time, the Sultans were the heirs to the 
Islamic tradition and could claim to exercise legitimate authority in Islamic terms. 
They were the upholders of the Shari a but, as they themselves maintained, they were 
the servants of the sanctuaries of Islam. In a large city, the mufti, appointed by Sultan, 
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were the chief legal experts for the Sunni administration of waqf In most cases, the 
highest offices in the legal service were held by graduates of the Imperial foundations 
in Istanbul. The chief judges of the provincial capitals, Baghdad, Mosul and Basra, 
were Palestinian Mamluks and Turks sent from Istanb51.9 
The traditional learning system continued in the Shi'a religious communities. Iraqi 
Shia leaders had their own history. With the rise of the Shia Qajar state in Iran 
(1779-1925), the shrine cities served as important recruiting grounds for clerical 
personnel. From the middle of the nineteenth century, a convention developed that the 
leading clerics in Najaf were the chiefs of all the learned Shia clerics.10 
The education of civil servants and military leaders 
In 1868, the Galatasary Lycee was established in Istanbul; it provided a comprehensive 
system of education from primary to university level. The school furthered the 
dominant French impact on Ottoman culture.11 The curricula for all secondary study 
(rushdiya) were similar, except for the emphasis on gymnastics in the military schools. 
Instruction was in Turkish rather than in French, and for those who did not know 
Turkish, an extra year was required to catch up. New students needed some knowledge 
of arithmetic and reading. In 1899, the course of study was four years long and 
included Islamic history, Ottoman geography, elementary engineering, arithmetic, 
natural science, Arabic, Turkish, French, hygiene, and gymnastics. The preparation 
course for higher education (i'dadiya) included trigonometry, algebra, engineering, 
hygiene, astronomy, geography, religion, calligraphy, drawing, gymnastics, Turkish, 
Arabic, Persian, French and English. 12 Graduates from rushdiya and i aidiya were 
expected to enter the War College and the colleges of law and medicine. The students 
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in Istanbul under AbdUlhamid II's rule were educated in boarding schools, secluded 
from city life. I3 The Arab students in the War College developed networking circles14 
and played an important role in the politicisation of officers before and after 1936 in 
Iraq. 
In 1917, the system of schools in the Baghdad province consisted of one school of law, 
one i 'dadi, one training school for teachers, one technical school linked with the 
irrigation project, and 71 primary schools." 
The education of religious leaders 
The traditional educational institutions, including the religious institutions, were unable 
to meet the demands of state education, and the resulting pressures led to the opening 
of additional modern schools, first at the secondary level. The traditional Sunni and 
Shia leaders had different theological doctrines in terms of the practice of 
jurisprudence, the weight of ijtihad and the focus of leadership. The Sunni community 
focused on the traditional education for judges. 16 Baghdad, Mosul and Basra 
continued to be centres for the study of Sunni Islam and leadership. 
The education of the tribal leaders 
Within the Mesopotamian provinces, educated groups, including many Iraqis, emerged 
in the various professions. This was due to the Ottoman education system based on 
Tanzimeit projects. However, what was counted as good knowledge for the civil 
servants and military leaders and sons of the tribal sheikhs was not derived from 
education for individual cultivation and Islamic moral values. The process of 
institutionalisation of these traditions, in particular the philosophical learning of Islam, 
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history and literature lost its effect in the Ottoman state education system. 
In contrast, the socialisation of the tribal leaders through the traditional forms of diwcin 
education continued. The purposes of learning for tribal leaders were, as discussed in 
Chapter Five and Six, to promote self-cultivation in order to serve the tribal obligations 
and to maintain the protection of their own boundaries and welfare. Thus differences 
in the education of leaders at state and social level emerged in the Ottoman period. 
To summarise, political and cultural struggles, over the institutionalisation of Islamic 
moral values, national morality and technocratic foreign knowledge and languages 
learned through state education, shaped the late Ottoman civil servants, military 
leaders, academics and school teachers. Emphasising national moral values and 
practical knowledge, a well-disciplined imperial education system was constructed, but 
there was a loss of knowledge of Islamic philosophy. Practical foreign and indigenous 
traditional knowledge were not combined. 
Excluded from the Tanjimeit projects, the Shia group revived and developed the Shia 
learning community and theological education in the hawza in the later Ottoman 
period. This education of clerical leaders was different from meritocratic state 
education because of differences over Islamic obligation and the community. The 
Ottoman legacy of a meritocratic education system was recreated, though in different 
forms, in Iraq as a part of the state education system in the twentieth century. 
The education of leaders in Iraq (1921-1968) 
The British mandate and the Monarchy (1921-1958) 
In this second section, the chapter identifies the leadership positions of the civil 
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servants, the military leaders, the urban and tribal leaders and the clerics. It describes 
the ways in which the state leaders struggled over a cultural renegotiation involving the 
Ottoman legacy of knowledge and Western knowledge, and their institutionalisation in 
the education of leaders. As the state modernised itself, changes were made in political 
leadership. Change in the political and social order was driven by the reinforcement of 
the state bureaucracy as the pivot of the state's power. However, the differently 
educated leaders pursued their own agendas with differing results. 
The Ottoman legacy of the education of leaders was recreated as the Sunni Arab state 
leaders educated in Istanbul took political power. The development of the education of 
leaders in Iraq is seen in the changes in ideologies and in the leadership positions of the 
civil servants, military bureaucrats and cultural leaders. 
Until the British Mandate took control, Iraq was composed of three Mesopotamian 
provinces with various types of leaders and a mosaic of societies. In the first half of 
the twentieth century, three types of political leaders emerged. The first group 
included military leaders who were educated in Istanbul. The second group included 
the tribal sheikhs. The King, his family, and the tribal sheikhs' positions were 
legitimised by the British Mandate officials. The tribal sheikhs' power and community 
influence have continued until today. The third group included the young urban 
political leaders who were graduates from the new state colleges, including the 
returned overseas students. 
The establishment of Mandate Iraq took place at a time of challenges to state 
leadership. King Faisal was ceremonially enthroned, but his power in political practice 
was restricted by the 1925 Constitution. Except over military affairs, power was put 
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into the Prime Minister's hands. 
King Faisal was aware that with the existence of divergent community groups and 
interests within his kingdom, a strong national army was needed to symbolise and 
preserve a minimum degree of cohesion in society and prevent it plunging into chaos. 
Immediately after his proclamation as King of Iraq, Faisal turned his attention to 
strengthening the state's newly established army. In the absence of mass support and 
of a deep-rooted power base, King Faisal insisted on the introduction of conscription in 
the face of intense opposition from Britain and tribal sheikhs.' 
The new Iraqi government was controlled by the ministers, often under the domination 
of a strong figure such as Niiri al-Sald, who had graduated from the War College in 
Istanbal.18 From 1921 until 1956 there were more than fifty Councils of Ministers 
(cabinets) in Iraq. In the Mandate, from 1921 to 1932, nine of the fourteen prime 
ministers were previous Ottoman military officers, as were thirty-two out of fifty-six 
major cabinet members.19 The membership of the first 50 cabinets was drawn from the 
same group of 150 men. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century Iraqi 
politics was unstable; the cabinets were reshuffled 58 times between 25 October 1920 
and 14th July 1958. 20 There was, however, a heavy concentration of ministerial 
political power. 
By 1936, among those Iraqi officers holding posts of high rank in the new Iraqi army, 
fifty out of sixty-one were ex-Ottoman officers who had received their education in 
Istanb51.21 The Iraqi army emerged at the centre of politics through the Bakir Sidqi 
coup in 1936. The civil servants and military bureaucrats' power over the Iraqi 
population, combining politics and military affairs, constituted the particular form of 
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the Iraqi political system. 22 These features of the political background made the 
formation of Arab and Iraqi national projects difficult. 
 
The education of civil servants 
In the earlier stage of the state modernisation projects, the most obvious issues which 
were taken up by the government were the ideological basis for state education, the 
formation of national identity and the supply of technocratic experts. The new state 
and the Mandate officials attempted to unify the existing educational systems and to 
centralise them under the control of the state, in terms of Islam and Arab and Iraqi 
nationalism. However, there was an absence of social trust and pedagogical dialogue 
between the state educationists. There were no debates on their controversial 
educational policies between the state and leaders in the society. The PhD thesis of al-
Jamali on The Problem of Bedouin Education was not translated into Arabic. 
There were also conflicts between the civil servants and military bureaucrats, and 
between the Pan-Arab nationalist and Iraqi nationalist groups. Those who supported 
nationalism were a variety of groups from different social and educational 
backgrounds, belonging to different networks and clubs at state and social levels. Most 
nationalists had a functionalist view of the futftwa education project. The emphases 
were on the students' role as the national vanguard, the way to the Arab nation-state, 
and on the civic ethics and political docility and knowledge to realise the project. 
Indigenous and Western knowledge 
When the British Mandate was established in 1921, not only was there a shortage of 
military officers but also of bureaucrats, schoolteachers, administrative officials, 
judges, engineers, and physicians. The state school system and the College of Law, 
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instituted under Ottoman rule, began slowly to expand under British supervision.23  
The College of Law was established in Baghdad in 1908. Engineering, Medicine, and 
Higher Teachers' Training Colleges were established in the 1920s. Although it took 
more than twenty years, the efforts of the Iraqi and British governments for the 
establishment of the first university started in the 1930s.24 In 1936, the College of 
Pharmacy was set up. In the 1940s, the Colleges of Commerce, Literature, and Science 
were established and in the 1950s the Colleges of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine 
and the Dental College.25  
The College of Law was the first new tertiary institution in Iraq since the destruction of 
the University of al-Mustansiriyah by the Mongols. The college aimed to train 
bureaucrats, diplomats, lawyers and judicial administrators, but had limited numbers. 
In the academic year 1949-1950, the college offered 30 courses including civics and 
economics. In the first year, students studied principles of law and history of Roman 
law, constitutional law and Shari a, in particular Islamic civil and family law. Each 
subject was given three hours a week, and English was studied for six hours a week. 
Western criminal law was taken in the first and second years, while Shari a continued 
in the third year. In the second and third year, various fields of law were studied. 
Among them were international law, theory of obligations, administrative law, public 
international law and criminal law. In the third year, the subjects were focused more 
on practice. Among them were public finance, theory of obligations (contract and tort), 
civil court procedure, commercial law, and criminal court procedure.26 
In the fourth year, two special subjects were available, one to prepare lawyers and 
judges, the other to prepare local government administrators. The prospective judges 
took, in addition, criminology, medical law and criminal psychology, while the future 
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administrators took administrative law, financial law, diplomacy, political science, the 
history of politics and statistics.27 Assessment was formal and obligatory, and affected 
ranks in subsequent careers. Indigenous philosophical literature and tribal customary 
law were excluded from the study of criminal court procedure. The knowledge 
provided for the future state leaders had no room for the indigenous traditional 
philosophical and moral values, hence there was no knowledge and feeling shared with 
the indigenous citizens. 
The Ottoman legacy of the combined study of politics, law and economics continued. 
In 1969, the subject of political science was added, and the college was renamed the 
College of Law and Politics (also known as the College of Law and Political 
Science). 28 The knowledge offered for the civil servants included politics and 
economics, which were incorporated into the knowledge of law. 
The training of students for positions in teaching and the bureaucracy included studies 
abroad. The provision of study outside Iraq was not new. In the late Ottoman period, 
the educated Iraqis who were members of the Young Turks' groups CUP, military 
leaders and sons of the tribal sheikhs were the products of education in Istanbul as part 
of the modernity projects. When the state of Iraq was established, the overseas studies 
projects were institutionalised and stabilised by the government. The new state needed 
researchers and trainers in the fields of agriculture, industry, business, economics, 
sociology and hygiene.29 Education abroad had social effects. 
It was in 1921, just after the foundation of the state and the accession of King Faisal 1 
to the throne of Iraq, that the Ministry of Education proposed sending qualified 
students abroad to study. Based on Arab nationalism, and the vision of the 
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establishment of an independent Iraq through applying Western knowledge, the 
overseas studies project aimed to modernise Iraq. The project went through three 
stages: the emergence of the state overseas studies project (1921-1929); the growth of 
the academic professions (1930-1951); and their consolidation (1952-1968). 
In the first stage, overseas studies aimed to train specialists in teaching, and were 
characterised by the choice of knowledge and of countries to overcome a lack of 
human resources in the fields of health, agriculture and education. The project was 
focussed on graduates from the senior secondary schools. Nine boys were selected; six 
were sent to the American University of Beirut and three to Britain. Two were to study 
medicine in England, one was later to study agriculture in the United States, and six 
were to prepare for high-school teaching." 
In 1926, the first overseas students returned to Iraq and were absorbed in the secondary 
schools and the Primary Teachers' College. 
In 1927, when the Royal College of Medicine was established in Baghdad, the overseas 
study of medicine ended, except for graduate study, dentistry and veterinary science.31  
In 1929 the medical college adapted the curriculum of the Faculty of Medicine of 
Edinburgh University, under the supervision of Professor Harry Chapman Sinderson.32 
From the 1930s to 1951, the dispatch of students abroad was expanded. The American 
University of Beirut served as a conduit for students going to America to improve their 
English, and prepared them for advanced study in the United States. England and 
Germany were second to the U.S. in popularity.33 The number of overseas students 
rose from nine in 1921 to thirty-five in 1928-29, and sixty-six in 1938-39. The projects 
34 included English teacher-training. The number of students reached a peak of 234 in 
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1951-52. Altogether more than 700 students were sent abroad for study after 1930.35 
Both in the first and second stages, the roles of the returned students were to introduce 
Western knowledge and technology to the country. 
In 1936-37 seventeen students were sent to the U.S, and thirteen to England. In the 
next year, 1937-38, only one student was sent to the U.S. while eighteen went to 
England, and the next year, 1938-39, three students went to the U.S and only one to 
England. The dispatch of students to England, the U.S., Egypt and Lebanon continued 
during World War II, but the inconsistent pattern continued during and after the war.36 
Germany received the most students in the 1930s. This was due to the personal interest 
of the German Minister in Baghdad in exporting the German style of education to 
Iraq.37 The end of the 1930s and the 1940s was the period when the British Council 
strongly cooperated with the Ministry of Education to support technical, vocational, 
medical and English-speaking teacher-training in Britain.38  
In the third stage, in the 1950s and 1960s, study with foreign teachers was gradually 
giving way to study with the returned overseas students. By this time, overseas studies 
projects were promoted by several ministries. More emphasis was placed on 
postgraduate study to prepare advanced specialists.39 
In 1952 and 1953, 2346 students were sent abroad by the Ministries of Information and 
Labour. Of these, 1331 studied specific subjects and 1015 were sent as government 
researchers. Forty-three percent of and the students were sent to the U.S.A, while 
twelve percent went to Turkey and eleven percent to Britain. Other chosen countries 
were Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, France, Sweden, Belgium, 
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India, Iran and Pakistan.4° The returned overseas students were obliged to serve within 
the state institutions. 
During the Mandate period, scholarships abroad were very few and were not in 
proportion with the real needs of the country for specialised cadres in various fields.41  
The majority of returned overseas students became academics. This was because the 
state needed these. Only about a fifth of the total of ministers had studied overseas, 
mainly in Europe or the United States.42 
Overall, the overseas studies programme gave impetus to the growth of a new middle 
class. However, the effects of the project were small. Its most significant effect was 
the increase of academics, but political, social and educational changes were small as 
the returnees did not have freedom in their roles, which were ordered and defined by 
the administration. 
The education of the military leaders 
The military school in Baghdad was a major mechanism for linking positions in the 
bureaucracy and a means for politicisation. Modern knowledge and training for the 
future military leaders included studies abroad. However, the state bureaucrats lacked 
trust in the overseas returnees from Sandhurst, hence this overseas project did not 
greatly affect the emergence of a new style of military leaders. However, education at 
a Sundhurst is discussed here, because of the assumption that the returned officers' 
group was involved in the social movements. 
As soon as the state was established, the process of creating an Arab army was set in 
motion. The first step was the setting up of the Ministry of Defence and the 
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appointment of Ja'far Pasha al-Askari, the Commander-in—Chief of the Hijaz army, as 
the Minister. Britain had high hopes for the young Iraqi officers. Parallel to the 
education of civil servants, the education of the military leaders rapidly expanded. 
British influence was in the main channelled through the training and instruction of 
officers and cadets. The Iraqi Military College was established in 1924, on the 
Sandhurst model, accepting students from secondary schools and the law school.' A 
Staff College was established in 1928; it offered a two-year graduate programme which 
trained air force and army officers for high command. 
The Ottoman rushdiya school system for basic military education was not revived, but 
the school for tribal sheikhs' sons continued in a different form. In 1928, although 75 
percent of the infantry rank and file were of urban origin, 25 percent of officers were of 
tribal origin. This meant that although some sons and relatives of the tribal sheikhs 
who could read and write were absorbed into military careers, they received a separate 
education at a lower educational standard. The urban officers remained in the 
majority.44 
Foreign knowledge, the Iraqi Military College and Sandhurst 
When the Military College was opened, the British staff included not only its director 
and his assistant, but also fifteen out of the twenty instructors. The British officers, 
graduates of the Royal Military Academy, taught and trained the Iraqi military staff 
using the Sandhurst curricula, fitting them to take their place in the army as instructors, 
leaders and, officers. The courses included military geography, modern history, 
economics, languages, mechanical engineering or electricity and wireless technology 
and science.45 English military textbooks and training manuals were translated into 
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Arabic, and even ex-Sharifian and ex-Turkish officers were required to undergo fresh 
training in order to learn the new system.46 
It was in 1924 also that a first batch of four cadets was sent to England and India for 
further training; this annual flow was augmented until it reached an average of twenty-
five during the years 1932-6 (twenty of them going to England). The Ministry of 
Defence dispatched large numbers of Iraqi military officers to the Staff College in 
Great Britain, and army cadets to Sandhurst between the 1930s and the 1950s.47 It is 
important to notice that there were Iraqi military officers who were influenced by 
foreign knowledge through the curriculum at Sandhurst. 
 
The Charter of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst stated in 1950 that the object 
of all training was to produce: 
a young officer with a sound education in appropriate Academic and 
Military subjects, with a wide interest in the current problems of world 
affairs, and the enthusiasm to continue to increase his knowledge by his 
own initiative. He will be firmly grounded in the British Army Officer's 
traditional code of behaviour, responsibility and reliability and his powers 
of leadership will have been developed. He will thus have been brought to 
the stage in Military and Academic subjects where, ... he is fit to command 
a platoon or equivalent sub-unit.` 
A military officer had to be a man suitable to command other men in all sorts of 
conditions of difficulty and danger - and hence must command their respect before he 
was able to acquire the appropriate professional skills.49 Education at Sandhurst 
provided the teaching subjects by mixing the King's Own Royal Regiment and Royal 
Army Service Corps staff with civic lecturers and professors from Cambridge, London, 
Manchester, Oxford and other universities. 50 
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Before 1954, education at Sandhurst focused on three areas, technology and science, 
morality and leadership, and community development through sport." This education 
system was changed in 1954, according to an inspection report by the Ministry of 
Education. The curriculum was divided into two courses, for military instruction and 
for academic subjects. Moral leadership was absorbed into the basic training course.52 
In 1955, a new curriculum for military history was provided. This subject was taught 
on an academic basis by officers. This study aimed: 
to give an essential background to an Officer Cadet's profession through the 
study of selected leaders and their careers and campaigns, thereby providing 
insight into the art of leadership, into the understanding of the principles of 
war, and into the application of strategy and tactics in practice; to inculcate 
the habit of self-study; to encourage the search for information and the 
weighing up of evidence, and to provide practice for the officer cadet in 
writing, talking and discussing, taking discussions and model-room work.53  
An officer cadet could elect to study any one of the following: Alexander the Great, 
Marlborough, Napoleon, Nelson, Stonewall Jackson, Wellington. 54  The British 
campaigns of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were valued in the study of 
history. Individual instructors were given the maximum discretion in the way in which 
they approached the study of their particular leaders. Frequent practice in written work 
was afforded, to improve the standard of English. Thus the students gained depth in 
historical knowledge of particular times. 
The philosophical and practical study of morals and leadership was directed to the 
setting in which leadership was exercised by junior officers in the regular army. The 
course aimed to examine through discussion the essential qualities of military 
leadership, discipline and morale. Thus in 1954, as in Meiji Japan, the study of 
morality and leadership was separated from the acquisition of knowledge. In the same 
year of 1954, top Sandhurst officer cadets could be prepared to proceed to degree 
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courses at Cambridge University for mechanical sciences and London University for 
engineering. There were strong recommendations to obtain officer cadets with Arts 
qualifications, which should be given similar recognition to that enjoyed by those 
whose abilities were of a more scientific nature.55  
The overseas studies projects for the military leaders started in 1924 and continued 
until the 1970s. Although no actual figures are given for later years, the British 
Embassy continuously dispatched students of the Iraqi Military College and officers at 
the Staff College in Baghdad overseas.56 Within ten years, from 1954 to 1962, twenty 
Iraqi military cadets graduated from Sandhurst. Sons of traditional Arab tribal families 
were among them.57 
Studying abroad was politically and sociologically significant. However, despite the 
increased number of cadets and staff returning from overseas studies, the 
overwhelming majority of high—ranking officers continued to be ex-Turkish and ex-
Sharifian officers. In September 1936, for example, the Iraqi officer corps (comprising 
officers with the rank of commander and above) numbered 84: a sample of 61 of these 
officers shows that 50 had served in the Turkish army, whereas out of the fifty cadets 
trained abroad in 1935 and 1936, only two had been given senior appointments by 
October 1936. 58 Under the regime of Nuri al-Said [1948-1958], the educational 
backgrounds of the cabinet ministers were concentrated in four fields: law, military 
studies, the arts and sciences. Engineering, education and medicine were the 
background of only a small proportion of the numbers. Of the cabinet ministers, the 
old urban Sunni group and graduates from the Baghdad Law College held forty-one 
percent of the seats. Another fifteen percent were graduates of the military academies 
in Istanbul or Baghdad.59 
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From 1921 to 1958, during the monarchical period, twelve army officers who had 
studied in Istanbul were ministers. Eight other officers were graduates from Baghdad. 
Major General Hussain Mekki Khammas, a graduate from Istanbul and Sandhurst, was 
Minister of Defence for a short period, from 17th September, 1953 to 17th June, 1954 in 
al-Jamali and Arshad al-Umari's regime. Before Khammas in 1953, Nun al-Sa'id was 
Minister of Defence, and in 1954, Major General Khammas was replaced by Nuri Said, 
who became Prime Minister and concurrently the Minister of Defence.6° Thus an 
overwhelming proportion of army officers who had studied in Istanbul was ruling for 
most of the time. 
This phenomenon suggests, firstly, that the state bureaucrats from the old ruling classes 
did not trust and tolerate those who were trained at Sandhurst or renowned military 
academies abroad. The returned overseas officers' superior qualifications and more 
independent identity did not secure them a proportional share of senior appointments. 
Secondly, since Iraqi politics was personality-orientated and bound to patronage and 
interpersonal ties, there could be no institutional autonomy, whether in the military, 
administrative or political spheres. The army was therefore not an independent 
institution, but reflected the society of which it was a part, and also the influences and 
aspirations operating in Sunni society.61 As described in the previous chapter, the 
militarisation of secondary education was enthusiastically supported by the military 
officers, the Muthanna club, the Ministry of Education and the Teacher Training 
College. 
The roles of the military leaders and the civil servants were muddled. However, the 
young generation of military officers, calling themselves Free Officers, were able to 
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expand their group in the 1950s and brought about the 1958 revolution. 
The education of religious leaders 
Religious schools for the tertiary level were organised by the Ministry of Awqal.62 The 
waqf system changed its forms and contents, but retained its social significance as an 
endowment of property or money, which was held in trust for charitable and religious 
causes. 
63 	 The nine types of Islamic administrative officials in Iraq were 
institutionalised: (1) a religious scholar (Alin? (pl. `ulamei)); (2) an expert in the 
established Shari a (Faqih); (3) an Islamic prayer leader (Imam); (4) one who gives a 
Khutba (sermon) in a Slii`a mosque during Friday prayers (Khatib); (5) one who 
delivers the call to prayer from the minaret of a mosque (Muezzin); (6) an expert in 
Sharra, competent to give afatwa (legal judgement or opinion) on matters not covered 
in Islamic law books (Mufti); (7) a scholar in Shari competent to give interpretations 
(Mujtahid); (8) a religious scholar (Mulla); and (9) a judge who administers the Shari 
and issues decisions in specific cases (Qadhi) 64 
Dar al-q.J15m, the religious school, was established in 1937, and renamed Al-Imam Al-
A'dham College in 1946.65 The College offered a Bachelor of Arts degree programme 
in Islamic jurisprudence, for men only. Graduate clerics were paid, and Sunni 
knowledge was geared to serve the state as a part of the modernity project. Unlike the 
Shia education of leaders, the Ottoman legacy of the state education of Sunni religious 
leaders continued, and was not independent from the state. The role of the institutions 
for Sunni leaders was to organise the Sunni social and political environment in a way 
which would help Iraq to unify its people. 
The state modernity projects were impersonal and unrelenting to the new, educated 
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citizens. Despite the increase in the number of college graduates, young educated 
Iraqis were excluded from political participation. This was due to the old state leaders, 
who were committed to the status quo of bureaucratic power, and the positions of the 
old ruling classes. 
Resistance arose among many of the returned overseas academics, and those educated 
in the state education system, protesting against the Anglo-Iraqi treaty.66 Unlike in 
Meiji Japan, the struggles of the academics for institutional independence and 
academic autonomy had to wait for success; the establishment of semi-private 
educational institutions (financially supported by the state) was prohibited until 1963. 
Hence access to foreign knowledge was through the channel of state education only. 
In their social networking processes, several educational institutions and leaders in the 
society emerged, with religious or tribal purposes for the education of leaders which 
were different from those of state education. In the Sunni tradition, Islamic learning 
was passed to succeeding generations in the mosques. In the 1950s there were no 
formal Sunni Islamic schools, but there was a learning community, heiya `ulamei 
Muslim [the Association of Muslim Scholars], established by Amjad al-Zahawi.67 The 
study of jurisprudence, theology and the interpretation of the Qur'an was a prerequisite 
for a member of the ` ulama'. 
In the Shr a tradition, Islamic learning and the pursuit of ifithad were passed to 
succeeding generations by the clerical teachers in the hawza. This was changing its 
forms and contents throughout the twentieth century, in reaction to the state modernity 
projects. In 1918, just before the 1920 social movements, no fewer than 6,000 students 
ere attending the hawza in Najaf. They were a major obstacle to the creation of the 
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Iraqi state under the British Mandate until June 1923, when the British and Iraqi 
authorities deported to Iran a number of leading Ayatollahs, including Muhammad 
Mandi al-Khalisi, as a result of their refusal to withdraw fatwas against Sid' a 
participation in the Iraqi elections.68  
Shia religious leaders pursued their religious and social obligations by reforming 
hawza. One of the reformers was Sheikh Muhammad Ridah al-Muzaffar. In the mid-
1930s, al-Muzaffar led a drive to renew Shia religious learning, which, in his view, 
was essential for reforming religion itself. He organised a publication club, Muntada 
al-Nashr. In 1935 the Ministry of the Interior approved the new Shia madrasa, 
Muntada al-Nashr, named after the publication club. Its members were drawn from 
Najaf s religious circles. This institution became the educational body of the Muntada 
al-Nashr.69 
Having established a new curriculum, the Muntada al-Nashr became a higher 
institution for religious learning. Its role was twofold. On one level, it aimed to 
narrow the gap between secular state education and the hawza, and to link the 
development of the Shia community to the mainstream of modern life in Iraq. On 
another, the Muntada al-Nashr was intended to bring the religious and secular 
components of the Iraqi Shia community close together.7° In authorising the 
establishment of the Muntada al-Nashr and controlling its affairs, the state gained a 
new generation of Shia teachers and clerics loyal to the state. The state could appoint 
Shia clerics only from among the graduates of the Muntada al-Nashr, thus isolating 
the members and graduates of the hcrwza.71  
In and around 1943, Muzaffar's struggles over the institutionalisation of a faculty for 
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preaching and guidance generated strong opposition in Najaf, particularly among many 
traditional clerics, who were influencing hawza.72 They did not recognize the Muntada 
al-Nashr as a true madrasa, and discouraged pious Shia from contributing money to 
the school. The Muntada al-Nashr had difficulties in gaining sufficient funds from 
Iraqi Shia donors. Its development is discussed in the next section, on the education 
of leaders after 1958. 
Thus not all the Shia students were educated in the traditional hawza communities. 
Some were educated in the Muntada al-Nashr and other state institutions joining the 
ahedi and communist party groups and the Ba'th party, as described in the previous 
chapter, or through joining the party organisations. All of these groups emerged during 
the 1930s, 40s and 50s. 
Different styles of Shia leadership emerged. The academic theological activities and 
the selection of knowledge for the Stir a leaders were affected by the views of al-
Muzaffar, as-Sadr and al-Khoei on how the Shia should relate to the state. The 
tensions within the clerics and between the Shr a community and the state resulted in 
the fragmentation of the Shr a community. The contestations between the religious 
leaders made the modernisation of Shia Islam and community lives difficult. The 
effect of the conflicts in the 1960s is discussed in the section in the education of leaders 
in the Republic of Iraq (1958-1968). 
The education of the tribal leaders 
As mentioned in Chapter Six, not all the sheikhs were educated in Istanbul; some were 
enrolled in one or other of the religious schools in Baghdad and took extra supervision 
under the religious leaders. Sons of sheikhs expanded their learning networks in the 
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city with the political leaders and the intellectuals.73 In their villages, the Arab tribal 
communities strengthened the solidarity of the tribal alliances, the Fasl system between 
the tribes, and the tribal sheikhs' diwan education and dialogue. These urban-rural and 
tribal networks, and the connection of state and intellectual urban and rural leaders 
(many of whom were cultural leaders), resulted in the 1920 nationwide tribal 
movement demanding the establishment of the state of Iraq by the national 
communities.74 
In tribal society, which was affected by the establishment of the 1924 TCCDR, the 
Monroe Report and the separation of the civil law from the TCCDR, as described in 
the previous chapters, tribal leaders and members revitalised the traditional values in 
diwan education.75 To the tribal sheikhs, knowledge of Islam remained as knowledge 
of the sacred as well as being philosophical,76 while knowledge about the Arab tribes 
was developed as knowledge for practical use based on Islam. Before and after 1958, 
the Arab tribal sheikhs continuously needed skills in peace negotiations between the 
tribes for the protection of the community and its welfare. In this context, strong diwan 
education continued, with the Islamic, judicial and literary language and traditions. 
Knowledge institutionalised in diwan education such as Fasl achievements, filth, 
literary history and events, and the classical oral tradition was shared knowledge 
among the tribal communities and brought about the cohesiveness of the tribal groups; 
hence strong tribal identities. These were transmitted by tribal families over 
generations:77 Tribal history included not only wars but also cultural relationships 
between the tribes. Some pastoral tribes enjoyed the cultivation of Arab horses and 
hawks, and exchanged these and knowledge about them with the Kurdish tribes for 
greyhounds. 
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High skill in negotiation and knowledge of poetry and prosody (al-Balagha) were 
required to realise tribal alliances. The game of impromptu composition of poems 
between two teams in Arab tribal diwan is one of the oldest survivals of tribal culture. 
Baleigha originated in the pre-Islamic era and was important for recognition as both 
women and men leaders within the tribe. This source of merit continues today. Each 
tribe passed its historical baltagha from generation to generation. Hence the learning 
of the tribal history at diwiin included poetry, balliigha and stories of the tribal fame 
gained through war, Fasl and peace alliances.78  
At this time, as described in the previous chapter, the gap between civil and rural 
knowledge and feeling was strengthened by the separation of tribal and civil law in 
1933. The gap in the levels of the social infrastructure between the urban and rural 
areas increased in terms of transport, communications and educational systems. The 
failure of the reforms in land law since the Tanzimat and the increase of feudalism in 
the south of Iraq brought about massive migration from the south to the cities. Those 
who migrated continued in the cities their relationships with those who were left in the 
village, and with their sheikhs who possessed homes both in the cities and the villages. 
The tribal legacy of interdependent relationships continued. At diwan, there were 
various learning and teaching contents for different occupational groups within the 
same tribes: for example, tribal sheikhs, sub-sheikhs, state leaders, lawyers, business, 
merchants, medical doctors, religious families, farmers and artisans. Thus instruction 
was not only given by the sheikhs, but by those who visited diwan, including the tribal 
members who lived outside Iraq. Sheikhs and their tribal members' learning circles 
continue today. 
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To summarise, in both the Ottoman and Iraqi periods Islamic knowledge was absorbed 
into national moral values, which dominated the traditional religious and ethnic 
knowledge, moral values and obligations. During the monarchical and republican 
periods, the legacy of the Ottoman educational system continued. The education of 
leaders meant the training of civil servants and military leaders, and was a part of the 
political projects. The acquisition of technical foreign knowledge and of a national 
identity based on Arab and Iraqi nationalism and the state morality of civic ethics was 
at the centre of curricula. 
The practical aspects of traditional knowledge, namely Islam and Arabic language and 
history, were emphasised in order to reinforce the national ideology. For the 
nationalists, there was no room for other indigenous knowledge. The effect of the 
overseas studies projects was the emergence of new styles of leaders in the academic 
and military communities. 
The crucial issue was the lack of access to Western knowledge, resulting from the 
state's uneven provision of education. 	 As a result of this, there were little 
understanding and shared feelings between the different regional, religious and ethnic 
groups in the provinces and between the rural and urban people. 
Until 1958, the state leaders' emphasis on nationalism, loyalty and political docility in 
the state education of civil servants and military leaders continued. The young 
generations, educated in the new state education system, began the 1958 revolution, 
after the gradual process of the Communists and the Ba'thists which had started in the 
late 1930s and the 1940s. 
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The Republic of Iraq (1958-1968) 
This fourth section of the chapter identifies the conflicting leadership positions and the 
changes in the education of leaders. Between the 1958 and the 1968 revolutions, new 
styles of leaders and the education of leaders emerged at the state and the community 
levels. In the 1960s, the academic leaders, the clerics and the tribal leaders struggled 
politically and defended their institutional independence. Baghdad University 
established the Council of the University to defend its independence from the 
government. The cultural Shia and tribal communities were rapidly fragmenting. 
However by the early 1960s, the differences within the communities were dynamic, as 
the Shia and tribal communities were transforming and solidifying diwan and hcrwza 
education. 
Under the regime of Abd al-Karim Qasim [1958-1963], the leading ministers were 
most likely to be military leaders of Arab Sunni family origin. At the second level, 
they were more likely to be Shia or Kurds, but the participation of these in politics 
declined. Increasingly the ministers were born in a provincial city or town, especially 
in the northern Tigris and Euphrates area. The top official was most likely to be an 
army officer, a graduate of the Iraqi Military College, but less often the Staff College, 
who had probably not lived abroad and did not know a foreign language well.79 The 
modern military regime emerged, and was led by middle-class national radicals. 
The educational backgrounds of the cabinet ministers, that is, law, military affairs, arts 
and sciences, did not change from those of the first generation of the highest ministers; 
70 per cent were educated primarily in the Baghdad Law College or the military 
academies in Baghdad or Istanbul. However, between 1958 and 1968, the cabinet 
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ministers who were graduates from the Law College declined from 41 per cent (1948-
58) to 22 per cent of the total who were graduates from higher education. The 
graduates from the Military College increased from 15 to 29 per cent.8°  
The old Ottoman-educated cohort was replaced by men who were educated entirely in 
Baghdad, and the cabinet tended to become polarised between those who were 
Baghdad-educated and those who were foreign-educated. The gaps in knowledge and 
overseas exposure between the military and the highly educated citizens led to 
tension. 81  
The top echelon of the cabinet was composed of army officers and graduates from the 
Baghdad military college, professionals who were technocrats with Ph.Ds from 
Western universities, and graduates of the Baghdad Law College. Having lived abroad 
and studied one Western language well, they had acquired a high degree of technical 
competence in their field, but had little practical experience in administration and 
politics. 82 
Under the new military regime after 1958, there were frequent dismissals of civil 
servants and their replacement by military men. Political instability reduced the 
number of experts at the top. Thus while the new cabinets incorporated a higher degree 
of talent than the previous regime, they were unable to use their competence and 
knowledge effectively. 83  
The education of the civil servants 
In 1956, eleven colleges were united under the name of Baghdad University.84 The 
1958 Revolution and the 1960s were significant in the development of higher 
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education. 85 Baghdad University aimed to advance scientific research and to train 
leaders for the Arab-Islamic state of Iraq. The 1958 Charter of the university states that 
"the university shall encourage scientific research, and artistic and technical studies, 
and work towards the propagation of Arabic and Islamic cultures".86 
All the colleges of the university required specialists in the arts and the sciences, and 
applicants needed to have diplomas in education in order to qualify as teachers in 
secondary schools. This formal concern with educational training led to an abundance 
of holders of higher degrees, that is MAs and Ph.Ds. Most of these were employed in 
the state educational institutions." 
In 1960-61, the approximate percentages of students in the major fields were 80% in 
engineering and 15% in social and literary studies. The high percentage in engineering 
indicates the persistent needs for specialisation in areas most needed for Iraq's socio-
economic development. In the second generation of the various colleges in Iraq, the 
emphasis in overseas projects was shifted to post-graduate study to prepare advanced 
specialists.88 Literature (adab) was studied only when incorporated into the courses of 
Arabic language department of Baghdad University. 89 
The year 1963 was a turning point for the University. Under the new presidency of 
Abdul Aziz al-Douri (1963-68), Law No. 51 for Baghdad University stated: 
Article 3. the university will provide education through the emphasis on 
scientific research, the protection of the Islamic Arabic heritage and rational 
education. Article 8. the University is an independent body separated from 
the Ministry of Education. In dealing with the university' affairs, the 
Council of University is represented by the University President.9°  
Based on this law, Baghdad University defended its independence until the 1968 
Revolution. 
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In spite of being an independent institution, the College of Law and Politics was slow 
to develop. In the academic year of 1967-68, the curriculum of the College of Law and 
Politics was surprisingly similar to that of 1949-50.91 For twenty years, there were no 
reforms in the curriculum of the College of Law and Politics. One difference between 
the two periods was that in the earlier time, the students studied the English language 
more than in 1967-8.92 The students acquired wide knowledge of civil, criminal and 
contract law, as was the tradition of the Ottoman legal profession. Iraqi lawyers who 
graduated from the university were not allowed to specialise. This regulation 
continued until 2003. 
Admission to the university was restricted. In 1954-55 there were 1,324 students. (No 
information on the number of teachers is available.) In 1964-65 there were 1,905 
students and 26 teachers. In 1970-71, there were 847 students (21% women) and 77 
teachers.93 Women had no right to be judges. This continues today. 
At the same time, massive migration from the rural areas to the cities continued from 
the 1950s. The numbers of students at all levels of education trebled during this 
period, and there was a burst of school-building activity. However, the numbers of 
teachers did not increase proportionately, leading to problems in the provision of 
education. 
The education of the religious leaders 
In contrast, the Iraqi Shia clerics enjoyed relative independence from the 
government." At least since the nineteenth century, when the Ottomans controlled 
Southern Iraq, the Shia clerics had retained financial autonomy, which not only 
allowed them to decide on teaching issues, but also secured the avoidance of the 
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military draft. Being self-financed, the clerics could set their own course of studies in 
accordance with their traditions and beliefs.95  
Within the Shia groups, there were leaders who renegotiated Islamic traditions 
differently from each other and had different philosophical positions on the individual, 
the community and the state's identity. Each leader contested the others' visions 
within the communities. Among them, there were four religious leaders, who resisted 
the pressures from the state modernity projects and were developing their communities 
differently through the institutionalisation of the learning communities and through 
their hawza movements. They were Sheikh al-Muzaffar, Ayatollah al-Khoei, As-Sadr 
and Shams al-Din.96 
As described in the previous section, al-Muzaffar was responding to the way in which 
the state was modernising. In 1958, a College of Jurisprudence (KuWit al-Fiqh) was 
established under the auspices of al-Muzaffar. The knowledge provided there for the 
future Shia nationalists included modern philosophy, sociology, psychology, history, 
the English language and comparative literature. 97 The College of Jurisprudence 
produced government officials as well as some members of the Iraqi Shia opposition 
groups, most notably the Da'was, which gained strength in the late 1960s and the 
1970s.98  
In contrast to al-Muzzafar, Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei had a traditional view of 
Islam as independent from the state. His groups had no aspirations to set up an Islamic 
theocracy (wilayat al-faqih), but were more active in religious, social and cultural 
affairs. The practice of jurisprudence and ijtihad was for al-Khoei an important aspect 
of learning Islamic law. In the 1960s, the learning of Islam in the hawza community 
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changed from that of the Ottoman period and the 1930s. Al-Khoei reformed the 
traditional hawza according to the new way of learning about Islam and the 
development of the pursuit of iftiheic/.99 
The first grade was devoted to introductory subjects (Muqadameit). This took four to 
six years. Then the undergraduate level (al-Sutiih) took four to five years. The highest 
degree was at the postgraduate level (al-Bahth al-Kharij), after an additional four or 
five years for the acquisition of access to ijtilkid.1°° 
The first stage of introductory studies required work on the Arabic language including 
syntax (al-Nahw), inflection and grammar (al-Sarj), prosody (al-Balagha) and logic. 
Optional subjects were literature, mathematics, and other subjects, with one or more 
students, usually less than seven but on rare occasions as many as twenty, choosing and 
receiving instruction from a teacher whom they knew to have higher knowledge of the 
subjects involved.101 The syllabus was taught in Arabic. In addition, Arabic literature 
and linguistics were studied in great depth and detail.102 For intermediate studies, the 
required subjects were the principles of jurisprudential inference and rational 
jurisprudence. Optional subjects were rhetoric (ilm-ul-Kalam), philosophy, and 
exegesis of the Qur'an (tafsiyr). 
The second stage of research and higher studies, which is known as `al-Buhlith 
[literally, research], required the principles of jurisprudence, and practical 
jurisprudence. A lesson was never less than half an hour in duration, and usually no 
longer than one hour. 
The third stage involved group study, with those who passed the first two stages 
gathering around one of the prominent mujtahids (or an imam) who lectured on either 
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principles of jurisprudence or practical jurisprudence, explaining problems and 
engaging the students in discussion and debate.'°3 
 
Overall, traditional curricula were not changed from the Ottoman period. Mohammed 
Baqir as-Sadr translated the old textbooks into the modern language for the students. 
Among textbooks, most conspicuous was his book on usfd al-Fiqh (principles of 
jurisprudence. This book, which became widely used for introductory teaching at 
Najaf, was published in 1964.104 The important subjects were jurisprudence (fiqh), 
principles of jurisprudence, the interpretation of the Qur'an (tafsyr), Islamic philology 
and hadith [oral tradition and the records of sayings of the Prophet and the first 
Muslims]. The study of the science of hadith was new, and included a study of Arabic 
literature and language. The educational programme adopted the free teaching style 
(al-Ta'aleem al-Hur), in which the student chose the teacher, the time (day or night), 
the location, and the subject within a particular discipline in the hawza community.105 
The classical education of Najaf in the 1950s and 1960s was retained, because of the 
importance of the colleges in the constitutional system of the Shia world. But as-Sadr 
tried to counter the communist appeal in his analysis of Our Economics (Iqtiseidnci).106 
In the late 1950s, he enlarged hawza, institutionalised this learning community and 
established institutions for the political movement, the Islamic Call (al-Da 'w a), by 
recruiting laymen.107 
The hawza education of Shia leaders developed by renovating the colleges of Najaf. 
In the later 1950s and 1960s, the religious circles at Najaf were active. As-Sadr 
published Our Philosophy (Falsafatuna,1959), Our Economics (1qtisCidunc-i, 1960), in 
al-Adwa', a journal in Najaf, and the Nonusurious Bank in Islam (Al-bank al-Laribawi 
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fi al-Islam, 1973). When Our Philosophy was published in 1959 it coincided with calls 
for the rejection of the communist appeal by the Najaf religious leaders.'" Their 
general perception of `Abd al-Karim Qasim was hostile because, as mentioned in 
Chapter Five, Qasim used communist influence in the Shia community.109 Thus under 
urgent circumstances of ideological threat, the Shia religious leaders committed 
themselves to disseminating new Shia ideas, and institutionalised these in the hawza in 
a new form to educate followers in the new views. Al-Tadhamun al-Islami [Islamic 
Solidarity], Falsafatund [Our Philosophy] and Risalat al-Islam [the Message of Islam] 
were calling for alternative views, and were widely read in Najaf, Nasirya and Hilla.110 
Najaf became an active shrine city with the publication of weeklies, books, and 
booklets authored by various clerics, most of them junior. A number of clerical writers 
later became leaders of the various Shia establishments." 
In 1959, Shia jurisprudence was included in the curriculum of al-Azhar, the centre of 
the Sunni school in Cairo. Muslim unity, tolerance for different schools in Islam and a 
denunciation of prejudice were emphasised.112 
The education of the tribal leaders 
Although the Law of Tribal Regulation was abolished in 1958 and the position of tribal 
sheikhs was not formally recognised, they retained social recognition. The sheikhs' 
influence continued as the Fasl system continued and expanded in the cities. This 
meant that the diwan, and diwan education, remained at the centre of tribal culture. 
Although the Fasl system lost its legal framework, the civilian and criminal courts 
recognised the criminal cases which passed through the tribal Fasl system. Fasl 
decisions influenced the application of punishments and sentences in the courts. In this 
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context, tribal members asked for the application of the Fasl traditions before their 
appearance in courts. This phenomenon continues today. 
To summarise, the new state leaders struggled over the institutionalisation of 
indigenous knowledge, the Arabic language, Islam and historical narratives, and 
synthesised these with technical foreign knowledge in the school textbooks. The 
knowledge and moral values selected for nationalist leaders excluded the study of 
literature and literary history and reinforced conformity with Arab and Iraqi national 
identities. The knowledge and moral values of the tribes and the Shr a, which 
functioned in their communities, were not a concern in state education. This 
phenomenon was rooted in the Ottoman Tanzimat period. 
The well-educated leaders within the clerical, Arab tribal groups and the Ba'thist, the 
Communists and free officers' group were dynamic. These new civic leaders, as they 
became cultural leaders, struggled over the institutionalisation of what they redefined 
as good knowledge and moral values. Suppressed by the new regime, they had 
different goals in their learning communities and activities, and remained divided from 
each other. 
Conclusion 
Leadership positions in the 'Abbasid period were characterised by Sunni Islamic moral 
values and knowledge. In the Ottoman period and in monarchical and Republican Iraq, 
various patterns of the education of leaders emerged. Under the British Mandate, there 
was little change in the state leadership positions and the education system, and only a 
slow shift to industrialisation in spite of the discovery of oil before 1927."3 
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The knowledge provided for the new military leaders was similar to that for civil 
servants; it included Sunni Islamic loyalty, rehbel-i Akhleik and foreign practical and 
technical knowledge. The new Iraqi leaders emerged among the young officers' elite 
through this education system under AbdUlhamid if These leaders became the main 
founders of independent Iraq. For most of the time in monarchical Iraq, the 
educational projects were dominated by the urban military leaders educated in Istanbul, 
and social modernity did not include alternative voices and citizens' struggles to create 
a new society. Education for the state leaders was limited in the following four 
contrasting ways. 
Firstly, the frequent conflicts among the state leaders, al-Husri, al-Jamali and Shawkat, 
over these different political, social and educational visions weakened the effect of 
state education. In 1963, al-Douri, as a president of Baghdd University, defended the 
institutional independence of Baghdad University. Among the Shi`a clerics, Muzzafar 
allied with the state projects, while al- Khoei, as-Sadr, and Shams al-Din pursued their 
own theological, social and political ifilhad. For the Arab tribal leaders, traditional 
diwein education was reinforced as the Fasl system was legitimised and separated from 
civil law. 
Secondly, until the 1960s the impact of overseas studies on teacher training, the 
academics and military officials was small. This was due to the fact that the returned 
overseas students were obliged to serve within the state institutions. The modernity 
projects designed by the new military regime of Qasim were re-creations of the 
previous political system. The regime maintained the status quo in the bureaucracy 
and the exclusion of officers educated abroad from senior appointments; that is, the 
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state leaders did not trust the returnees. As a consequence of the state's emphasis on 
military education, by 1963 different styles of military officers existed, educated in 
Istanbul, Baghdad, Sandhurst or Germany, and from urban or tribal backgrounds. 
Among them, the privileged group who held power was those who were of urban 
origin and educated in Istanbul and Baghdad. 
Thirdly, the gaps in knowledge and overseas exposure between the military officers 
educated in Baghdad and the civil servants who had been highly educated abroad led to 
tension, but the overseas returnees were subjected to the military officers. The 
overseas studies programme gave impetus to the growth of a new middle class. Its 
most significant effect was the increase of academics, but political, social and 
educational changes were small, as the returnees did not have freedom in their roles, 
which were ordered and defined by the administration. Unlike in Meiji Japan, 
relationships and academic co-operation between the state leaders and the leaders in the 
society did not develop. However, some of the returned overseas groups joined in the 
1958 revolution, together with the young educated urban modernisers. 
Fourthly, foreign knowledge was not combined with traditional Islamic and Arab tribal 
knowledge. This was because, restricted by the state curriculum and the continuity 
with the Ottoman education system, state education was part of the modernity projects 
to reinforce national identity, morality and technical skills. Even in the university's 
Faculty of Literature, the study of literature and literary history were placed in the 
department of language. The cultural traditional knowledge, that is, Islamic or Arab 
tribal ijtihad, was ignored in the curriculum and lost its effect. 
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In the 1960s, the religious leaders emphasised the necessity of reforming hawza, 
debated in public their redefined political, cultural and religious orientations of Islam, 
and struggled over the institutionalisation of these in hawza, the College of 
Jurisprudence, the Najef University and Kufa. For the Arab tribal leaders, diwan 
education was reinforced when the Fasl system was legitimised in 1924, separated 
from civil law in 1933 and its separation abolished in 1958. Tribal education of leaders 
continued because Fasl was a prerequisite to maintain peace within and between the 
tribes, and the modern courts recognised its effect on the final decisions. 
Thus, different patterns of cultural leaders emerged with the different education of 
leaders and the different knowledge provided for these leaders. The emergence of the 
private education of leaders implied the political, social and cultural voices of 
alternatives to the state projects for the social order. However, throughout the 
twentieth century, Iraqi politics were characterised by the absence of dialogue between 
the state and the cultural leaders. The citizens had few opportunities for public 
disputes about social issues and moral values. 
The double modernity process changed political leadership positions and developed 
political, social and cultural processes. 	 It also shaped serious educational 
contradictions in Iraq. National morality, loyalty to the nation-state and foreign 
knowledge were emphasised, while individual cultivation in relation to group 
obligation was reinforced through the non-state education of Shia and Arab leaders. 
Three types of political cultures, namely traditional, state and civic political cultures, 
were now institutionalised in the different educational systems. 
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The fragmenting society will continue to exist in the structures which have developed 
in the past, unless the cultural leaders are determined to renegotiate what was counted 
as good knowledge for the people in the society, to pursue public debate and networks, 
and to institutionalise socially embedded values and knowledge in the education 
systems, to develop trust in a democratic civic society, and negotiate with the state 
leaders. 
254 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
As a conclusion to the thesis, this chapter explores the complex interrelations between 
state modernity, social modernity and the education of leaders in Japan and Iraq. To do 
so, it returns to the central arguments and themes which have been developed in the 
narrative chapters on the education of leaders. 
The first section considers the interrelationships of modernity projects, the new leaders 
and their educational styles, and transformations in the social stratification systems in 
Iraq (1921-1968) and in Japan (1868-1912), when both countries experienced drastic 
political and social changes. The second section reviews the processes through which 
cultural renegotiations developed differently in the two societies, and the different 
timings of the modernity projects. This section concludes with a consideration of the 
nature of the education of leaders and of the strong cultural continuities in each 
country. The third section offers a new notion of social ontology which I think helps to 
understand the arguments. The fourth section identifies the limitations of the thesis 
and suggests future research. 
Leaders and educational styles in Iraq and Japan 
This section will start by reviewing the argument that as each state was modernised, the 
cultural traditions were renegotiated and institutionalised in the education of leaders, 
and various styles of education were created. The modernisation of Meiji Japan began 
fifty years earlier than that of Iraq. The urgent need for legitimacy felt by both new 
governments put pressure on the state leaders to form a new education system for the 
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new leadership positions. The first state university, the Imperial University, emerged 
by combining the shoheiko hank5 and Kaisei gakko, the military schools of the 
Tokugawa government and the Tokyo medical school. In Iraq, the Ottoman legacies of 
the Military College, the Law College and the boarding-schools for the sons of tribal 
sheikhs were retained. 
It has been shown that, in both countries, political and social changes were effected by 
the state leaders who were civil servants and military leaders with technocratic 
knowledge who put their loyalty to the state before their obligations to individuals. 
Whereas the Meiji state leaders were a self-made status group, and the new Iraqi state 
leaders were the creation of a foreign power, both groups of leaders emerged rapidly in 
a non-violent way, and had a common educational background. The state leaders in 
Meiji Japan consolidated their political power in a relatively short period of time, in 
contrast to Iraq where consolidation was lengthy and conflictual. 
However, analysis of the emergence of these leaders revealed a similarity in the way 
that they aimed to modernise the state and to change the social structure. They viewed 
the cultural traditional values and old merit systems as resources for reinforcing new 
political identities and obligations. 	 These leaders looked at social modernity 
instrumentally, seeing it as a part of the state modernity project. Both were, politically 
and educationally, self-conscious status groups. They soon developed new places in 
the social stratification system for themselves, as the leaders of modern states. 
Cultural leaders, the groups which reacted as opposition groups against the state 
modernity projects, had alternative values. They gradually emerged from the private 
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education system and the social movements during the political and social transitions 
in both countries. The educational institutions set up by the cultural leaders reflected 
their traditional values derived from the philosophical knowledge of the 'Way', which 
they used to promote alternative voices. To play their roles, the cultural leaders used 
both the new media and the traditional learning network system. As shown in Chapter 
Four, Fukuzawa's critical ideology and alternative voice emphasised that the use of 
knowledge cannot be separated from 'enlightenment', by which he meant the 
development of the spirit of freedom and independence in society. Fukuzawa publicly 
suggested that scholars should remain in the private sector to promote the 
independence of Japan. As a state moderniser, Mori did not reject Fukuzawa's attitude 
toward personal autonomy, but was ambivalent about the cultural leaders' standpoint 
which saw the state and society as equivalent. 
Similarly, in Iraqi society, the Arab tribal leaders and the Islamic leaders emerged as 
opposition groups when they resisted the British occupation in the name of freedom 
and independence. Leading Shi'a Ayatollahs, including Muhammad Mandi al-Khalisi, 
and various tribal sheikhs in the north and the south developed the 1920 revolution and 
were becoming cultural leaders by expanding the networks linking the urban and rural 
groups. However as shown in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, Shi'a leaders, notably 
Sheikh al-Muzaffar, and Ayatollah al-Khoei and as-Sadr, and tribal sheiks had different 
views of the state and different emphases on the modernity projects, the networks, the 
value systems and the education of leaders. In the 1950s, the changes in the tribal 
leaders' social status and in the tribal codes, as well as the changes among the Shi'a 
religious leaders and the new educated young urban leaders, notably the Ba'thists, the 
communists and the free officers, brought about tensions between them and the state. 
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These tensions have continued until the present day. 
In the process of the modernity projects, the cultural leaders in Japan and the emerging 
cultural leaders in Iraq, as well as new state leaders in both countries, were also 
struggling to change social stratification systems. 
The Tokugawa regime governed the population through 'rule by status'. One of the 
consequences of political change after the 1868 Meiji Renovation was that it destroyed 
the immobility of the four social strata of the Tokugawa period. The social 
stratification system was altered rapidly and drastically with the intention of creating a 
rich and strong nation-state (fukoku kyohei) and industrial and economic development 
(shokusan kogyo). Meiji state leaders quickly constructed new privileged social strata. 
By redefining the social strata, the government opened up access to official positions in 
the governmental agencies. Among these strata, the most conspicuous were the civil 
servants and the military leaders and cultural leaders in the society. As described in 
Chapters Two and Four, enterprising individuals from the old privileged Bushi stratum 
worked with groups from the formerly disadvantaged social strata. Thus political 
struggle and social change were linked. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
thirty-five years after the Meiji Renovation, the visions of the private universities 
varied, but their common idea was, as Fukuzawa claimed, the creation of a civilised 
and enlightened society and of civic leaders for this society. 
In contrast, Iraq failed to transform its social stratification. The Ottoman regime 
governed Iraqi provinces through 'rule by status'. Status was regulated by the 
separation of the nomad communities, the urban communities and the rural agricultural 
258 
communities. 	 Despite the Tanzimat reforms, tribes remained self-regulating 
communities which saw to the tribal administration of justice. As described in Chapter 
Five, the Ottoman bureaucracy was recreated. The most conspicuous groups were 
sharifian (Arab officers in the Ottoman military) and urban civil servants. The Law of 
the 1924 Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation (TCCDR) legitimated the 
position of the Arab tribal leaders but this did not imply the abolition of the previous 
social stratification system. Until the July 1958 Revolution, Iraq remained subject to 
two norms, one for the cities through the civil law and one for the tribal countryside 
through the tribal regulations. However, as in Meiji Japan, the new political 
revolutionists worked with groups from the formerly disadvantaged social strata. In 
the 1940s and 1950s, the disadvantaged groups were recruited by the Ba'th party and 
party activists or by the Communist party activists. In contrast to Japan, private 
universities did not emerge in the four decades following the end of the old sharifian 
bureaucratic al-Said regime. Hence higher education remained under political control, 
strengthening the national ideology and bureaucracy. 
Overall, in both countries, the changes in the social stratification system were closely 
linked to the growth of bureaucracy, the emergence of cultural leaders and new 
educational patterns. Social change in Japan was dynamic with major changes in 
personal status becoming possible. In contrast, social change in Iraq was ambiguous, 
and controlled by the most privileged political and military leaders. The preservation 
of the tribal and religious traditional society was a consequence of the state modernity 
project. 
The differences between state and cultural leaders were marked in the routes to 
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leadership positions, in the education of leaders, and by socialisation into differently 
valued knowledge. Crucial differences between the two countries in the education of 
leaders are seen in the way in which the leaders renegotiated foreign knowledge and its 
institutionalisation. 
The nature of the education of leaders 
This section tries to review three central arguments of the thesis and suggest that while 
Japan transformed traditional values and concepts of merit by combining them with 
foreign knowledge, Iraq preserved much of its tradition, resisting modern pressures. 
The changes in the education of leaders were affected by the renegotiated and selected 
knowledge. In both countries, technical knowledge was valued as practical and useful 
to promote the modernisation of the state and the society, and was thus legitimated and 
institutionalised in the education system. Between the two countries, however, there 
was a differential acceptance of foreign knowledge and differences in the 
renegotiations of cultural traditional values. 
In Meiji Japan, at the state level, the traditional practical learning (jitsugaku), was 
replaced by foreign knowledge. The acquisition of foreign knowledge was expressed 
in the proclamation of the 1868 Charter Oath of Five Articles as a basic way to 
construct a 'strong and rich' nation-state and a civilised and enlightened society. As 
described in Chapters Three and Four, demand for the importation of foreign 
knowledge was expressed in the Meiji government's first major effort to organise state 
education and the importation and selection of knowledge by legitimating the 
examination system in 1872, and by institutionalising the overseas study projects in the 
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Fundamental Code of Education in 1872. 
The Tokugawa legacy of practical learning (jitsugaku), was replaced by foreign 
knowledge. Consequently, as in the Law Department at Tokyo University in 1881, 
education in foreign knowledge and language became a preparation for official 
promotion; that is, foreign knowledge led to political power. 
A reaction to the state's emphasis on foreign knowledge and to the neglect of the 
traditional moral code of philosophical knowledge resulted in the creation of private 
educational institutions, with a different emphasis. The cultural leaders developed 
academic movements, emphasised the Tokugawa legacy of jitsugaku, combining the 
contents of indigenous literature and classics and Western knowledge, and 
institutionalised the ideas of egalitarianism, personal autonomy and institutional 
independence in the private universities. The moral values of the movements were 
expressed in terms of these new concepts. 
As Sakuma Shozan and Fukuzawa Yukichi argued in public, the philosophical aspect 
of traditional knowledge and jitsugaku in the private educational institutions continued 
in the society. The private universities aimed not only to educate cultural leaders but 
also to develop their learning. Both knowledge of classical literature and foreign 
knowledge were perceived by the cultural leaders as useful. In 1885, the study of law 
in the Japanese language became a new method of teaching. The emergence of various 
courses or schools for the study of law at Chao University, Senshii University and Keio 
University was the consequence of the intellectual struggles of the renegotiation of the 
traditional system of learning by the cultural leaders, such as Hozumi and Aiba. In the 
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time of the rise of nationalism, it was significant that the founders of the Waseda, Keio, 
Doshisha and Chuo Universities argued in public that academic freedom and 
educational independence were important as conditions for national independence. 
In Iraq, the curricula of the state College of Law in Baghdad emphasised the mixture of 
indigenous and foreign languages and laws. However, the indigenous customary law 
currently practised by Arab tribal society was not taught as an academic subject. Law 
college graduates who were not from tribal families had no knowledge of such socially 
constructed law, which made it difficult for them to understand the Arab tribal values 
and identity. Consequently, knowledge of tribal affairs was not valued by the urban 
bureaucrats, but the survival of Fasl knowledge and the networking systems were 
useful for them to control regional security. The state leaders were determined to 
control and balance state and tribal power, but the knowledge required by the 
bureaucrats gave only a partial understanding of the indigenous world. 
For example, as described in Chapter Five, the establishment of the new Political 
Officers allowed them to intervene in the tribal Fasl traditions. However, the Fasl 
decisions made by political officers often did not satisfy the two affected parties. The 
separation of urban and rural education gave the tribal members limited access to the 
new knowledge. This was seen by the fact that the school for the sons of the sheikhs in 
Baghdad were abolished. Also, the Monroe Commission Report and al-Jamali' s 
educational project underpinned the separation of the teacher training for the urban and 
rural area, and the separation of the civil law and the tribal law. Foreign knowledge 
was not combined with traditional Arab knowledge, hence the tribal life styles and 
much of their values were preserved within their traditions. Fasl remained as tribal 
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authority, honour and merit. The preservation of the traditional society was a 
consequence of the state modernity project. Educational contradictions led to tensions, 
not only between the state educationalists, but also between leading tribal members 
over the traditional knowledge and obligation, and loyalty to the state and its Pan-Arab 
and Iraqi ideologies. 
The overseas studies programme in Iraq gave impetus to the growth of a new middle 
class, such as members of the al-Ahab and Muthanna groups. However, the effects of 
the project were small as they served within the state institutions. Unlike in Meiji 
Japan, relationships and academic co-operation between the state leaders and the 
leaders in the society did not develop. However, some of the returned overseas groups 
including the military officials joined in the 1958 revolution, together with the young 
educated urban modernisers. Under Qasim's regime, the gaps in knowledge and 
overseas exposure between the military educated in Baghdad and the civil servants who 
had been highly educated abroad led to tension, but the overseas returnees were 
subjected to the military officers. 
In Meiji Japan, the 1872 Fundamental Code of Education (Gakusei) institutionalised 
the pattern of students studying abroad as a national system. The dispatch of students 
abroad was legitimised and institutionalised in the Imperial University. In the first and 
second generations, the main aim was to train bureaucrats. The third generation was 
focussed on the training of scientific professionals. The reform introduced by the 1882 
Overseas Student Law helped to meet the state's needs for bureaucrats and then for 
academic teachers. The educational system supported a new privileged social class, 
but their identity was established by the state as that of bureaucrats of the Emperor, 
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with technocratic knowledge. Their knowledge was new to Japan, and separated from 
the historical legacy of knowledge. Until 1881, thirteen years after the Renovation, 
kokugaku [the study of Japanese classical literature] was not considered as having an 
equivalent value to foreign knowledge at Tokyo University. Kokugaku was then 
redefined and replaced by the study of wabungaku [Japanese literature] in 1886. 
Thus in the two countries, at a time of political and social transitions, the balance 
between the acquisition of foreign knowledge and the renegotiation of traditional 
values became a serious issue. At the same time, there were rapid changes in the 
traditional concepts of merit, and these had implications for the education and 
socialisation of leaders. 
The thesis has argued that the education of leaders was affected by changing concepts 
of merit, and that the struggle over state and social modernity projects created new 
modes of the education of leaders. The narratives on Japan and Iraq showed that what 
was previously counted as sound knowledge and moral values was negotiated and 
renegotiated throughout the pre-modern and modern epochs at state and social levels. 
In both countries, as the state modernised, the merit system was gradually consolidated 
through the enforcement of the public obligation to acquire technocratic knowledge 
and the examination system. As described in Chapter Three, the examination system 
was perceived by Ogata and Fukuzawa as a means of breaking down the feudal system 
of the four social strata and also the bureaucratic system. For the state leaders, the 
examination system was a practical means to produce new talent and to reinforce their 
position in the bureaucracy. Articles 48-57 of the Education System Order [Gakused 
264 
in 1872 concerned the examination system, and stressed that egalitarianism in pursuing 
learning for attaining personal and social merit had to be guaranteed through the 
educational system, and competence through examinations. The examinations and the 
award of certificates for academic attainment became the legitimated way to promotion 
and positions of prestige, influence and power; hence the competitive examination 
system and curriculum control developed, and the education system expanded. 
The Education System Order outlined the curriculum. In 1879, Ito argued for the 
importance of the acquisition of Western knowledge, and of education leading to 
prestige through the examination system and the strengthening of the bureaucracy. The 
1880s marked an increase in bureaucratisation and, at the same time, the legitimisation 
of the examination system for the selection of civil servants. As the new state 
bureaucrats acquired privileged social status, in society, there prevailed, though only 
for a short time, the notion of lanson minpu' [respect the governmental bureaucrat and 
despise the commoner]. 
The main route into the bureaucratic system was established before the introduction of 
the Cabinet (1881-1885) and the promulgation of the Constitution (1889), by the 
establishment of the examination system, the Fundamental Code of Education (1872) 
and the Education Order (1879), and the Imperial University Order (1886). The 
majority of the high echelon of civil servants were the product of a university 
education in law, had passed civil service examinations which demanded knowledge of 
Western languages, had knowledge of law and jurisprudence partly on the basis of 
foreign experience, and were assured tenure. 
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In Iraq, the Ottoman legacy of the examination system continued. By 1936, the 
government had incorporated compulsory knowledge, defined by the examination 
system and an emphasis on the transmission of compulsory national moral principles, 
in the education system. As described in Chapter Six, Public Education Law in 1940 
extended direct government control over all private schools. The two political 
ideologies, Arab and Iraqi nationalism, were institutionalised in the school system by 
training the teachers, establishing the examination system, distributing textbooks and 
providing knowledge for Arab national leaders. Attainment in education affected 
political and social positions through the examination system. 
In both countries, the state education system supported a new privileged social class, 
but their identity was established by the state as that of official bureaucrats with 
technocratic knowledge.  
As the state modernised, the concept of merit as honouring the Way of Heaven was in 
both countries shifted from personal cultivation to requirements imposed by the state 
educational policy. As described in Chapter Three and Four, in the early Meiji period, 
the Way of Heaven was re-emphasised in terms of the democratic notion of equal 
learning for all in the 1872 Fundamental Code of Education. However, in Article One 
of the 1887 Discipline Code of the Bureaucrats, the Way was redefined in terms 
imposed by the bureaucrats as the servants of the Emperor. In the middle of the Meiji 
period, the Imperial Rescript on Education established the basic ethical code of 
Japanese society for the next fifty eight years. The schools became major agents of 
socialisation by linking the family with a hierarchical political ideology that sanctified 
the relationships among children, their parents, ancestors, and the Emperor. In Iraq, as 
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seen in the educational principles of al-Husri, al-Jamali and Shawkat, the redefined 
moral codes of merit and the notions of loyalty, obedience and filial piety were closely 
linked with the selection of religious knowledge through Arab history and were used to 
strengthen nationalism and militarism in terms of national morality. 
By using and regulating traditions for modernising purposes, by strengthening the 
political ideology and by changing the relations of leaders to the state and society, the 
state in both countries became what I would like to call 'a new traditional state'. Such 
state modernity brought about tensions and contradictions between state and social 
modernity projects 
The important element which was reinforced in Meiji society was that the 
contradictions between state and social modernity were visible in the political, social 
and intellectual struggles over the institutionalisation of the redefined concepts of 
merit. As described in Chapter 4, cultural leaders such as Fukuzawa tried not to 
conflict with Mori, who emphasised the westernisation of the state's educational 
projects. The cultural leaders sought a consensus on the new knowledge and on 
personal, institutional and national independence. The social ethos (WO of "personal 
independence for the sake of national independence" was effective for both political 
and social changes. The Tokugawa legacy of knowledge of the Way of Heaven was 
redefined and combined with the ideas of the American Declaration of Independence 
by Fukuzawa. 
Thus the education of leaders was affected by changing concepts of merit. In the two 
countries, the concept of sound merit in the previous times had strong political 
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implications for the modernity projects. The two elements, knowledge (philosophical 
and practical or useful) and moral values, were negotiated and renegotiated throughout 
the pre-modern and modern epochs at state and social levels. It is suggested that in 
Meiji Japan, the optimum pattern of 'balanced' knowledge composed of philosophical, 
practical and useful knowledge was redefined. As Fukuzawa emphasised, moral values 
were based on indigenous cultural values. He combined these with new concepts of 
independence, enlightenment and civilisation and created new moral values regarding 
individual, social and national independence and social obligations. In the case of Iraq, 
`balanced' knowledge and indigenous moral values were retained in the tribal and 
religious groups but in different forms and contents. Throughout the twentieth century, 
education through magi& in Baghdad was vulnerable to government control and did 
not develop learning networks. Very few were retained by the end of twentieth 
century. 
Overall, cultural leaders in both Iraqi and Meiji societies struggled over the 
institutionalisation of the renegotiated cultural traditions and the concepts of merit in 
the education of leaders. The narrative chapters showed also that the education of 
leaders was affected by the different timings of the formation of the state. 
The thesis has described the rational state modernity projects, which suggest a 
remorseless, impersonal and bureaucratic structural process. Yet the narratives have 
shown how different leaders pursued their own agendas with different results. In my 
view, modernity is, as defined in Chapter One, a consequence of the simultaneous 
interactions of state and social modernities which included diversified changes in value 
systems in the state and the society. Political and social changes in Japan were rapid 
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and simultaneous, while the changes in Iraq were slow and asynchronous. 
In the early stage of rapid and drastic political and social changes, the leaders in both 
countries found it difficult to adapt to the differences which arose from the state 
modernity projects, and to their new society. The impact of the double modernity 
projects on the political and social changes depended on the openness of the political 
system and the power of resistance to the state projects. In both countries the state 
modernity projects required rapid political, social and educational changes. For 
example, the new Meiji state emerged simultaneously with the development of the state 
apparatuses which rapidly legitimated the new bureaucracy, the military, the court, the 
social stratification system, and the state education system and the four redefined 
institutions of the Shinto religion. 
Opposed to the state education systems and its ideologies, there was also the 
simultaneous emergence of various styles of cultural leaders in the society, including 
economic, academic, social and religious modernisers. New forms of the state 
education of leaders and private educational institutions emerged simultaneously as the 
state modernised; these changes took place fifty years earlier in Japan than in Iraq. 
This was due to the Meiji citizens' involvement in the peoples' freedom and rights 
movements as they expanded the learning networks, resisted the state modernity 
projects and raised moral issues which the bureaucracy had neglected. The cultural 
leaders took up the issues in public debates. There was an educational transfer of the 
redefined legacies of religious and social status group Bushi traditions to the new 
curricula of the private universities, such as Kokugakuin, Waseda and Keio. The social 
modernity projects were closely associated with the new forms of private education of 
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leaders and the emergence of new styles of leaders. The new civic society and the 
private universities adapted themselves to the modernised Shinto and Bushido codes 
and developed consequent changes in the education and socialisation of leaders and in 
social status. A new cohesive Meiji society emerged. 
The emergence, growth and maturity of the Meiji state and society occurred within four 
decades after the Tokugawa regime collapsed in 1868. This meant that there was rapid 
social mobility, and new Meiji leaders could lead major political, social, economic and 
educational changes simultaneously over a relatively short time span; as Cowen 
suggested, in a span of ten years. Within 35 years of the Renovation, there were two 
state universities, and more than fifteen private universities with different aims. 
In contrast, in Iraq it took 38 years to establish the first state university in Baghdad. 
The educational, economic and social changes during the monarchical period took 
place much more slowly than in Japan. The development of the bureaucracy was not 
interrelated with the industrialisation of the country. Economic growth was slow, in 
spite of foreign interests in the oil economy after 1910s. Although there were changes 
in the militaristic regimes at intervals of about ten years, the political, social and 
educational changes were not simultaneous. The Ottoman legacies of the Imperial 
moral order in the education systems and the training of the state leaders through the 
military and the law college were retained. Education was thus a political force. There 
was British support for the educational reforms which established parts of the higher 
education system, such as the Medical College in 1929, the Military College in 1924 
and Baghdad University in 1958. However, the development of the state educational 
projects was uneven. Access to education remained different for urban and rural areas, 
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for the north and the south and for different religious groups. These differences have 
continued until the present day. 
Three types of education of leaders in Iraq and Meiji Japan are now distinguished here. 
The first type is the education of experts. The experts in the two countries emerged 
from the state higher education, and in the case of Iraq, this included the Military 
College as well as the Medical College. Meiji experts modernised and used their 
Shinto mixed with Confucianism and Bushi legacies of socialisation and learning 
networks, legitimated the redefined values of Bushi loyalty as the source of national 
morality and identity in the education system, and consolidated the bureaucracy. The 
Iraqis renegotiated but retained traditional values, keeping the Sunni aspect of these 
values, which, in the education system, were those of the Ottoman bureaucratic elites, 
and legitimated the redefined values of Islamic loyalty as the national morality of the 
system. In both countries, the first legitimation made by the experts was the 
standardisation of language. The second level of legitimation entailed the redefinition 
of religious, ethnic or social status groups values. At the third level, the symbolic 
changes of these redefined values and merit were legitimated and institutionalised in 
the education system. At the fourth level of legitimation, an ideology based on a 
selection of knowledge and the concepts of merit was developed. 
The second type is the education of cultural leaders. The cultivated Japanese in the 
Tokugawa period had a thorough knowledge of neo-Confucian philosophy, which 
embraced cultural aspects of morality, the arts, in particular literary arts, and religious 
codes; they pursued self-discipline as well as knowledge. Leadership positions in the 
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Tokugawa period required philosophical and practical knowledge balanced with moral 
values. Notions of equality, democracy and human rights, as well as the system of 
values and world vision, were built on traditional values, knowledge and morality 
combined with foreign knowledge. 
Cultural leaders in Meiji Japan emerged in private academic space and the peoples' 
freedom and rights movements in the 1870s. At the end of the Meiji period, a new 
style of leaders who possessed both practical expertise and cultural knowledge 
emerged, through education in the private universities. As pioneers Fukuzawa, 
Hozumi, Okuma and Nijima founded private universities. Hattori, Yatabe and 
Minosaku founded scientific and academic institutions. These academics, and other 
groups, in particular lawyers, new political party leaders, social engineers and literary 
and artistic enthusiasts, could adapt themselves to the rapidly changing society and 
expand their communications with various status groups by using their shared values, 
knowledge and networks. As described in Chapters Two and Four, the establishment 
of the constitutional state, the plural political party and electoral systems, and the 
private universities has largely the result of both the state and cultural leaders' efforts 
through negotiations and public debates, which created new networks based on the 
cultural heritage, including kai. 
Cultural leaders in Iraq emerged from the social movements in the 1920s and 1958, in 
the rural tribal, religious and urban academic space. Tribal leaders were created by the 
British Mandate legacy of the 1924 Tribal Regulation. The Ottoman legacy of the 
Sunni religious hierarchy was recreated through state education, while the Shia 
hierarchy was, as described in Chapter Six and Seven, created within the Shia hawza 
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community. After the independence of Iraq in 1932 and when militarism became a 
new factor in the politics, cultural aspects of education were neglected in state 
education. High levels of study of indigenous religious, ethnic and social groups' 
values and their knowledge were neglected in the state education system. There was 
weak institutionalisation of indigenous philosophical aspects of knowledge in the 
education of the experts. These aspects were fully provided and demanded in the 
diwiin and hawza education for tribal and religious leaders. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
when social movements developed and Iraq changed its political form from the 
monarchy to the republic, the tribal and religious leaders, notably Sheikh al-Muzaffar, 
and Ayatollah al-Khoei, al-Hakim and as-Sadr, struggled to relate their traditional 
education of leaders to the new values. The consequence is visible today. 
The third type is the education of traditional leaders. In tribal society, this group, in the 
Tokugawa period and before and during the Ottoman period, involved those who were 
characterised by supporting the moral order and by older forms of loyalty and 
obligation, in contrast to expert knowledge. In these, the tribal and Shia leaders in 
monarchical and republic Iraq were considered as the cultural leaders, or as the 
emerging cultural leaders affected by their formal and sequences of educational 
experiences, leadership positions and value systems. In Meiji Japan and monarchical 
and republic Iraq, charismatic leadership was routinised either into bureaucracy or 
cultural leadership. 
It is suggested that the three types of the education of leaders not only reflected 
leaders' different renegotiation of traditional values in their education but also leaders' 
influence on other authorities as they transformed themselves into new styles of 
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leaders. The significant example was the political, social and intellectual 
interrelationships between the Meiji experts and the cultural leaders. 
	 As a 
consequence, new styles of leaders who possessed both practical expertise and cultural 
knowledge emerged in the private universities. These elements do not stand alone but 
in complex interrelations with other new themes. 
Reflections on the nature of the education of leaders 
Although the thesis has tried to analyse how cultural traditions were adapted to 
modernity by the different styles of leaderships it is not clear where the different forms 
of society, a coherent society in Meiji Japan and a fragmented society in Iraq, 
originated. It is also not clear how these sociological and educational themes may be 
further understood comparatively. In order to explore these two questions, I attempt 
here to develop an understanding of the nature of the education of leaders in times of 
drastic political and social transitions. The different types of societies reflected the 
differently renegotiated values of religious, ethnic and social groups and concepts of 
merit embedded in the education of leaders in Iraq and Japan. 
Such an argument might be developed by understanding the social ontology 
underpinning the education of leaders and might enable us to understand more clearly 
the process of modernisation of the education of leaders which changed these societies. 
An Interpretation of the social ontology underpinning the education of leaders 
As has been shown in the thesis, state modernity not only included projects which 
modernised the state itself, but also implied altered values based on the life experiences 
of individuals and groups in the society. The state enforced the rationalisation of 
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traditional religious, ethical, ethnic and social groups' values in the education systems, 
but these values lost much of their legitimacy. 
The notion of ontology here means the nature of being as a person or group. Social 
ontology refers to how we conceptualise social being. Voices raised by the cultural 
leaders expressed alternatives to the state modernity projects. As described in Chapters 
Three and Six, the struggles over the changing concepts of merit and for the 
institutionalisation of these in the education system were cultural leaders' expressions 
of the ideal social being, and this ideal underpinned the education of leaders in terms of 
religious, ethical, ethnic and social group values. Such voices were based on the 
cultural leaders' world views and their social obligations, with which renegotiation 
could work. 
The concept of state modernity has been defined in this thesis as a form of 
rationalisation, legitimation and institutionalisation of the education of leaders. As 
Weber emphasised in his Science as a Vocation, the rationalisation of authority was 
`fate in the modern era'. He encouraged his academic followers to live with this fate 
and their vocation. However, Weber's construction of historical dynamics in terms of 
charisma and the routinisation of moral charisma contradicts his fatalistic interpretation 
of the process of rationalisation.' Although Weber was aware of the fact that social 
dynamics result from many social forces, he nevertheless placed great emphasis upon 
the rise of charismatic leaders.' In this context, Weber's process of rationalisation of 
authority should not be thought to lead to fatalistic conclusions but to renegotiations. 
As introduced in Chapter One, rationalisation affected not only bureaucracy and 
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religion but all walks of life. It implied rational state modernity and also social 
modernity. 
In the case of the modernisation of Meiji Japan and Iraq, this approach allowed for a 
detailed investigation of the changes in social and cultural structures; how the state 
established the institutions that were meant to dominate society and how the traditional 
and cultural leaders established alternative ways of educating leaders and alternative 
social visions. As discussed in the previous section, modernity entailed ambivalent 
attitudes to the bureaucracy, religious, ethical and ethnic or social group values, and the 
education of leaders. 
For the experts and the cultural leaders in the two societies, the tension within 
modernity projects was due not only to the way in which they struggled over the gap 
between the rational and social projects, but also to the intellectual gap between 
indigenous and foreign knowledge. Both Iraq and Japan had deeply rooted religious, 
ethical, ethnic and social status group traditions. Mainland Japan was called the land 
of the Yamato ethnic group. Religion became part of modern consciousness, and 
religious and political ideology always had an impact on the leaders in society and on 
the education of leaders. The concept of merit shifted from personal cultivation as the 
Way of Man to requirements imposed by state educational policy. Religion was 
vulnerable to rational authority. 
Weber's sociology of religion analysed the variant social structures of religion, the 
relation of religion to social and economic institutions, and the role of religion in social 
change.3 Overall then, Weber's use of religion and religious leaders as a perspective 
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for the study of society was useful, and illuminated my main theme of the nature of 
institutions for the education of leaders. However, Weber overlooked the presence of 
alternative voices of disagreement with the rationality of state modernity, and 
differences between state modernity and social modernity projects at times when 
political and social transitions were in tension. In these processes, three types of 
leaders emerged. 
Firstly, the rationalisation of religion in Iraq involved the development of forms of 
state and social organisations, association and community and in the case of the state 
projects, systematically calculated means, which were characterised by the Ottoman 
legacy of Sunni-centred Islam. This state rationalisation of Sunni Islam and 
nationalism implied the division of diverse indigenous cultural and social structures, as 
well as individuals' or groups' lives, cultural and philosophical thoughts, religious 
groups' codes and status, and the absorption of individuals into the states' rational 
ideological institutions. Islamic institutions, Islamic principles and systems of Islamic 
learning were entangled in religious, political and cultural conflicts. As a consequence, 
not all of these were developed into a modern form. In Meiji Japan, the state experts 
and the Shinto leaders renegotiated the legacies of Shinto values and created the 
Emperor State, which influenced decisively modern political and social development. 
They redefined previous Confucian knowledge and underpinned moral codes of merit 
and the notions of loyalty, obedience and filial piety in order to regulate national 
morality and state education. 
Secondly, the cultural leaders encouraged the development of personal autonomy, and 
learning networks, the establishment of private universities and new curricula for 
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philosophy, literature and in particular, theology for the new religious universities. As 
discussed in the previous two sections, the consequence was the emergence of new 
styles of leaders. The modernisation of the Shinto religion did not emerge from the 
establishment of the new Shintii schools. It emerged from the independent function of 
the new knowledge of Shinto in the society at large, in which the religious leaders, 
including Kurozumi in the Meiji period, struggled for an independent role for the 
believers in society. 
Unlike the experts and religious leaders in Meiji Japan, cultural leaders considered 
traditional values as a moral code derived from the philosophical knowledge of the 
`Way,' and used these values to promote self-expression and a civilised society by 
combining old indigenous and new Western knowledge. They believed in personal 
autonomy, and debated in public their political stance and social obligations. The 
cultural leaders were aware of their roles in disseminating ideas about rights to 
personal and group autonomy and freedom, in the process of the growth of civic 
society. The idea of the Way of Heaven in the two countries was a source of individual 
identity and of autonomy embedded in the social system. The concepts of merit in 
Japan and Iraq were based on religious and ethnic values and retained at state, social 
and family levels. Collective social obligation was a fruit of the cultural leaders' 
struggles over the cultural renegotiations. The Way of Heaven in Iraq was renegotiated 
in terms of the philosophical development of if tihad, and this redefined Way 
underpinned Fasl and hawza educational institutions. Cultural authorities in tribal and 
religious communities used especially their knowledge of the moral order and older 
forms of loyalty and obligation. 
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Thirdly, in both countries, memories of the modernity conflicts, including the armed 
clashes, and the life experiences of individuals, families, communities, and the society, 
were also sources of discussion, public debate and negotiation. In Meiji Japan and 
tribal and religious communities in Iraq, particularly, issues of morality were explicit. 
Within the Arab tribes, the series of Fasl practices of justice, forgiving, compensation 
and peace making reinforced tribal obligation and underpinned the diwan education for 
honour, merit and authority. In Meiji Japan, having a vision of the future state, the 
society and the citizen, the new curriculum in the private universities offered a new 
humanist model, in which the education process was centred on the human as a 
culturally independent being. 
Cohesiveness and fragmentation in the societies 
The processes of modernising the education of leaders in the two countries developed 
different forms of society. 
Firstly, there was an important element of social solidarity in the two societies which 
served to bind the three types of leaders together. This is the moral value based on the 
education of leaders and individuals' or groups' life experiences. Leaders deal with 
these experiences when they institutionalise the redefined traditional values and the 
concepts of merit. In Meiji Japan, the modernisation of religious, ethical, ethnic and 
social groups' values and knowledge developed simultaneously through their political, 
social and intellectual struggles over the cultural renegotiation and institutionalisation 
of these in the education of leaders. As a consequence, the cultural leaders shared 
philosophical and cultural values and knowledge, and feelings of ethical and social 
solidarity — the 'trust' which promotes social solidarity. In Iraq, an ethical code of 
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social solidarity did not develop in society. The emergence of cultural leaders was 
confined to various small communities.  
Secondly, the private education of leaders in Iraq was less affected by the state 
modernity project and fragmented, but small and protective communities developed in 
order to preserve much of their ways of life from the pressure of the state modernity 
projects. In contrast, the private educational institutions in Japan were independent of 
the state as well as of international institutions. They developed independent 
institutional principles and systems of learning, and promoted a community with 
shared knowledge. In this context, they were able to develop a cohesive and 
democratic society. 
Thirdly, in addition, alternative voices to the state's modernity project were weak in 
Iraq in the twentieth century. There were increasing gaps between urban and rural 
groups concerning values, merit and knowledge. There was exploitation of indigenous 
knowledge concerning peacekeeping. Disruption also arose from foreign intervention 
in political, economic and cultural spheres. Each group of leaders placed a different 
emphasis on the modernity projects and the institutionalisation of the cultural 
traditions, and these differences were reflected in the emergence of different styles of 
the education of leaders who possessed different knowledge and values. The experts, 
cultural and traditional leaders were fragmented, and the Iraqi state continued to be 
patrimonial. The country lost its intellectual middle class, individual and academic 
autonomy, and institutional independence. Moral issues raised by the state leaders 
were little questioned; hence alternative voices were not raised. The religious and 
tribal groups' private educational space in Iraq developed within the community in 
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terms of protection from the state modernity pressures. 
Individuals or social groups certainly make their own history. For example, in the case 
of Iraq, it can be suggested that British Mandate project related to the state in Iraq 
showed an ambivalent attitude towards the new Iraqi leadership and the education of 
leaders among the Mandate officials. The 1920 social movement against the British 
spread from north to south and took most of the year to suppress. As a consequence, 
the Mandate officials diverged about Iraq's future leadership between the group which 
emphasised the Ottoman-trained urban Iraqis, and the other group which recognised 
the provincial tribal leaders. The early modern Iraqi state was formed by the British 
officials' social and cultural perspectives. The 1924 Tribal Criminal and Civil 
Disputes Regulation (TCCDR) legitimated the social position of the sheikh within his 
community. The sheikh became the final decision maker of Fasl but also the arbitrator 
between the state and his tribal members, who were obliged to enforce the state laws. 
TCCDR changed the relationships between the sheikhs and members of the tribes. The 
British legacy of the Regulation was an outcome of their officials' understanding of the 
nature of Iraqi society. The revived Arab tribal position in provincial Iraq maintained 
specific communities of generosity, honour and trust and these had to be protected 
from rational state modernity. In this context, Iraq in 1932 became independent with 
international agreement on its boundaries, not through its own state and military forces. 
In the 1930s, after the mandate, Iraq experienced covert and overt linkages between 
foreign educational influences from the USA, Germany and Britain and state 
education, through al-Jamali, Shawkat and Hamley. Traditional tribal and religious 
institutions were less affected by the state and from foreign educational institutions. 
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Independence meant separation or fragmentation, which was a new phenomenon of 
modern segregation from the state's educational institutions, and there was little 
religious, ethical, ethnic and social knowledge shared by the tribal and religious groups 
and by those who favoured the state curricula. 
Overall, the creation of fragmented or coherent patterns of society reflects the 
education of leaders. Modernity in Meiji Japan permeated a coherent society, and in 
Iraq it promoted a fragmented society. However, in both countries, traditional values, 
institutionalised in the education of leaders and based on the life experiences of 
individuals or groups, were neither abandoned nor firmly defined, but negotiated, 
renegotiated and continued, either transformed in the society or preserved in much of 
the traditions in the communities. 
As a consequence, the patterns of the education of leaders in the two countries 
developed different styles and routes, with contrasting long-term consequences. The 
role of the Meiji state modernity project, which established separate state and private 
higher education, ended in April 2004, as the state universities were turned into public 
or private corporations. The contemporary Iraqi state, society and education of leaders 
are traceable back to the Ottomans and the first half-century of modernising Iraq. The 
contemporary Japanese state, society and education of leaders are traceable back to the 
Meiji period. 
Limitations of the thesis and future research 
On a complex topic such as this, there will always be limitations in the structure and 
shape of research. I have identified three kinds of limitations in the development of the 
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arguments in the thesis; these are the limitation to two countries, the limited time scale, 
and the omission of discussion of the social trust issue in the education of leaders. 
Firstly, I undertook research on the education of leaders and on modernity projects in 
Iraq and Japan. These countries were chosen because of my experience of living in 
these countries for over twenty-five years and my knowledge of their languages. Both 
countries had deeply rooted religious, ethnic and social traditions which had influenced 
the education of leaders, with various political and social consequences. However, 
since Iraq and Japan had particular experiences in their struggles, in order to offer a 
more comparative interpretation of modernisation it might have been helpful to include 
two further countries. 
Secondly, the thesis investigated specific periods of about fifty years in each country, 
times when they experienced drastic political and social transitions. Although a longer 
time span which included the present day might have enabled an analysis of a larger 
spectrum of modernity processes, the periods covered by the research demonstrated 
particular complex changes and therefore provided an opportunity to develop particular 
understandings and to focus in depth on periods of particularly interesting 
developments. Nevertheless, not taking the study up to the present day was, for me, a 
weakness in what I might have achieved. 
Thirdly, social trust in the two societies was different. In Meiji Japan, social trust 
included the state leaders' trust of the cultural leaders and vice versa, as well as trust 
among the civic groups, while in Iraq, there was a loss of social trust at state and social 
levels. As a result there were enormous differences in political and social changes in 
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these societies. In Japan a cohesive society was constructed, while in Iraq the 
fragmented but self-protecting communities continued.4 Future research might enable 
these limitations concerning time, space and social trust to be addressed.' 
Interestingly, on 13th April, 2006, after critical debates and dialogues more than 
seventy meetings over three years within the ruling party in Japan, the party leaders 
announced the draft of a Fundamental Law of Education Reform containing a preamble 
and eighteen articles, which will be submitted to the National Assembly. The limits of 
patriotism were debated, and Japan's wish to contribute to world peace and the welfare 
of all human beings was reaffirmed. Overall, the new words 'love of country and the 
home province' and 'public spirit' were added.6 
However, Japan has retained certain outcast communities. 	 Past and current 
discrimination has resulted in their educational attainment and socioeconomic status 
being lower than those of the majority of Japanese.' Powerful nationalists in previous 
times exploited national symbols. In this sense Japan is still organised by ethnicity. 
The efforts through movements to change their situation from the liberation to 
integration have continued over the years. 8 In 2006, foreigners living in Japan 
(permanent residents) are estimated to total around 2,000,000. During the last ten 
years, there was a sudden increase of 600,000. The number of migrant people will 
increase.9 
In Iraq, politically, in the twentieth century, the Kurdish people and Shi'a religious 
groups were separate from the Sunni Arabs. In terms of Arab nationalism, Kurdish 
nationalism raises distinct questions. After the third war in Iraq in 2003, the chasm 
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between Sunni and Shi'a has become severe. In this political environment, social trust 
between the state and the society, as well as between the different social groups has 
disappeared. Tension between the different cultural and social groups over their social 
visions increases. 
Future research could examine the powerful mixture of ethnicity and nationalism, and 
the sensitive versions of the excluded in both countries. In Iraq I would study the 
nationalism of the Kurds and the Ba'th party after 1968. In both cases there are 
different forms of social trust; in the case of Japan, social trust is restricted by ethnicity. 
In Iraq it is also restricted by ethnicity but also by coercion, coalition and Iraqi politics. 
What are the consequences of the previous regime and the way Saddam corrupted the 
state ? What is the consequence of that for the selection of leaders ? 
At present, Japan and Iraq are facing new questions about the nature of education, the 
education of leaders and the nature of national education and social trust. 
A contemporary coda 
Contemporary Japan is changing the relationship between the education of experts and 
that of the cultural leaders. In order to maintain a position of international leadership, 
and to launch a new era distinct from the post-war period, Japan requires the education 
of new leaders, the creation of a new social infrastructure and to make a contribution to 
international society through university reforms. In May, 2005, the Open Course Ware 
(OCW) project was established by the six allied universities, Tokyo, Kyoto, KeiO, 
Waseda, Osaka and Tokyo Technology University. The syllabus and lectures taught in 
the scientific departments in these universities were made available on the internet. IT 
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education is rapidly expanding. At the same time the universities required, and Kei6 
University called for, the renovation of the cultural aspect of education .10 
Education in Iraq has become today a human rights issue. Education was never set free 
from power - the state's power and its control of knowledge. The indigenous cultural 
aspect of education is separated from modern state education. Within the political, 
social and cultural identity crises in Iraq, with the loss of peace and security in daily 
life, tribal leaders in the city are now active in forming the tribal learning circles-dim:in 
or majahs meetings. The religious community of hawza might in future be 
transformed into a religious or secular university. The Iraqis are now trying to search 
for a new identity. In these struggles, Iraq will be able to turn its plight into fortune. 
The Iraqi citizens can make sense of their painful experiences. As Tripp put it, "Iraqis 
will have good reason to fear subjection once more to a regime that equates power with 
force and dissent with treason".'1 
One important factor in the education of leaders was the indigenous cultural and 
spiritual climate of Japan and Iraq. In my perspective, the cultural aspect of education 
is described as a study of the way of understanding the self and others, and as a core of 
education based on the legacy (ever changing and continuing) of philosophy, morality, 
the arts, and religion. Without cultural education based on redefined traditional values 
and, through it, personal understanding of philosophy, morality, arts and religion, there 
will be no development of education related to religion, ethnicity and social groups 
within the frame of social modernity and the state as well as international modernity. 
For such development I would like to take some responsibility in my life.  
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Glossary 
Arabic glossary 
akhlaq (akhlak): 
National morality, literally "manners"; good dispositions and the virtues that adorn the 
human being with respect to sense and truth.(B. Fortna,2000.). In the Turkish language, 
akhlaq is spelled akhlak. 
akhlaq al-Mudnrya: 
Civic ethics used in the schools in Iraq in the twentieth century. 
asabrya: 
The Arab tribal virtue of solidarity; the term used by Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406). 
ashrra (plural: ashair): 
Tribes: the Arab tribe is a primordial group which shares a common ethnicity, 
language and culture. The group members unite when war is declared, but they have a 
tribal obligation to maximise consensus through peace negotiation between the tribes. 
In this context, the thesis emphasises that the tribal education of leaders based on 
nomadic philosophy in the Middle East forms a particular pattern and changes in 
various ways. 
Ayatollah: 
A title for a senior mujtahid created in the twentieth century. 
diwan: 
The exclusively male guest house; the word designates the main sitting room, that 
accommodates a crucial socialising and educating role for the tribal leaders. It is a 
sheikh's office, in which the tribal sheikhs and members deal with tribal affairs in 
relation to the state and the different tribal communities across the borders. The tribe's 
members are consulted there. This institution is part of the Arab Islamic culture of 
Fasl traditions endorsing systematic networks through the social, tribal and family 
obligation of peace keeping and making. 
fasl: 
Literally, Fasl is "an adjudication between right and wrong". Al-Zajjaj mentioned that 
one of the epithets for Allah is Al-Faasir. He judges fate among His creation. Fasl 
pronounces rights, distinguishes the opposite things, and then judges and combines. 
Lisan al-Arab [Lexicon of the Arab] 1956. 1 1 vols. Beirut: Daar Beirut, pp. 521-522. 
Fasl means 'the final decision', 'conclusion of formal greetings', 'to make a decision', 
`to fix the compensation'. Today, in most Arab countries, 'Rai' is called 'Soli' which 
means 'reconciliation'. It is a method of settling disputes (reconciliation) between two 
parties when any of the parties is a tribal member, through mediators; an Arab tribal 
tradition in the pre-Islamic period, recognized in Islamic law and practised by the 
Prophet Mohammed. Tribal knowledge served individual and community life. The 
most popular phrase used in the Arab world is "Bainy wa Bainaka Ease al-Khitab" 
[Between you and me there is a public procedure and final decision]. In this context 
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Fasl can be defined as a judicial meeting (ijutima al qadhai) and consultation 
procedure (tashawar al-shfira) set up to reach a final decision. 
fatwa: 
A final judgement and legal opinion of the religious authority on a religious matter. 
fiqh: 
Islamic jurisprudence as well as tribal jurisprudence; literally, "understanding". 
futuwa: 
A paramilitary youth organisation set up by the Iraqi government in the 1930s; 
literally, "the Sufi Islamic notion of youth". 
hawza: 
The Shr a learning community and theological madrasa. According to Litvak, the 
hawza `ilmiya (lit. territory of learning) is the community as centre of learning 
independent of the state. It denotes a communal whole which encompasses scholarship 
and inter-personal and social bonds, as well as the organizational and financial spheres. 
Litvak, Meir. 1998. Shi'i Scholars of Nineteenth-Century Iraq: the 'Mama' of Najaf 
and Karbala'. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 2. 
heiya ulama Muslim: 
The Association of Muslim Scholars, established by Amjad al-Zahawi in the 1950s. 
Under the previous regime, there was a strict control of the activities. Only six old 
leaders existed at the time of the fall of the regime in 2003. The learning community 
was expanded, and in 2004, the numbers of Sunni religious learners rapidly increased, 
to 6000. 
OW: 
In an Islamic context: a statement of arriving at an independent interpretation of the 
Islamic law by employing the sources of law and by using the principles of 
jurisprudence(usul al-fiqh); in a tribal context: interpretation of the customary law, or 
an un-precedented decision concerning compensation in Fasl. 
Utihad used by religious leaders: 
Ijtihad, literally "exerting oneself', is the technical term in Islamic law, first, for the 
use of individual reasoning in general and later, in a restricted meaning, for the use of 
the method of reasoning by analogy (kiyas). The ancient schools of law freely used 
individual reasoning, both in its arbitrary and its systematically disciplined form, and it 
is often simply called ra-y [opinion, considered opinion]. Shafi' i school identifies the 
legitimate function of ijtihad with the use of kiyas, the drawing of conclusions by their 
method of analogy, or systematic reasoning from the Qufa'n and the Sunna of the 
Prophet. This important innovation prevailed in the theory of Islamic law. B. Lewis, 
V.L. Menage, C.H. Pellat and J. Schaght (eds.), 1971. The Encyclopedia of Islam: New 
Edition Prepared by Number of Leading Orientalists. Volume II. London: Luzac & Co, 
p.1026. 
Islam: 
Literally, "submission to One God"; designates a civilisation and a culture established 
over the centuries. 
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madrasa: 
Literally, the "place of learning"; Classical instructions in the universities, colleges of 
law and religious schools focused on the teaching of Islamic theology and 
jurisprudence; nowadays, madrasa refers to a school in general. 
madrasa al-Mustansirrya: 
On the curriculum of Muslim higher education in the 'Abbasid period, "the summation 
given by Abu Yakhya Zakarriyya is of interest. It included legal subjects: Shari'a 
jurisprudence, exegesis, tradition; literary studies (adabiyat)' in philology, syntax, 
rhetoric, prosody, composition, reading and history, mathematics (riyadhiyat) 
including geometry, astronomy, arithmetic, algebra, music, politics, ethics and 
domestic economy, rational (aqliyat) studies in logic, dialectic, dogmatic theology, 
metaphysics, natural science, medicine and chemistry, and surveying, veterinary, 
agriculture, phrenology, dream interpretation, astrology and magic". Al Lu'lu al-
Nazim fi Rawm al-Ta' aluum Wal-Ta'lim, referred to in: Ahl-wardt Verzerchmiss der 
Arabischen Haudschriften, Vol. 1,p. 28c; see Totah, K.A., 1926. The Contributions of 
the Arabs to Education. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 56. In: 
Mehdi.Nakosteen. 1964. History of Islamic Origins of Western Education A.D. 800-
1350: with an introduction to medieval Muslim education. Boulder[Col]: University of 
Colorado Press, op. cit., p. 53n. 23. 
majalis: 
A private learning network maintained by urban intellectuals. It is not for the 
education of leaders but an educational tradition in the city, based on the Islamic spirit 
of family honour. In the 'Abbasid period, majalis developed as the professor's chair or 
post, and it also designated the people of the majlis-the place of sitting. 
mufti: 
A Muslim cleric or legal expert empowered to give rulings on religious matters; a 
jurisprudent consultant recognised by the Caliph as a person familiar with legal opinion 
in the context of religion. 
mujtahid: 
A clerical authority who is recognised by the clerical community as a competent to 
expresses an independent legal opinion. 
mura'a: 
The spirit of the ideal youth of the tribe, which combined the virtue of the tribe with 
Islam with Arabhood; The concept was retained over generations from the pre-Islamic 
period. 
Qur'an 57:25 
"We verily sent Our messengers with clear proofs, and revealed with them the 
Scripture and the balance, that mankind might observe right measure". 
Rehber-i Akhlak: 
The Guide to Morals used as a text book in the schools in the nineteenth century, 
during the Ottoman period.. 
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Shari a: 
Islamic law. 
sharifian: 
Arab officers who served in the Ottoman army but opposed the Ottoman officers. In 
the 1910s, Arab officers first served King Faisal in Damascus, supported his Hashimite 
family and were active during the Arab resistance to the British mandate. 
Sheikh: 
In Arab Iraq, either a religious scholar or a tribal notable chieftain. Tribal leaders of 
several clans within a tribe are also called sheikh. 
Sheikh al masheikh (tribal) 
Literally, "sheikh of sheikhs". The chief sheikh of the whole tribe which has a member 
of over fifty thousands. In the thesis 'tribal leaders, sheikhs' refer to sheikh al 
masheikh in Iraq. 
Shia: 
The Shi'a split from the main body of Islam in the first Islamic century over a political 
issue and later developed doctrinal differences with the Sunnis. The Shi'a school 
believes in Ali the 4th Caliph, as the leader of the community of Islam. 
Sunni: 
A school of Islam which puts emphasis on belief in the Qur'an, hadith and sunna and 
umma [Islamic community]. 90 percent of the Muslims in the world are Sunni. The 
Sunnis follow the elective principle in selecting their leaders. Hadith and Sunna are 
oral tradition and the records of sayings (hadith) and behaviour (sunna) of the Prophet 
and the first Muslims. Hence, both are regarded as defining the ideal custom and 
practice of the Muslims. These collections are used as an addition to the Qur'an for 
understanding Islam. 
Tanamat: 
The 1858 Ottoman reforms which included land and educational reforms; They aimed 
at modernizing the Empire by extending the powers of the central authority and 
sapping the autonomy of the tribes and their leaders. 
wag,: 
A Muslim religious endowment. As in the Ministry of Awqaf [plural of waqf]), the text 
of the final draft of the Mandate: Article 6 prescribes: "The Mandatory shall be 
responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Mesopotamia shall 
safeguard (a) the interests of foreigners; (b) the law and (to the extent deemed 
expedient) the jurisdiction now existing in Mesopotamia with regard to questions 
arising out of the religious beliefs of certain communities (such as the laws of waqf and 
personal status). In particular the Mandatory agrees that the control and administration 
of waqf shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the 
founders". Stewart Erskine. 1933. King Faisal of 'Iraq: An Authorized and Authentic 
Study. London: Hutchinson & Co. (Ltd), Part Two: The King of Iraq and His Country, 
p. 123. 
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Japanese glossary 
bakufu: 
Government of the Shoguns, distinct from the Imperial court and from the landlords 
(daimyo) in the local domains. Minamoto Yoritomo set up the first bakufu at 
Kamakura in 1192. Tokugawa Ieyasu opened it in Edo (the present Tokyo) in 1603. 
Literally, "camp office" of the government in the hands of the military class. 
bishi and gushi: 
Bureaucrats who served the central government (bishi) and local government (gushi) at 
the time of the establishment of the Meiji government. 
bukeshohatto: 
The Law Governing the Military Households issued by Shoguns. The first 
bukeshohatto was enacted by the second Shogun Tokugawa Hidetada in 1615. The law 
regulated Bushi family order and identity in relation to the Tokugawa central 
government. 
bun and bu: 
In the Tokugawa period, Article One of Bukeshohatto descibed the way of the arts of 
peace and war, in terms of the obigation of Bushi to devote themselves to balancing 
learning (bun) and the military arts (bu). In the Meiji period, ideal bureaucrat was 
described in terms of 'pen' (bun) and 'sword' or the martial arts of war (bu). 
bunbu-kan: 
Bureaucrats. The literal meaning is: government officials who balance knowledge of 
literature (bun) and the military arts (bu). This bun-bu kan system, together with the 
distinction of social strata between shizoku (the gentry) and heimin (the commoner), 
continued until 1947. The privilege of the bunkan system was then abolished and 
replaced by the Law of the State Civil Service [Kokka komuin ho]. 
Bushi: 
A status group of professional warriors and administrators who emerged in the 12th 
century and continued until 1868; literally, ` Bushi' means "a person who has mastered 
the knowledge of the martial arts (bu) and the world (shi)". Being a samurai was a role 
of the Bushi. 
bushido: 
Literally, the "Way of the Bushi"; the ideal ethical code of Bushi; It emphasised the 
loyalty, based on balanced knowledge, of a Bushi to his lord. In Tokugawa feudalism, 
the old ties of Shinto and Bushid5 values in the feudal society were regulated by 
national ties and neo-Confucian ethics through bukeshohatto and kakun. The feudal 
relationships throughout the Tokugawa period were regulated so that the Bushi (C) 
who owed his loyalty to the lord (B) who served the higher lord (A) did not have the 
right to show his loyalty to (A). For example, when Naruse, who was an eminent 
retainer of the first Tokugawa Shogun, Ieyasu was appointed as an executive retainer 
(karo) of Tokugawa Yoshinao in the Owari domain, he sent a letter to his previous 
lord, Ieyasu in Edo, saying that "from today my lord is Owari Tokugawa and so if he 
revolts against you, I also shoot an arrow to Edo." Thus the concept of loyalty held by 
Bushi was strictly in the context of direct personal relations to the lord of the domain. 
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In: T. Furue kawa. 1958. Bushido no Shiso to Sono Shuhen [Thought of Bushido and its 
context.] Nihon Rinri Shiso Shi Kenkya [A Study of the History of Ethical Thought of 
Japan] Tokyo: Fukumura Shoten, pp. 86-7. This meant that in the Tokugawa period 
feudal relationships between the retainer and the lord were different from western 
chivalry, which allowed a knight to be loyal to more than one lord. 
Daimyo: 
The feudal landlords under the direct control of Tokugawa government and who 
governed over 10,000 koku of rice crop land granted by the Shogun. Each ruled 
domains (han) through their systems and leadership. During the Tokugawa period, in 
1664, there were 269 daimyo domains. 
gakubatsu: 
Academic alliance (gakubatsu). Batsu meant a small but protective and supportive 
status group. Gakubatsu, political cliques (hanbatsu), and financial and industrial 
combines (zaibatsu) emerged in the Meiji period. Each group was originally under the 
control of a single 'family' or state or private institutional group, with or without the 
aid of special state or private groups' subsidies or favours. 
Gakusei: 
The 1872 Fundamental Code of Education. This guided the establishment of a modern 
educational systems. In 1879, Gakusei was replaced by the Education Order, kyOiku 
rei. 
gokajo no goseimon: 
[The 1868 Charter Oath of Five Articles] The Oath proclaimed: 1. An Assembly 
widely convoked shall be established, and thus great stress shall be laid upon public 
opinion. II. The welfare of the whole nation shall be promoted by the everlasting 
efforts of both the governing and the governed classes. III. All subjects, civil and 
military officers, as well as other people shall do their best, and never grow weary in 
accomplishing their legitimate purposes. XI. All absurd usages shall be abandoned; 
justice and righteousness shall regulate all actions. V. Knowledge shall be sought for 
all over the world, and thus shall be strengthened the foundation of the Imperial Polity. 
W.W. McLaren, 1914. "Japanese Government Documents," TASJ XLII. Part 1. Tokyo. 
hanbatsu government: 
An oligarchical faction in the Meiji government based on particular domains, mainly 
from Satsuma (the present Kagoshima prefecture) and Choshu (the present Yamaguchi 
prefecture). The term was critically used as a contrast to government by a political 
party. 
hank& 
A domain school run by a local landlord (daimyo). Among them were the Nisshinkan at 
Aizu and the Meirindo at Owari and Kanazawa, which had long histories, the Kojokan 
at Yonezawa, the Kodokan at Saga and Mito, the Gakushfikan at Wakayama, the 
Meirinkan at Hagi, the Yokendo at Sendai, the Jishiikan at Kumamoto and the Zoshikan 
at Kagoshima. These domain schools admitted people from non-Bushi status groups, 
except for learning the martial arts. 
359 
find& 
The way of human beings. 
jinzai: 
Human talents, or the ideal human resources of skills together with moral qualities, 
according to the position and the role of the various professions. In the late Tokugawa 
and Meiji period, the term was used to urge recruitment on the basis of ability rather 
than hereditary status. 
jitsugaku: 
Practical learning based on the Tokugawa legacy, advocated by Shogun Yoshimune 
and later by Fukuzawa Yukichi in the Meiji period. 
jiya minken undo: 
The People's Freedom and Rights Movement. 
kakun: 
Kakun was a body of knowledge, admonition and moral principles for the family, 
which was transmitted orally from the time of the twelfth century. It is a socialisation 
in the ethical code of family education, applied in each Bushi family over generations. 
Family members' activities and educational attainments include sport and music. 
kangaku: 
The study of Chinese classics. It revived in the Tokugawa period. 
kansei no igaku no kinshi no rei 
A law of prohibition of the study of classical Confucianism and other learning except 
neo-Confucianism issued by 11th Shogun, Tokugawa Ienari in 1790. 
kanson minpu: 
The prevailing attitude "respect the governmental bureaucrat and despise the 
commoner", in early Meiji society. 
kiffi: 
Ethos, spirit or characteristics. 
Kokka Shinto: 
State Shinto. Broadly, it encompassed the state support and regulation of the emperor's 
sacerdotal roles, Shinto rites, constitution of Shinto shrines and the education of 
schoolchildren in a compulsory national moral curriculum. 
koku: 
Unit of measurement of volume or capacity, used generally for rice. In the Tokugawa 
period, a koku of grain equaled about 0.18 cubic metre, 180.39 litres, theoretically 
enough rice to feed one person for a year (chigyodaka). The stipends of Bushi, and the 
wealth of daimyo were all measured in kokudaka [land productivity]. 
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kokugaku: 
The study of Japanese classics and national learning. The term given to Tokugawa-
period restorationist scholarship and thought based on the interpretation of classical 
Japanese texts and literary sources. 
Konica-schools: 
A sect of Shinto (Kyoha Shinto) founded by Kawate Bunjiro (1814-1883)with 
headquarters in the city of Okayama. 
Kurozumi-schools: 
The first recognised sect of Shinto (1876), founded by charismatic Kurozumi Munetada 
(1780-1850) in the late Tokugawa period, with headquarters in the city of Okayama. 
Kyoha Shinto: 
Sectarian Shinto. This refers to a group of thirteen organisations which includes 
Kurozumi-kyo, Konko-kyo, Tenri-kyo and Ontake-kyo. Each organisation originated in 
a revelation from God to a charismatic founder. 
Meiji: 
Literally, the "reign of enlightenment". The name given to the reign of Mutsuhito, the 
Emperor between 1867 and 1912. 
Meiji ishin: 
In the narrow sense, the process of the establishment of the new Meiji government. In 
the broad sense, the process of Meiji renovation from 1868 to the creation of the 
modern Meiji state. The 1868 change of government is known in Japanese as the 
`Meiji Ishin'. Traditionally Ishin is translated as "Restoration". 	 This term, 
`Restoration', stresses the return of power to the Emperor. However, Meiji Japan did 
not only restore the past. By using the term Meiji (enlightened governing) and by 
renegotiating and transforming the past, the Meiji government and citizens made 
efforts to form a new Japan. In this context, Meiji Ishin was a revolution and 
furthermore a renovation of the traditions in the new context. This author thus 
translates the term Meiji Ishin as Meiji Renovation. 
Meiji Kenpo (Meiji dainippon teikoku kenpa): 
The Constitution of the Empire of Japan in 1889: Article IX. "The Emperor issues or 
causes to be issued, the Ordinances necessary for the carrying out of the laws, or for 
the maintenance of the public peace and order, and for the promotion of the welfare of 
the subjects. But no Ordinance shall in any way alter any of the existing laws". In: 
Beckmann, George M. 1957. The Making of the Meiji Constitution: The Oligarchs and 
the Constitutional Development of Japan, 1868-1891. Lawrence, Kansas: University of 
Kansas Publications, p. 151. Article X: "The Emperor determines the organisation of 
the different branches of the administration, and salaries of all civil and military 
officers, and appoints and dismisses the same. Exceptions especially provided for in 
the present Constitution or in other laws, shall be in accordance with the respective 
provisions (bearing thereon)". Ibid, p. 151. Article X 1 : "The Emperor has the supreme 
command of the Army and Navy". Ibid., p. 152. Article LV: The respective Ministers 
of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it. All Laws, 
Imperial Ordinances, and Imperial Rescripts of whatever kind, the relate to the affairs 
of the Sate, require the countersignature of a Minister of State. Article XXIII: 
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"Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not 
antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief'. Ibid., p. 152. 
meiroku zasshi: 
Literally, the "meiroku magazine". This was a series of academic bulletins and the 
public lectures delivered at its meetings published by meirokusha (Meiji Six Society). 
The society was founded by Mori Arinori, Nishimura Shigeki, Fukuzawa Yukichi, 
Nishi Amane and Kato Hiroyuki in 1874 for the purpose of promoting civilisation and 
enlightenment. It played a leading role in introducing and popularising Western ideas 
during the early Meiji period. Its 332 members included some of Japan's most eminent 
educators, bureaucrats, and thinkers. In 1879, Meirokusha was replaced and 
reestablished as Tokyo gakushikaiin. Many of the enlightened scholars from 
Meirokusha joined, as well as scholars in Chinese and Japanese classics. In 1906, 
Tokyo gakushikaiin was renamed and re-established as the Teikokugakushiin (the 
Imperial academy). 
moto: 
A centre of power in the Shinto world. The Emperor was a centre of the virtues of chfc 
[loyalty], ko [the obligation of care] and tei [obedience]. 
kai: 
A meeting or an assembly. Personal socialisation through regular study meetings. 
rangaku: 
The study of Dutch, and of Western sciences through the medium of the Dutch 
language. 
saisei-itchi theocracy: 
The traditional conformity between religious rituals and government, which authorised 
the political and social position of the Emperor as a consequence of absolute divine 
right. 
shijuku: 
Private schools which prevailed in the Tokugawa period. Shoheiko was originally 
private school run by neo-Confucianist scholar, Hayashi Razan. Primary educational 
institutions for the town dweller, terakoya, and the kaitokudo school [literally, "a 
pavilion of opened virtue"] run by the town merchants in Osaka, may also included as 
a type of shijuku. In the end of the Tokugawa period and the early Meiji period, 
shijuku were run by the Confucianists, neo-Confucianists, Japanese classical scholars, 
Chinese classical scholars as well as scholars of a study of Dutch or of western 
sciences including languages. Shokasonjuku was run by Yoshida ShOin who learned 
from Sakuma Sh&an. Ito Hirobumi, the first Prime Minister, and Yamagata Aritomo, 
a founder of the Japanese Army, learned from ShOin's school. Teki-juku was run by 
Ogata KOan. Fukuzawa Yukichi, a founder of shijuku Keio gijuku, learned from 
Ogata's school. 
Shinto: 
The indigenous religion of Japan. Literally, Shinto is the "Way of the Deity". In its 
earlier history, Shinto developed by interacting with Buddhism and Confucianism. 
However, Shintc5 embraces the belief in the divine origins of the imperial family and 
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contains the essence of belief in nature and ancestral worship, in particular, ancestral 
protection, hence the individual Shinto family express gratitude to their own ancestor 
over generations. 
shizoku: 
The new social status group, the previous Bushi group, established by the Meiji 
government (established in 1869, abolished in 1947). Many differences of status within 
the Bushi stratum in the Tokugawa period were de-emphasised. 
Shogun: 
The title, literally "generalissimo", given to military commanders of Japan in the name 
of the Emperor. 
shoheiko (shoheizaka gakumonjo): 
A school for learning neo-Confucianism, established in 1690. In 1797 the school came 
to be run by the central government and to focus on the education of the sons of high 
officials in Bushi families. In 1877, shoheiko was merged into the Tokyo University. 
shashin: 
National moral education designed by the Meiji government. 
Tenn& 
Emperor 
